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Debates over GMOs, vaccines, and climate change are but a few examples that highlight a growing body 
of high-stakes scientific controversies and the manifest difficulties inherent in communicating 
about them. Addressing these and similar issues requires navigating a wide array of competing scientific, 
technological, social, democratic, environmental, and economic exigencies. The development of scholarly 
approaches that can account for the complexity and dynamism of these cases is an essential part of 
ensuring effective, ethical interaction between scientists and publics. In this dissertation, I explore one 
such case, the L’Aquila earthquake controversy, in which seven technical experts were charged with 
manslaughter for failing to warn the public. With the addition of the trial, this earthquake overflowed the 
boundaries of seismology, entangling the public, political, and technical and foregrounding the specific 
challenges of public-expert communication about risk and uncertainty. To better account for and negotiate 
public-expert interaction, my dissertation develops rhetorically-oriented approaches for improving 
communication about risk and uncertainty. In so doing, I explore new synergies among three concepts – 
agency, expertise, and uncertainty – which have previously been treated separately by rhetoricians but are 
inextricably entangled in situations like L’Aquila.   
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“How do we talk about earthquakes?  
How do we even approach them, let alone integrate them into our lives?”  
– David Ulin (2004) 
 
 
Amid the gray, desolate city center, the dug-up pavement, and a maze of scaffolding, 
blocks of color and warmth hang in Piazza Duomo (Figure 1). In stark contrast to the pale, 
fractured façades, this large, vibrant quilt was stitched together from knitted squares of yarn. It 
dresses up the main square, covering the metal barricades that block citizens’ entrance to some 
areas of the city and bringing life to a place that – before the earthquake – used to be the social, 
economic, and political heart of the Italian city of L’Aquila. But these are not just random, 
playful patches providing cozy coverage for damaged buildings.  
This quilt, a part of “Mettiamoci una pezza” [Let’s Patch It!], is one of the first urban 
knitting (or yarn bombing) actions in Italy. This action was organized by five women from a 
local acting company, Animammersa, in 2012 to 1) commemorate the third anniversary of the 
2009 earthquake, 2) draw attention to the state of the city, and 3) protest the lack of 
Figure I: Yarn bombing quilt covering up a broken historic building in downtown L’Aquila: "A red 
zone, wherever it is, it's a national matter. Let's fix it.” Photo retrieved from GreenMe.it 




reconstruction in the three years since the quake. Viral circulation of the project call resulted in 
the donation of about 5,000 pieces from knitters and crocheters around the globe. Hanging in 
contested “red zone” space, this multi-authorial patchwork makes visible the challenges and 
tensions in post-earthquake L’Aquila – how to manage and use city and public spaces, who 
should be allowed in these spaces, who or what can speak, who or what should act, how to 
remember and think about the earthquake and its aftermath. It also specifically calls for political 
action and renewed civic engagement: “UNA ZONA ROSSA, DOVUNQUE SIA, È UNA 
QUESTIONE NAZIONALE. METTIAMOCI UNA PEZZA!” [A red zone, wherever it is, it is a 
matter of national concern. Let’s patch it!] 
 This is quite different from how earthquakes and their aftermath are typically portrayed, 
which is to say, technically. Since 1935, scientists have described earthquakes in the briefest of 
terms: an epicenter and a magnitude, a neat, quotable number that can be calculated from the 
readings of measuring instruments. The first magnitude scale, created by Charles Richter, was an 
attempt to eliminate the need for human observers and their uncertainties. Indeed, the history of 
seismology since the mid-eighteenth century “is traditionally seen as a progressive liberation of 
natural knowledge from the subjective impressions of earthquake victims” (Coen, 2013, p. 15). It 
is, of course, easier to deal with earthquakes as technical objects. Objects, as Bruno Latour points 
out in his rumination on the famous Heideggerian distinction between objects and things, stand 
against or apart; they are “out there, unconcerned by any sort of parliament, forum, agora, 
congress, court…” (2004, p. 236). When earthquakes are technical objects, they stand apart from 
the social, political, and economic. Placed within scientific contexts, the manifest uncertainty of 
earthquakes becomes manageable because it is subordinated to the puzzle, to the normal 
processes of inquiry.  




 But the yarnbombing of L’Aquila is a vibrant reminder that earthquakes and their 
aftermath are not just technical objects. Rather than standing apart, they are at the center of 
gatherings, imbricated in the personal, social, technical, political, economic, spiritual, material, 
and so forth. The Piazzo Duomo quilt, a message placed at the literal center of the city and in a 
literal public gathering space, is a direct reminder of this fact. Challenging expectations, 
“Mettiamoci una pezza” [Let’s Patch It!] asks people to think about and see the L’Aquila 
earthquake and its aftermath differently. It is a reminder that disaster is “a hopelessly hybrid 
entity: inextricably entangling the natural and the social, freighting objectivity with subjectivity, 
and binding global science to local contingencies” (Coen, 2013, p. 3). Earthquakes are not just 
sterile quantifications, and they are not just discourse; they are done and lived. 
As the yarnbombing hints at and as I will show, the situation in L’Aquila illustrates many 
of the matters facing experts and publics – what do we know and what don’t we know about 
particular disaster situations? How do we communicate about events that have a low probability 
of occurring but very high consequences (e.g., earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, 
tornadoes, hurricanes)? How can experts communicate with publics about the changing nature of 
scientific conclusions as new evidence is presented? How can experts and publics interact most 
productively with the press, politicians, and community leaders?  
A case like L’Aquila highlights the specific challenges of public-expert communication 
about risk and uncertainty. Natural hazards such as earthquakes are inherently uncertain; they 
involve complicated systems that are, by in large, invisible and uncontrollable on a time scale 
that is often at odds with human time. While challenging to talk about, this uncertainty can act as 
an intersection for expert and non-experts (Walker and Walsh, 2012), raising questions about 
who should be included in deliberation and decision-making and how to determine that. As 




mentioned above, earthquakes and their aftermath are sites at which the technical, political, and 
public intertwine. These hybrid situations make it abundantly clear that agency is distributed 
among technical experts, computer models, instruments, seismic activity, governmental policy, 
the media, citizens, and more. As the boundaries between these sites and actants become 
increasingly blurred, situations like what has transpired in L’Aquila may become more common.  
The Case of the L’Aquila Seven 
 
Riddled with geologic faults, Italy has a long history of earthquakes and other seismic 
activity. So, the 6.3-magnitude earthquake (and its ensuing damage) that struck the central Italian 
city of L’Aquila on 6 April 2009, while tragic, is not unexpected. Italy does not, however, have a 
history of holding trials over such seismicity. In the wake of the 2009 earthquake, seven 
technical experts were charged with manslaughter for failing to warn the local residents.1 They 
endured lengthy public trials from 2011-2015. Found guilty in 2012, six of the seven defendants 
were acquitted by an appeals court in 2014. This sentence was confirmed by the Italian Supreme 
Court in 2015. Now, more than eight years after the earthquake, the dust in L’Aquila has still not 
settled. Tangential legal cases and citizens’ activism is ongoing. Also, major central Italian 
earthquakes in summer 2016 thrust the spectacle of L’Aquila back onto the global stage as 
parallels were inevitably drawn among the three places.2   
Like “Mettiamoci una pezza,” the trial is further evidence that this earthquake has 
overflowed (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe, 2009) the boundaries of seismology. The 
                                                            
1 I will describe these key events and others surrounding the L’Aquila earthquake in more satisfying detail in the 
next chapter.  
2 As Lynda Walsh (2013) points out, this case should not be written off as a “vagary of Italy’s legal system” (187). 
In Scientists as Prophets, she offers an example closer to home – the federal and civil fraud investigations of 
atmospheric scientist Michael Mann following his publication of the infamous “hockey stick” climate-change graph. 
Similarly, Lauta (2014) argues that there is an increasing trend globally in seeking legal action and criminal liability 
following natural disasters.  
 




indictment, conviction, and now partial-acquittal have elicited international uproar, adding 
earthquakes to a growing body of high stakes scientific controversies – such as GMOs, vaccines, 
toxic waste storage, FDA hearings, and climate change – in which publics must interact with 
experts. While there are certain overlapping themes or concerns among these accumulating 
issues, L’Aquila provides a unique opportunity for study. Seismology as a science is young, and, 
when it comes to earthquakes, rather uncertain with no resolutions on the horizon; it involves 
complicated systems on a time scale that spans billions of years. People hunger for prediction, 
and yet the most earthquake scientists can offer is earthquake forecasting, which is particularly 
convoluted and often delivered in extended timeframes that complicate communication about 
probability. Communicating about these technical aspects alone is inherently difficult, let alone 
accounting for the social, environmental, economic, and so forth. Furthermore, publics may not 
have experience with earthquakes as they would with more common natural disasters, such as 
tornadoes or snowstorms. Despite this, Nigg (1982) shows that people are still likely to compare 
earthquakes to other natural disasters, thus skewing their understanding of seismic risk. 
Earthquakes, however, are increasing in frequency due in part to human activities, such as 
wastewater injection, deep mining, and hydraulic fracturing (Petersen et al, 2016). As the 
unprecedented addition of a criminal trial indicates, the stakes surrounding the communication of 
risk and uncertainty – for experts and publics alike – have never been higher.  
With these exigencies in mind, I argue that the development of scholarly approaches that 
can account for the complexity and dynamism of these cases is an essential part of 
ensuring effective, ethical interaction between experts and publics and a necessary step towards 
saving future lives. Rhetorical scholars have done much work to consider public-expert 
interaction, writing, and other practices in the realm of science. This work has often 




demonstrated a persistent interest in three principle theoretical areas: expertise, uncertainty, and 
agency. As topics of study, these concepts have been taken up by many and in association with 
many different conversations. While scholars continue to grapple with fundamental, definitional 
questions, the discussions in which expertise, uncertainty, and agency have been invoked range 
widely – epistemology, trust, materiality, authority, embodiment, risk, kairos, and public inquiry 
to name a few – reflecting the vibrancy and complexities of these concepts. As I will argue, the 
issues present in this dissertation project are squarely situated within the long tradition of 
scholarship and practice in rhetoric, particularly around notions of uncertainty, expertise, and 
agency (which I will expand upon in more detail in the following chapter). 
Inspired by these conversations, I am interested in how material-discursive situations 
such as L’Aquila can be negotiated by a variety of stakeholders. As I will argue, these hybrid 
situations defy the binaries that are embedded in many of our traditional analytical tools because 
they entangle fact and value, expert and non-expert, human and non-human. Therefore, in this 
dissertation I work to develop methods and frameworks that do not replicate the dualisms that 
are rejected by these rhetorical imbroglios. Given calls in the rhetorical community to ensure the 
broader impacts of our research, I hope that my dissertation can contribute to the development of 
novel approaches that foster public-expert communication about risk and uncertainty. In the 
remainder of this introduction, I will more thoroughly outline the contents and arguments within 
the chapters as well as how each of them relates.  
Outline of Chapters 
 
Each of the following chapters contributes to the development of rhetorically-oriented 
approaches that can more adequately attend to the entanglement of expertise, uncertainty, and 
agency in hybrid situations.  





To begin, I provide a thick description of the L’Aquila earthquake controversy, the 
primary case study through which I explore these three key concepts. A rich site for inquiry and 
analysis into issues of science policy, communication, and decision making, the L'Aquila 
earthquake and its ensuing controversy has been described as one of the more momentous events 
in the history of modern science and also one of the most misunderstood due to factors such as 
disjointed international coverage, the circulation of incomplete, second-hand information, issues 
of language access, and the wide range of settings in which the case has played out (Alexander). 
I use this chapter, then, to stitch together a more coherent narrative of the case’s key events and 
issues – the concerning increase in seismic activity beginning in 2008, the unofficial predictions 
and alarmism prior to the earthquake, the emergency meeting of scientific advisers and 
politicians, the press conference, the devastating earthquake and subsequent public 
outcry, and the ensuing trial. 
I will then use this thick description of the L’Aquila controversy to begin to show not 
only the relevance of expertise, uncertainty, and agency to these hybrid cases but also the 
relationships among them. As I will argue, when treated in isolation, each of these concepts only 
gets rhetorical theory so far in its attempts to address high-stakes sociotechnical imbroglios and 
the manifest difficulties inherent in communicating about them. Specifically, I will orient the 
reader to the most recent developments regarding these three key concepts in rhetoric of science 
and science and technology studies (STS). In outlining this work, I hope to demonstrate the need 
for greater dialogue between these three areas. I will use this theoretical excavation and 
explanation to establish the needed foundation for the case analysis and my ensuing efforts 
to begin integrating these previously isolated bodies of work. 





Chapter two, Expertise as Doing, takes up the challenge of both recognizing marginalized 
voices and leveraging expertise appropriately. Negotiating this tension is especially important 
because of the blurring of technical, personal, and political boundaries. While recognizing 
multiple expert classes, many of the proposed alternative models retain epistemic challenges, 
namely they perpetuate the very binaries (subject/object, culture/nature, words/things) that are 
defied by these hybrid situations.   
One way forward, I argue, is to move beyond the epistemic register and approach 
expertise as doing or practice-based. Therefore, in this chapter, I draw on the work of 
philosopher Annemarie Mol to theorize a practice-based model of expertise. Such an approach 
extends the possibilities for legitimacy and agency and provides a more flexible 
conceptualization that can adapt to these varying material-discursive situations. Turning to 
L’Aquila, I will ruminate on what an expertise of doing might suggest about how to reconfigure 
such a controversy.   
Chapter Three 
Just as cases such as L’Aquila necessitate a reconsideration of the participants in 
deliberation, they also require a reconsideration of deliberative practices and the rhetorical tools 
used to account for them. One of the primary reasons for this is the deep uncertainty in which 
this deliberation occurs. Even though rhetoricians have worked to explicate the nature of 
uncertainty and its distinction from risk, traditional analytical tools often have difficulty 
accounting for the complexity and dynamism of deliberation under and about uncertainty.   
To this end, chapter three, Uncertain Deliberation, investigates a key event in the 
L’Aquila controversy: the emergency meeting of scientists and politicians over whether or not an 




advanced warning should have been issued to the area residents. In this chapter, I draw upon one 
of the primary analytic tools deployed in rhetorical investigations of science-policy deliberation 
– stasis theory. While traditional stasis theory application comes with the side effect that 
complex and messy stasis moments are disentangled and purified into separate questions, I 
employ a “functional” approach that will analyze the dynamic flow of issues in situ (Graham, 
2015). While I must limit myself to one analytic tool, this approach to stasis theory aims to serve 
as a model to reflect on implications for broader issues of accounting for uncertainty in 
deliberation. Accounting for deliberative practices in uncertain situations also has ramifications 
for issues of inclusion and expertise. As I mentioned earlier, the risk/uncertainty distinction has 
been proposed as one criterion for determining participation and relevant expertises. Situations 
of uncertainty warrant a more open (but not unlimited) approach.   
Chapter Four 
As described earlier, hybrid cases require the consideration of “a complete set of new 
actors,” actors that are both human and non-human. Whereas the previous chapters emphasized 
human actors, chapter four, Agency Visualized, considers the non-human and its role in how 
rhetorical agency is perceived, distributed, and fostered. Indeed, the recent interest in agency 
scholarship over the role of objects and technologies and the distribution of agency across 
networks is well-suited for exploring a variety of associations between human and nonhuman 
actors. Continuing this work, I use this chapter to explore the rhetorical, agentive nature of 
seismic risk visuals, such as those referenced in the L’Aquila controversy. I offer agentive 
modeling, a mixed methods data visualization approach for networked modeling of agency, 
applying this method to a collection of technical and public-facing risk visualizations from the 
websites of key seismic risk organizations. Such a method aims to help make visible how these 




visuals act. Through this analysis, I identify potential agential configurations and rhetorical 
strategies in seismic risk visuals. I will show that these visuals most often configure people as 
passive in the face of seismic activity, but interventionally, we need visuals that configure 
humans as agentive, that help them to reduce danger. These visuals mediate how earthquakes are 
thought about and seen and have material consequences for catalyzing future actions and 
realities. Traveling across personal, technical and public spheres, visuals are ideal artifacts for 
unifying agency, expertise, and uncertainty because they can be used to visualize uncertainty, 
construct expertise, and condition possibilities for response or action.    
Conclusion 
In “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?,” Latour suggests that critics should be 
redefined as the ones who bring things together when the personal, social, technical, political, 
economic, environmental, and material intertwine. In that spirit, I use the final chapter 
to synthesize the results of the previous chapters, including a detailed theoretical reflection on 
what the L’Aquila case suggests for rhetorical theory and possible ways forward for 
integrating uncertainty, expertise, and agency.  
In so doing, I also take seriously Ceccarelli’s (2013) call to more explicitly address 
how rhetoricians engage in public scholarship in order to more effectively transform scholarly 
findings into action in non-academic fora. Therefore, an additional purpose of the conclusion is 
to begin to transform the insights from this dissertation into practical suggestions for those 
engaged in communication and deliberation about seismic risk. To offer a contribution to this 
applied rhetoric of science that can walk the path from understanding to critical engagement, I 
describe key practices to effectively scaffold civic agency and the design of spaces of interaction. 




Such a movement to engage in broader areas of science communication is not only possible but 
also part of the rhetorical tradition.  
  




Chapter 1: The L’Aquila Controversy 
 
 There is an old saying in Italy, “Chiedi alla polvere.” Literally translating to “ask the 
dust,” this phrase usually refers to something unknowable. There is certainly much about the 
L’Aquila case that has been unknownable or unknown. As one of the more momentous events in 
the history of modern science, the 2009 earthquake and its ensuing controversy has also been 
described as one of the most misunderstood due to factors such as disjointed international 
coverage, the circulation of incomplete second-hand information, issues of language access, and 
the wide range of settings in which the case has played out (Alexander, 2010). I use this chapter, 
therefore, to give the dust a voice, to stitch together a more coherent narrative of the case’s key 
events and issues – the concerning increase in seismic activity, the unofficial predictions and 
alarmism prior to the earthquake, the emergency meeting of scientific advisers and politicians, 
the press conference, the devastating earthquake and subsequent public outcry, and the ensuing 
trial. I will then use this extended description to demonstrate the relevance of expertise, 
uncertainty, and agency to this case.  
Before the Earthquake 
 
L’Aquila lies in the seismically active region of Abruzzo. A mountainous area in central 
Italy, Abruzzo has a documented history of disastrous earthquakes dating back to at least 1315, 
including more recent major events in 1703 and 1915 (Cello et al, 1998; Guidoboni et al, 2012; 
Molin et al 1997). This part of Italy is undergoing what seismologists call crustal extension; 
eastern central Italy is moving to the north-east relative to Rome. As a result, this region 
experiences normal faulting earthquakes as the land is torn apart. As part of this faulting, in 
October 2008, the area surrounding L’Aquila experienced intermittent seismic swarms, or low-




magnitude tremors. By late winter, several alarming shocks had occurred, but none was powerful 
enough to cause major damage.  
In late March 2009, Giampaolo Giuliani, a resident of the neighboring village of Coppito, 
publicized unofficial predictions of an impending earthquake via interviews with the press and 
personal phone calls to local officials. A retired laboratory technician of 40 years, Giuliani based 
his predictions on increased radon gas levels, which had been recorded by four homemade radon 
detectors he had installed throughout the area. Giuliani predicted that a strong earthquake was 
possible “within a week and probably centered on Sulmona.” On both counts he was wrong, but, 
as word of Giuliani’s unofficial predictions spread, the local residents, or Aquilani, became 
increasingly uneasy (Kerr, 2009). Local officials issued Giuliani a citation on 30 March 2009 for 
disturbing the peace and, on the same day, issued a press release stating that  
Nell’aquilano non sono previste altre scosse sismiche di alcuna intensità. Lo rende noto 
la sala operativa unificata permanente della protezione civile, evidenziando che “tutte le 
informazioni diffuse di altro contenuto sono da ritenersi false e prive di ogni fondamento. 
[In the L’Aquila region no earthquakes of any size are forecasted. The information comes 
from the unified, permanent operations room of the Regional Civil Protection, saying that 
‘all other information contrary to this one are to be taken as false and without 
foundation.’] (Stucchi and Cavallo, 2014).3 
 
Responding to the growing public alarm and the ill-advised press release, Guido 
Bertolaso, head of Italy’s Department of Civil Protection (DPC), called a meeting of the 
Commissione Nazionale per la Previsione e Prevenzione dei Grandi Rischi [National 
Commission for the Prediction and Prevention of Major Risks] (Commissione ‘Grandi rischi’ or 
CGR, for short).4 The CGR is composed of 21 representatives, including experts in evaluating 
geological, chemical, nuclear, and environmental risks. Appointed by the DPC, the CGR 
                                                            
3 Unless cited otherwise, I thank Louise Zamparutti for her help with the translations.  
4 There is some disagreement about the official nature of the gathering on 31 March 2009 (See Stucchi, Pinho, & 
Cocco, 2016). 




typically holds lengthy closed meetings bimonthly in Rome (where most of the then-members 
resided) to provide technical and scientific recommendations regarding public risks (Civil 
Protection Department, 2006).  
However, this specific session was rather uncharacteristic. The meeting was held the 
following day, 31 March 2009, in L’Aquila; it was opened to local and regional authorities; and 
the minutes were made available quickly thereafter. Additionally, the exigencies for this 
particular meeting were both conflicting and, at times, fell outside the stated purpose of the CGR. 
According to the 30 March 2009 meeting summons, the purpose of the meeting was to provide 
una attenta disanima degli aspetti scientifici e di protezione civile relativi alla sequenza 
sísmica degli ultimi quattro mesi, verificatasi nei territorio della Provincia di L’Aquila [a 
close examination of the seismic events of the past four months in L’Aquila and its 
surrounding area, from the perspective of scientists and civil protection agencies] 
(Bertolaso, 2009). 
 
This exigency is reflected in the opening remarks of the meeting as Bernardo De Bernardinis, 
then-vice president of the DPC, states that the meeting was called, ‘con l’obietivo di fornire  
elementi per informare I cittadini sull’attivita’ sismica delle ultime settimane [with the  
objective of putting together the facts needed to inform the public about the seismic activity of  
the past few weeks]’ (Commission, 2009, 1). However, further into the meeting minutes, Franco 
Barberi, vice-president of the CGR and a volcanologist, shared an outline for the scope of the 
meeting that is slightly different from the original stated objectives:  
La CGR si è riunita e si deve esprimere su due questioni: 1. fare una valutazione 
oggettiva degli eventi sismici in atto, anche in relazione a quanto si possa 
prevedere, 2. discutere e fornire indicazioni sugli allarmi diffuse nella 
popolazione [The CGR has gathered to address two issues: 1. making an objective 
evaluation of the ongoing seismic events and the extent to which predictions can 
be made, 2. discussing and making recommendations regarding the current public 
warnings being issued throughout the population]. (Commission, 2009, p. 3)  
 




Other communication between members of the DPC indicate additional exigencies in the form of 
political maneuvering. In a telephone call that was captured as part of an unrelated political 
corruption investigation, Bertolaso was recorded telling Daniela Stati, a regional DPC official, 
that, unlike what he said in his faxed meeting summons, he was calling the meeting  
in modo da stare zitto, subito, qualsiasi imbecille, di calmarsi congetture, preoccupazioni 
e così via ... stiamo facendo questo non perché siamo preoccupati, ma perché vogliamo 
tranquillizzare la gente [so as to immediately shut up any imbecile, to calm down 
conjectures, worries and so on…we are doing this not because we are worried, but 
because we want to reassure people]. (Caporale, 2012)5 
 
Conflicting with the meeting summons, the wiretap transcript seems to be a strong indication that 
Bertolaso and the DPC set out to deploy the CGR as a technocratic method of exclusion, one that 
“shut up” both Giuliani and the public, at great cost not only to the public but also to the CGR 
experts who appear to have been co-opted, perhaps unwittingly, in this exclusionary agenda.  
 Meeting minutes, summarizing the discussion that took place were not available before 
the night of the earthquake. While some have interpreted this as evidence of further 
manipulation, others have argued that this lag time is typical when documents from meetings 
involving several participants need to be finalized.  
Immediately following the meeting, a press conference was convened by Barberi, De 
Bernardinis, Stati, and Massimo Cialente, the mayor of L’Aquila. Two of the seismic engineers 
from the meeting were also in attendance, though they sat in the audience. Exactly how much 
information was shared with the public is unclear. Video recordings from the press conference 
itself did not emerge until after the trial began.  
                                                            
5 In my research, I have come across multiple versions of the minutes from the emergency CGR meeting. There are 
several discrepancies across the versions, most notably the omission of all conversation regarding Giuliani. 
However, the overlap of later versions of the minutes and the recorded wiretap allows me to conclude that these 
additional exigencies were present. 




The four press conference speakers also gave brief interviews. Aired by local TV station 
Abruzzo24ore, Barberi, Cialente, and Stati’s interviews all emphasized the impossibility of 
predicting earthquakes, discredited Giuliani, and acknowledged that while swarms rarely result 
in a large earthquake the possibility could not be excluded. De Bernardinis’ post-meeting 
comments emphasized seismic safety measures, specifically concerns about building safety. But 
De Bernardinis gave another interview, the infamous “glass of wine” interview. While both of 
his interviews were broadcast after the meeting, the glass of wine interview was recorded before 
the emergency meeting, a key detail that is not particularly obvious to viewers (Cocco et al, 
2015, Stucchi and Cavallo, 2014). In this pre-meeting interview, De Bernardinis, in contrast with 
the other interviews, indicated that the seismic swarms were “favorable because there is an 
ongoing discharge of energy,” a claim that was never discussed in the CGR meeting (Woodman, 
2013, p. 55). Pre-meeting De Bernardinis, implying the positive state of affairs, asked the 
Aquilani to “be and remain calm” and even recommended that they go home and enjoy some 
local wine, “a Montepulciano, absolutely” (Woodman, 2013, p. 55).  
Five days later, on 6 April 2009 at 3:32 am, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake devastated the 
medieval town of L’Aquila, killing more than 300 people and generating more than €10 billion 
in damage. 
After the Earthquake 
Compared to other seismic activity in the world, the earthquake in L’Aquila was a 
moderate seismic event with a fairly unremarkable magnitude (Alexander, 2010, “An 
Evaluation”). But, given the high vulnerability level of the area’s poorly maintained and 
unreinforced masonry buildings (many of which are concentrated in the historical city center), 
the earthquake had a disproportionately large human impact. The 2009 earthquake wreaked 




massive destruction on L’Aquila, reducing much of the historic, economic, and social heart of 
the city to rubble.  
Downtown L’Aquila was declared a zona rossa, a red zone; the seismic crater, as it 
became known, was closed to the public and garrisoned by the Italian army.6 In addition to the 
309 deaths, most of L’Aquila’s residents lost their homes and many lost their businesses and 
jobs. Approximately a third were temporarily relocated to government-sponsored tent camps, a 
third were put up in hotels on the Adriatic Sea coast of Abruzzo, and the remaining third found 
their own makeshift accommodations (Alexander, 2010, “The L’Aquila Earthquake”).  
While the emergency response and work of the DPC was praised by some, the Italian 
authorities’ promises for a quick recovery and their top-down approach to reconstruction has 
attracted significant criticism. Reconstruction, by and large, has been held up by bureaucracy and 
corruption. Commentators have extensively criticized the official reconstruction policies for 
inefficient use of resources, prohibitive amounts of red tape, and more broadly, for the political 
exploitation of the disaster, rampant corruption, and misappropriation of public funds. More than 
€2 billion were spent in 2009 on managing the aftermath and providing for the nearly 70,000 
evacuees. Now, eight years after the catastrophe, the seismic crater remains. There are still 
10,739 people living in temporary, government-subsidized housing according to a city report 
(“Popolazione Assistita,” 2016). L’Aquila’s residential neighborhoods are still undergoing 
reconstruction, and the work on the heart of the town, the heavily damaged historic city center, 
has only begun. The Progetto C.A.S.E. and Progetto M.A.P. housing projects resulted in the 
                                                            
6 Seismic crater is an expression that denotes the area affected by a seismic event. Here, it is used to identify the 
urban area of L’Aquila, where the earthquake generated damage to things and people. “Seismic crater” or simply 
“crater” is also often used by the Aquilani, with a more specific connotation to identify the community of people 
affected by the quake and still residing in the area. 
 
 




construction of temporary homes on the outskirts of the city, displacing residents from city 
resources and their homes and disrupting their social and civic lives. Many Aquilani, upset at 
being excluded from post-earthquake planning and decision-making, have led various protests 
and activist movements, including yarnbombing the city center, the “Yes We Camp” and “Last 
Ladies” protests, the “People of the Wheelbarrows” movement, and the “Rubbles of Democracy” 
rally.  
In the wake of this disaster, the Aquilani also took the unparalleled step of bringing 
charges against a group of technical experts from the emergency CGR meeting, now known as 
the L’Aquila Seven.7 Late in 2009, relatives of some of the victims pressed charges, arguing that 
the victims changed their habits (i.e., staying at home the night of the earthquake) after hearing 
the interviews and press conference. In June 2010, the Seven were indicted for the manslaughter 
of 29 earthquake victims.  
Over the next five years, a series of three trials ensued, following Italian legal 
proceedings. The first trial, beginning in September 2011, was held in L’Aquila and adjudicated 
by a single local judge. The Seven were found guilty by the presiding Judge Marco Billi on 22 
October 2012, sentenced to six years in jail, ordered to pay financial compensation of €1 million, 
and banned from working in the public sector. Approximately two years later, the appeal trial, 
arbitrated by three judges in L’Aquila, took place. Six of the seven defendants were acquitted on 
10 November 2014, on the grounds that the alleged conduct was not committed. The seventh 
defendant, De Bernardinis, received a reduced two-year sentence. At the request of both parties, 
                                                            
7 The ‘L’Aquila Seven’: Franco Barberi, volcanologist, vice-president of the Commission of Grand Risks (CGR); 
Enzo Boschi, seismologist, former president of the National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV); 
Giulio Selvaggi, seismologist, president of the INGV’s National Earthquake Center; Gian Michele Calvi, seismic 
engineer, president of European Center for Earthquake Engineering; Claudio Eva, seismologist; Mauro Dolce, 
seismic engineer, president of the Department of Civil Protection’s (DPC) earthquake risk office; Bernardo De 
Bernardinis, government official, former vice-president of the DPC.  




a third trial was held before the Supreme Court of Italy, which is responsible for assessing 
whether any formal errors have been made in the appeal trial. If errors are found, the appeal 
sentence can be revoked and a new appeal trial requested. On 20 November 2015, the Supreme 
Court confirmed the appeal sentence. 
Several tangential legal cases also arose after the L’Aquila earthquake. While the Seven’s 
trial was taking place, investigations into Bertolaso’s role in the pre-quake reassurances began, 
following the release of the wiretap in January 2012. Bertolaso, who at the time was the head of 
the DPC, was cleared of manslaughter charges in October 2016. A number of civil trials, 
connected with compensation requests, are ongoing.  
The indictment, conviction, and now partial-acquittal has elicited fervent worldwide 
international discussion, certainly far more than the earthquake (and its ensuing damage and 
aftermath)8. Following key case developments, scientific listservs, the blogosphere, and global 
media lit up (See for example: Block 2013; Bone 2012; Brown, 2012; “Earthquake Scientists 
Guilty,” 2012; Hall, 2011; Krueger, 2012; “L’Aquila Earthquake Trial,” 2012; “L’Aquila 
Quake,” 2012; Mullen, 2012; Nosengo, 2012; Ropeik, 2012; Smekens, 2012; Wolman, 2014). 
An open letter, signed by more than 5,000 members of the broader scientific community, was 
sent to Italian president, Giorgio Napolitano, in support of the L’Aquila Seven following the 
initial charges. A number of prominent professional organizations, including the International 
Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of Earth’s Interior (IAVCEI) and the Geological 
Society of America (GSA), wrote statements of support for the Italian defendants (American 
Geographical Union, 2012; Cas, 2012; Davis, 2012; Executive Committee, 2012; Holm-Nielsen 
                                                            
8 Overall, the events (and lack thereof) in post-earthquake L’Aquila have gone unnoticed by the global community 
and media. A series of recent 2016 earthquakes in Central Italy, however, has drawn attention back to the city, the 
people, and their plight. 
 




& Tindemans, 2012). In a statement issued following the indictment in 2010, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) wrote to the Italian President: 
Years of research, much of it conducted by distinguished seismologists in your own 
country, have demonstrated that there is no accepted scientific method for earthquake 
prediction that can be reliably used to warn citizens of an impending disaster. To expect 
more of science at this time is unreasonable. It is manifestly unfair for scientists to be 
criminally charged for failing to act on information that the international scientific 
community would consider inadequate as a basis for issuing a warning. (Leshner, 2010) 
 
Reflecting much of the professional commentary and media reporting on the L’Aquila trial, the 
AAAS, in this excerpt, construed the issue as one of prediction, as technical.  
Rather than prediction, the prosecution and the Aquilani they represented perceived the 
issue to be communicative. In a 244-page document detailing the charges, the prosecution 
accused members of the CGR of providing “incomplete, imprecise, and contradictory 
information” and, thus, failing to fulfill their duties as government-appointed technical experts 
serving on an advisory panel (Hall, 2011, p. 266). After gaining access to the CGR’s meeting 
minutes, multiple seismologists have contested this allegation, saying that the scientific 
presentation was “clear, measured, and scientifically accurate” (“Earthquake Scientists Guilty,” 
2012). From the written statements of professional scientific organizations to the coverage of the 
mass media to the blogosphere and listservs to the arguments presented at trial, much of the 
discourse and energy regarding the L’Aquila controversy has been focused on both scientific and 
communication issues. In addition to the failure of science communication, the L’Aquila case 
has also commonly been interpreted as an attack on science, a confusion of roles, and a 
commentary on the conflation of science and politics (Yeo, 2014).  
A Matter of Concern 
 
The development of the L'Aquila case has been a difficult one to follow, both nationally 
and internationally. In light of this widespread lack of familiarity with the details, I have 




provided this overview in order to establish from the outset a more coherent narrative (See 
Alexander, 2014 and Ciccozi, 2013 for even thicker contextual framing). But I have also 
provided this overview to begin highlighting the entangled challenges of expertise, uncertainty, 
and agency. Expertise, uncertainty, and agency have captured scholarly attention in varying 
ways, but there is a notable absence of conversation directly integrating these bodies of work.9  
Treated in isolation, each of these concepts only gets rhetorical theory so far in its attempts to 
address high-stakes sociotechnical imbroglios and the manifest difficulties inherent in 
communicating about them. In other words, the treatment of agency, expertise, and uncertainty 
in rhetoric fails to account for what Bruno Latour has called “matters of concern.” 
A matter of concern exists when an unanticipated event that had been demarcated as a 
technical concern overflows or escapes those boundaries and extends into the public sphere; it’s   
what happens to a matter of fact when you add to it its whole scenography, much like you 
would do by shifting your attention from the stage to the whole machinery of a 
theater…Instead of simply being there, matters of fact begin to look different, to render a 
different sound, they start move in all directions, they overflow their boundaries, they 
include a complete set of new actors, they reveal the fragile envelopes in which they are 
housed (Latour, 2008, p. 39).   
  
Though highly uncertain, matters of concern are just as real as matters of fact; but they are also 
“livelier, more talkative, active, pluralistic, and more mediated” (Latour, 2005, p. 115). The 
move to understanding a rhetorical situation as a matter of concern does not mean forsaking facts 
or accepting relativism; rather it puts facts in a larger context, a context in which they appear and 
are to be judged differently.  
                                                            
9 This is not to say that there has been no conversation, just a limited one. For example, Sauer (2003) utilizes 
research on mines in the US, UK, and South Africa to argue for more complex understanding of documentation 
practices, ones that, in her case, can account for the embodied expertise of the at-risk miners and better manage 
safety in uncertain environments. Madjik (2009) and Kelly and Maddelena (2016) explore how publics acquire 
agency via technology, hinting at issues of expertise. Walker and Walsh (2012)’s article on the use of uncertainty as 
a topoi to invite public participation in science, likewise, begins to bring agency and uncertainty into conversation 
by suggesting the agential possibilities of uncertainty. Callon et al (2010) propose a model for acting more 
effectively and ethically under uncertainty.  




Recognizing their complex and fraught nature, matters of concern require new and 
integrated scholarly approaches. Therefore, in this dissertation, I begin the process of exploring 
new possible theoretical synergies among these three crucial concepts –expertise, uncertainty, 
and agency – in order to better account for and negotiate the rhetorical, material dynamics of 
these particularly sticky science-policy situations in which complex networks of competing 
stakeholders, initiatives, and values intersect. Fully achieving this synthesis will require an 
interdisciplinary scholarly effort greater than any one dissertation; however, I will use a focused 
case study and agentive modeling – a mixed methods data visualization approach for networked 
modeling of agency – to begin the process and open new avenues of intersectional inquiry.  
Specifically, I aim to address the following research questions: 1) How is our 
understanding of expertise and stakeholder inclusion in situations of uncertainty altered 
by contemporary rhetorical theory, with its recent attunement to materiality and practice?; 2) 
How can we account for the deliberative practices in uncertain science-policy controversies in an 
ethical, effective manner?; and 3) Particularly in situations of potentially cataclysmic geologic 
events, how is the perception of agency and communication about risks and uncertainty 
influenced by visualization? These questions guide the analysis of this project and frame the 
thinking about each case presented. 
In the remainder of this first chapter, I will orient the reader to the most recent 
developments regarding these three key concepts in rhetoric of science and STS. First I will 
explore different models of expertise, including those based on knowledge and credentials and 
those based on practice and experience. Then, I will unpack competing approaches to uncertainty 
in the rhetorical scholarship. Finally, I will trace the recent history of agency theory as it has 
worked to move beyond the tension between individual agency and ideological forces, “the 




permanent anxiety over the meaning and potential of rhetorical agency” (Greene, 2004, p. 188). I 
will use this theoretical excavation and explanation to establish the needed foundation for the 
case analysis. In outlining this work, I also hope to demonstrate the need for greater dialogue 
between these three areas. Especially if we are to more fully explore the complexities of these 
concepts, rhetoricians need to more consciously probe the relationships among them. 
Expertise 
In the first case, rhetoricians have given sustained attention to questions of expertise and 
who is fit to speak in deliberative matters. In Gorgias, Plato (through the mouthpiece of 
Socrates) emphasizes the importance of experience and formal, institutional expertise. 
Attempting to counter the mere flattery of rhetoric, Plato argues that without credentials and a 
track record of accomplishment, a true politician cannot lead the polis to the truth in matters of 
civic deliberation. In other words, only through the correct experiences, certified by the correct 
institutions, can an individual be said to possess expertise. This emphasis on institutional 
accreditation over the individual or their experience, what Lyne and Howe (1990) call a 
“structural account,” has been widely accepted by western civilization as the measure for 
expertise. Arising only “after mastering the special knowledge and techniques of a field,” 
expertise is constructed, regulated, and certified by disciplines and institutions (134).  
But scholars have pushed back on this structuralist account of expertise. Responding to 
this positivistic view, which positioned scientists to weigh in broadly on socio-political issues, 
scholars in STS and rhetoric of science, technology, and medicine (RSTM) have, at length, 
critiqued the marginalization of non-expert voices (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe, 2011; Farrell 
& Goodnight, 1981; Gieryn, 1983, 1999; Herndl et al, 2011; Jasanoff, 1990; Koerber, 2006; 
Majdik and Keith, 2011; Teston and Graham, 2012; Wynne, 1989). Arguing for “lay-expertise” 




and the inclusion of all affected publics in decision making is the hallmark of this scholarship, 
which still continues today. This “second wave” of science studies has challenged traditionally 
sanctioned systems of expertise, advocating for a more democratic approach to policy and 
decision making and the inclusion of knowledges located outside of those traditions (Grabill & 
Simmons, 1998; Miller, 2003; Perrault, 2013; Teston et al, 2014). Scholars like Latour and 
Woolgar (1986), Barnes and Bloor (1995), Fox Keller (1995), Haraway (1997), and Shapin and 
Shafer (2011) have demonstrated that scientific knowledge is like any other form of knowledge; 
it is constructed, and thus, does not have special access to the truth. This approach legitimizes all 
knowledge—and flattens expertise.  
Latour (1999) frames this clash between credentialed expertise and the push for more 
democratic participation as the struggle of Right against Might. Tracing this struggle back to its 
origins, he contends that Plato’s credentialed, structural account of expertise (Right) was 
designed to safeguard the political process from mob rule (Might). Plato’s expertise relies on a 
natural, objective law that exists independently of humanity, a move Latour calls using 
“inhumanity against inhumanity” (217). These natural laws (and the knowledge they contain) are 
safeguarded by institutions and institutionally-sanctioned experts, thus deflecting the might of 
the masses and solving the problem (to Plato) of democratic participation. “The Greeks,” Latour 
argues, “made one invention too many! They invented both democracy and mathematical 
demonstration…we are still struggling, in our ‘mad cow times,’ with this same quandary, how to 
have a science and a democracy together” (218). 
In light of this continuing struggle, a more recent trend has been to examine the role of 
credentialed experts in the science-policy nexus (Archer, 2014; Bijker, Bal, & Hendriks, 2009; 
Ceccarelli, 2011; Hoppe, 2005; Latour 2004; Prelli, 1997; Pielke Jr., 2007). In response to 




invented controversy cases like global climate change, Ceccarelli (2011) recommends that 
technical matters should remain the province of credentialed, scientific experts, and that those 
stipulated facts can then be folded into the political process wherein an inclusive debate about 
values can be had. Similarly, Collins and Evans (2002) voice concerns about the lack of “clear 
limits to the widening of the base of decision-making” (237). Like Ceccarelli, they are concerned 
about the consequences of wide-spread delegitimization of scientific and technological expertise. 
While Collins and Evans acknowledge the value of deconstructing the epistemological privilege 
of scientific knowledge and demonstrating that expertise extends beyond the work of formal 
scientists and technologists, they note that this research is more descriptive in nature, and as 
such, does not specify or prescribe how much further the grounds for inclusion extend. 
One line of inquiry in response to these conversations has been the imagining of 
alternatives to credential-based expertise. Lyne and Howe (1990) began this work by 
demonstrating the rhetorical nature of expertise. They argued that the widely accepted view of 
the expert as simply a possessor of special knowledge must be altered into a more complex 
notion which embraces the person’s relationship to an audience as well as to subject matter 
(135). Similarly, Hartelius (2011) offers a framework of expertise as a situated, rhetorical 
construct that blends both symbolic and “real” knowledge. More recently, DeVasto (2016), 
Graham and Herndl (2013), and Majdik and Keith (2011) have proposed practice or experience-
based approaches to expertise. Instead of being based on what is said or known, these approaches 
ground expertise in what is done. It is from these practices that experts derive credibility, 
experience, and knowledge. 
Material and embodied rhetorics have also been used to explore how expertise develops.  




For example, Fountain (2014) has applied this embodied understanding to how expertise is 
acquired in medical education. His study of cadaver labs shows that learning is not just 
epistemological; anatomy students learn “to see, think, and even embody knowledge” through 
bodies, multimodal displays, and vision (124). Working within the context of marine policy, 
Dixon (2016) draws upon Latour’s ontological concepts of mediation, translation, and inscription 
to investigate what constitutes non-credentialed expertise and how to assess its quality in policy 
settings. He conceptualizes expertise as an accretion of material experiences and offers a 
materially oriented heuristic for identifying and evaluating stakeholder expertise.  
Uncertainty 
Along with expertise, uncertainty has been a foundational issue since the ancients placed 
rhetoric within the realm of the contingent. That is, whenever there is pressure to make decisions 
under constraints and uncertainty, rhetoric is called upon. For Aristotle, rhetoric is enmeshed in 
“the contingency of a moment, the motivations of an audience, and the imperatives of judgment” 
(Crick, 2014, 21). Or, as G. Thomas Goodnight (1982) put it, all arguments can be understood as 
attempts to discipline uncertainty: “Whatever else characterizes an argument, to be recognizable 
as such, a statement, a work of art, even an inchoate feeling must partake in the creative 
resolution and the resolute creation of uncertainty” (199). Perhaps most recently, Ulrich Beck’s 
(1999, 2009) notion of a world risk society has brought contingency and uncertainty back into 
focus as an effect of the advancement of technical, scientific knowledge and their attending 
controversies. Compared to the uncertainty of Aristotle’s time, the uncertainty that society now 
faces, Beck argues, has changed. And its severity has deepened. 
With the proliferation of high-stakes controversies (e.g., nuclear energy, 
nanotechnologies, GMOs, Zika, etc.) over the last several decades, rhetorical understandings of 




uncertainty have broadened from a lack of technical information (Doheny-Farina, 1992) to a 
boundary object (Sauer, 2003; Scott, 2006) to varied and multiple topoi (Walker & Walsh; 
Walsh). Despite this evolving understanding, uncertainty is often conflated with risk, as I will 
discuss in further detail in Chapter 3. This inconsistent approach to uncertainty is explained in 
Walsh and Walker’s (2016) insightful review:  
Recent work in technical communication has, for the most part, been done without 
principled, rhetorical frameworks for handling uncertainty. Even some of the finest 
studies of risk communication in recent years have presented negative definitions of 
uncertainty (Sosa, Eppinger, Pich, McKendrick, & Stout, 2002); used the term without 
explicit definition (Ding, 2009; Ding, 2013, p. 133, p. 145); used the term to cover 
distinct rhetorical functions (Ding, 2013); or conflated technical uncertainty, which 
expresses the probability of outcomes, with risk, which assigns values to those outcomes 
(Frost, 2013) (71). 
 
Though their review focuses on research from technical communication, their argument can be 
extended to rhetorical scholarship. Walsh and Walker call for “a more nuanced and pluralistic 
treatment of uncertainty” (71). To demonstrate this point, they describe an array of uncertainties 
– linguistic, technical, scientific, epistemic, rhetorical, sociopolitical. Drawing upon Goodnight, 
they offer a spheres model as a heuristic for locating and tracking the uncertainties of a particular 
rhetorical situation across genres, communities, and forums. They propose that a more granular 
approach to uncertainty will help scholars to more clearly examine the effects of uncertainties on 
risk communication, “produc[ing] better risk analyses and strategies… [and] better-targeted 
interventions” (72).  
 Often entwined with issues of risk, the scholarship demonstrates a persistent interest in 
uncertainty’s rhetorical possibilities.10 Its role in facilitating doubt has been established by 
                                                            
10 For many, the work on uncertainty has been more indirect. For example, Heimtum and Lovelock (2017) analyze 
strategies for communicating with tourists about uncertainty. Uncertainty is a factor in or a condition of the 
rhetorical situation, but it is not being analyzed. Similarly, in Koerber’s (2006) examination of how the speculation 
over the benefits of human milk transformed into certainty, her focus is on the transformation of the medical 
discourse and strategies for responding to scientific uncertainty.  




scholars such as Danisch and Mudry (2008), Oreskes and Conway (2010), and Paroske (2009). 
Primarily, this production of doubt has been characterized more negatively (i.e., use of 
uncertainty to obfuscate scientific consensus about the dangers of smoking). But Heazle’s (2006) 
study of international whaling policy shows how uncertainty can be strategically deployed for 
opposing political purposes. In his case, the role of scientific uncertainty dramatically shifted 
from protecting the industry and its interests to eventually protecting the resource and banning all 
commercial whaling. The rhetorical possibilities of uncertainty to foster action and engagement 
is also well recognized (Sauer, 2003; Walker & Walsh, 2012; Walker, 2014, 2016, 2017; Zehr, 
2000). Others have sought to construct a specific rhetoric of uncertainty. For example, Danisch 
(2010), building on Beck’s notion of world risk society, views uncertainty as a problem of social 
definition and negotiation that requires engaged, rhetorically-savvy citizens. 
The literature also demonstrates a consistent interest in methodology for dealing with or 
managing uncertainty. Traditional approaches advocate settling or reducing technical 
uncertainties first as the best way to provide useful information to decision makers (Pielke, 
Sarewitz & Dilling, 2010). Such approaches have been thoroughly critiqued as impractical in 
light of contemporary risks (Crick, 2014; Keranen, 2013; Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis, 2009; Prelli, 
2013; Scott, Segal, and Keranen, 2013; Wynn and Walsh, 2013). Rhetoricians, by and large, 
have offered deliberative approaches, which support an understanding of context and the 
articulation of common interests, as another way forward.  
Agency 
Finally, issues of agency have a long tradition in rhetoric as well. Classical rhetorical 
tradition established individuals as powerful agents of change. Gorgias, for example, touts the 
                                                            
 




superior persuasiveness of rhetoricians: “For not a single craftsman is able to speak in a crowd, 
on any subject in the world, more persuasively than the rhetorician” (Plato 456). Similarly, 
Cicero in Orator describes the ideal orator as one who has worked to develop wisdom and 
eloquence so that he (definitely he) may be a moral guide. Such an orator – the good man 
speaking well – would be able to stir the emotions of, prove the thesis to, and delight the 
audience via carefully crafted rhetoric (93). From this perspective, rhetorical agency is 
something possessed by an individual human subject, a subject whose persuasive efforts are in 
alignment his intentions. 
However, postmodern critiques undermine this classical idea of agency, emphasizing the 
role of ideological structures and the illusion of agency.  Taking up a Marxist position, Louis 
Althusser famously held that a person’s choices, desires, and judgements are the products of 
social practices. These social practices, or ideological structures (e.g., religious, familial, legal, 
political, educational, cultural) “interpellate concrete individuals as concrete subjects” (115). 
This subjugating is generally unrecognized by individuals, who believe their actions and 
thoughts are freely chosen. Although he presents the idea of interpellation in a linear sequence, 
Althusser makes it clear that “individuals are always-already subjects” even before they are born 
(119). In other words, because of ideology, we are all subjects and our freedom is just a product 
of ideology. This paints a bleak and drastically different picture for rhetoric, one in which agency 
is only ever imagined. 
Responding to this apparent dichotomy, Lundberg and Gunn (2005) argue that humanist 
and postmodern subjects are not polar opposites but offer different explanations of agency. 
Consequently, many scholars since have explored models that entwine individual agency and 
ideological forces. Agency, for example, has been described as the ability of agents to martial the 




structures of authority (Winsor, 2006). In her study of automated assessment systems, Carolyn R. 
Miller (2007) suggests that agency can be understood as a social contract, “as the kinetic energy 
of performance that is generated through a process of mutual attribution between rhetor and 
audience” (137). In her conception, agency is not possessed by the individual but a property of 
the event, one in which an individual must both intend to act and be accepted as an agent by the 
other agents operating in the rhetorical situation. With a shared emphasis on the relational, Carl 
Herndl & Adela Licona (2007) reconceptualize agency as a rhetorical space, as “the conjunction 
of a set of social and subjective relations that constitute the possibility of action” (6). In this 
understanding, agency is kairotic. It is shifting and diffuse, and it can be constrained or supported 
by authority. As their analysis of texts from women’s studies and professional writing shows, 
agency arises from the strategic occupation of subject positions within material-discursive 
networks. Still today, many of our approaches to agency draw upon rhetorical tradition, 
incorporating ideas about the freedom to make choices and take action, while also 
acknowledging social, political, and material influences on individual agency.  
 Another significant arm of agency scholarship seeks to destabilize the focus on the 
individual, human speaker. As Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (2005) points out, speakers may be 
“points of articulation rather than originators” (5). For some, this has meant acknowledging the 
rhetorical agency of the audience to shape the speaker (Defossez, 2016; Leff, 2012). But 
primarily, it has meant drawing attention to the agency of the non-human (Bogost, 2012; 
Bennett, 2010; Coole and Frost, 2010; Graham, 2015; Latour, 1999; Mol, 2002; Pickering, 1995; 
Rickert, 2013). Accounting for human and non-human actants, Karen Barad (2007) defines 
agency as a provisional and radically relational arrangement between objects. Influenced by 
network theory and new materialisms, rhetoricians have also been examining the distribution of 




agency and the boundaries among personal, technical, and public agency (Condit et al, 2009; 
Cooper, 2011; Grabill & Pigg, 2012; Graham, 2009; Keranen, 2007; Kelly & Maddalena, 2015, 
2016; Kessler, 2017; Koerber, 2009; Rawlins & Wilson, 2014; Wolford, 2011; Wynn, 2016). 
While we continue to wrestle with fundamental questions, like what is rhetorical agency and who 
possesses it (if it is, indeed, possess-able), this scholarship emphasizes the “interlocked, organic 
complexity of rhetorical agency” (Walsh et al, 2016, p. 3).  
Embracing the Imbroglio 
 
Thus far I have argued for the need to explore issues of expertise, uncertainty, and agency 
in conversation with each other. I have also contended that matters of concern require new and 
integrated scholarly approaches if rhetoricians are to more ethically and effectively intervene in 
these situations. As I proposed in the introduction and as the above extended case description 
shows, this earthquake, marked by the addition of the trial, has overflowed the boundaries of 
seismology and metamorphosed from a matter of fact into a matter of concern. As a matter of 
concern, the L’Aquila case is a rich site for rhetorical inquiry and analysis into issues of science 
policy, communication, and decision making. Indeed, as a site of inquiry it promises to add 
significantly to the rhetoric of science’s evolving understanding of issues of expertise, 
uncertainty, and agency. With these claims as my foundation, this project will explore the 
interwoven issues of expertise, uncertainty, and agency in a series of cases stemming from the 
L’Aquila controversy. 
Ultimately, I hope to shed insight on the ways in which we can understand and intervene 
in matters of concern by taking a closer look at L’Aquila and seismic risk communication. My 
goal is to better understand the complexity and dynamism of these rhetorical situations. Each of 
the subsequent chapters in this dissertation, therefore, explores entangled examples of expertise, 




uncertainty, and agency in the L’Aquila controversy in order to open up possible theoretical 
synergies among them. Identifying these possible synergies is merely the first step in what surely 
must be an interdisciplinary effort to cultivating adequate rhetorical theory, methodologies, and 
strategies for matters of concern.  
Specifically, in the next chapter, I will take up the challenge of leveraging expertise 
appropriately under conditions of deep uncertainty and distributed agency. As part of my effort 
to develop methods and frameworks that do not replicate the dualisms defied by matters of 
concern, I offer a practice-based model of expertise that extends the possibilities for legitimacy 
and agency while providing a more flexible conceptualization of expertise that can better adapt 
to the varying material-discursive situations of matters of concern. Turning to L’Aquila, I will 
ruminate on what an “expertise of doing” might suggest about how to reconfigure such a 
controversy. While some of this work will lead me into deep theoretical waters, it is my goal that 
the arguments I lay out here will move our discipline a little further toward drawing practical 
conclusions from our complex theories. 
  




Chapter 2: Expertise as Doing 
 
As sometimes happens in the cases of scientific controversies, “the narrative of 
controversy thus produced identifies skeptics as heroes in an unfolding scientific revolution, 
oppressed by mainstream scientists who are ideologically deaf to their appeals and who try to 
silence them so that others are not exposed to their heresy” (Ceccarelli, 2011, p 198). This 
pattern, in many respects, is present in the L’Aquila case. Giampaolo Giuliani, who does not 
hold any scientific degree and has never completed any official scientific training, claimed that 
he could predict earthquakes through the measurement of radon gas variations underground, 
specifying that he could make those predictions between 6 and 24 hours before the event and 
with 80% accuracy. As I have briefly discussed in Chapter 1 and will elaborate on further, 
government officials and scientists did not judge him to have appropriate expertise. Though 
unlike the controversies studied by Ceccarelli, where the skeptics promote uncertainty and the 
mainstream scientists argue for certainty, in this case, the scientists were the ones defending 
uncertainty. Prior to the earthquake, each group worked in different ways to silence and exclude 
him.  
Even after the quake, Giuliani remains a controversial figure. At times, he has been 
portrayed as a local “prophet” who had predicted the earthquake but had not been listened to by 
the authorities. Giuliani’s neighbors, friends, and Facebook followers claimed to have survived 
the earthquake because he encouraged them to remain safe outdoors and sleep in their cars. Other 
people claimed that Giuliani adjusted his prediction only after the disastrous earthquake had 
already happened, and consider him a local charlatan. 
Giuliani’s case, in particular, draws attention to several key issues – What counts as 
expertise? As evidence? Who should and do we listen to? The L’Aquila controversy adds 




earthquakes to a growing body of science-policy decision-making issues (e.g., toxic waste 
storage, FDA hearings, catastrophic climate change) dealing with the ever-pressing dilemmas of 
who gets a seat at the table and what happens once they get there.  
Issues of Expertise and Inclusion 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, problems of expertise and inclusion in scientific, technical, 
and health policy disputes are long familiar to rhetoricians of science and science studies 
scholars more generally. Despite the prominent call in STS and RSTM scholarship for more 
equitable inclusion and a democratic approach to scientific and technical decision making, a 
more recent trend has been to question the benefits of total democratization. This research tends 
to highlight the detrimental effects of unlimited inclusion (Ceccarelli, 2011; Collins & Evans, 
2002; Latour, 2004; Graham et al, 2015). In “Manufactured Scientific Controversy: Science, 
Rhetoric, and Public Debate,” Ceccarelli raises serious concerns about the uninhibited inclusion 
of non-experts in technical decision making, demonstrating that in cases such as global climate 
change the inclusion of non-experts has led to the denial of the scientific community’s consensus 
on the matter. Ceccarelli documents a strategic leveraging of arguments regarding undemocratic 
marginalization by those who would invent controversy.  
Equally concerned about these dangers, Latour (2004) tackles American academia head 
on and questions the value of our now-traditional approach. He argues that “a certain form of 
critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path” (231). Himself included, Latour is concerned 
about the effects of academia’s efforts to demonstrate the lack of scientific certainty, “that there 
is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth” (227). While this effort to show 
the construction of facts was initially an attempt to push back against experts’ privileged access 
to the truth and make room for marginalized voices, Latour (like Ceccarelli) worries about how 




these arguments are being strategically used to artificially maintain controversy and flatten 
expertise. 
In light of these critiques, a call to provide guidance for incorporating diverse 
perspectives in science-policy decision making has been taken up in more recent scholarship 
(Blythe, Grabill, & Riley 2008; Callon, Lascoumbe, & Barthe, 2010; Dixon, 2016; Graham, 
2011; Joss and Durant, 1995; Kleinman et al, 2007; Mitchell & McTigue, 2012). More recent 
work, especially in STS and STP, has taken an explicitly normative turn, recommending specific 
taxonomies of inclusion for non-expert stakeholders (Collins & Evans, 2002) and deliberative 
practices such as science courts or consensus conferences. In a similar contributory vein, 
scholars in rhetoric and technical communication have offered modes of participatory research 
designed to actively facilitate more equitable modes of inclusion and deliberative practices in 
science-policy decision making (Blythe, Grabill, & Riley, 2008; Koerber, 2006). Much of this 
work, however, is focused on developing models for inclusion, not rethinking how we 
understand and evaluate expertise.  
 One notable exception is Collins and Evans (2002, 2007, 2017) normative vision for 
science-policy debate. Broadly characterizing STS, Collins and Evans (2002) incorporate a more 
nuanced notion of expertise, one that admits different kinds of practical and experience-based 
expertise. Their account of expertise provides a foundation for “investigating how expertise 
functions in a time where people are constantly asked to engage with complex technical 
information” (Keith & Majdik, 2011, p. 372). They propose deploying a hierarchy or continuum 
of expertise, so that scholars and policy makers can develop a system that values and 
incorporates multiple expert classes—not just scientists – while avoiding charges of anti-science 
or the dangers of technological populism.  In their first attempt at articulating a model of 




expertise, Collins and Evans (2002) develop a four-part taxonomy of expertise that emphasizes 
the importance of including non-credentialed or experience-based experts, including those who 
may not be recognized by certification. As the terms suggest, these are experts who have direct 
experience with the technical issues at hand but not the typical MD or PhD appended to their 
names. In developing this taxonomy, the authors explore now canonical work such as Brian 
Wynne’s (1989) exploration of Cumbrian sheep farmers. Examples such as the Cumbrian sheep 
farmers demonstrate the manifest need for certain types of experience-based experts to 
participate in science-policy decision making but in no way imply that a public opinion poll 
would generate more ethical or effective results. This four-part taxonomy of expertise would 
later be developed into what they call the “Periodic Table of Elements,” which I will discuss in 
greater detail shortly (Collins & Evans, 2007). Collins and Evans’s model provides a useful 
starting point for deciding who gets to come to the table. While Collins and Evans do not seek to 
entirely bar non-expert classes from deliberation, they divide decision making into technical and 
political spheres. The technical phase emphasizes the production of knowledge about the world 
and provides resources for wider debate/guidance about what is known. The political focuses on 
questions of preference and priorities (i.e., what should be done given the uncertainty/facts in 
technical as well as many other exigencies) and developing policies and frameworks within 
which technical phase takes place. The broader (not just scientific) pantheon of experts 
contributes to addressing scientific controversies in the technical phase, while all stakeholders 
can contribute in the political phase to determine the societal values which will engage with 
scientific consensus in the formation of public policy.11  
                                                            
11 See Collins and Evans (2002), Evans and Plows (2007); Collins, Weinel, and Evans (2010) and Collins, Evans, 
and Weinel (2015) for additional delineation between the technical and political phases. It is worth noting that the 
authors argue that while these two phases may seem to be separating fact from value, we should not take this to be 
the case because they allow for values to be present in the technical phase – just Mertonian ones.  




An important and valuable touchstone in the science-policy scholarship, Collins and 
Evans’ model is not without its challenges.12 Critics have cited a range of concerns, including the 
mischaracterization of a body of scholarship and the unresolved question of how to determine 
pertinent experts (Keith & Majdik, 2011; Jasanoff, 2003; Rip, 2003; Wynne, 2003). However, I 
would suggest that a deeper and unaddressed challenge inherent in the model is its epistemic 
demons, which I will take up in greater detail shortly. Responding to the call to provide guidance 
for incorporating diverse perspectives in science-policy debate, Collins and Evans’ (2002) 
normative model of expertise provides a useful starting point for deciding who gets to come to 
the table – expertise and experience. However, new materialist critiques highlight the epistemic 
challenges of such an approach.  Drawing on the work of philosopher Annemarie Mol, I propose 
that the theory of multiple ontologies and a practice-based orientation can enrich conversations 
about expertise and inclusion in science-policy decision making, particularly in matters of 
concern.  In what follows, I describe the theory of multiple ontologies and the associated 
materialist critiques of epistemological practices in science studies. I then explore the analytic 
possibilities of this theory by applying it to the L’Aquila controversy.  
As a science-policy controversy involving issues of expertise and inclusion, the case of 
the L’Aquila earthquake is ripe for ontological inquiry. It has a material dimension that should be 
taken into account. “Don’t attend to what is loudest, the fight,” writes Annemarie Mol (2002), 
“but shift your attention a little, widen it, and try to see what all this noise is part of” (144). In the 
case of L’Aquila, there is an actual fight, the trial, which has gotten much of the official and 
unofficial attention. But what is all this noise part of? And how could attending to that impact 
                                                            
 
12 According to Collins (2016), a search for the term “interactional expertise” on Google will reveal a flourishing 
secondary literature and citations to Collins and Evans (2002) and (2007) together are approaching 3000.  




how criteria for inclusion in decision making are determined? Applying Mol’s shift to the work 
of rhetoric, S. Scott Graham and Carl Herndl (2013) suggest that “the rhetorical question ceases 
to be ‘What is your disagreement?’ and becomes ‘Where does your problem come from?’” 
(123). Following their suggestion, I will attempt a similar shift in question. Much of the 
conversation about L’Aquila has been focused on words and miscommunication. However, this 
focus on the language surrounding the L’Aquila earthquake has resulted in overlooking how it 
was done. So, rather than solely analyzing the communication breakdowns (an important point I 
will take up in greater detail in the next chapter) between stakeholders in the L’Aquila 
controversy, my concern rests first with the patterns of practices, specifically those pertaining to 
expertise, which shaped and informed the discourse in this instance of science-policy decision 
making.   
New Materialist Inquiry 
 
Recent scholarship in a range of disciplines, including STS and RSTM, demonstrates a 
renewed and widespread interest in ontological inquiry. Responding to Bruno Latour’s question 
of the missing masses, a strong concern for materiality, objects, ontologies, and the concrete 
have come to the foreground under what Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (2010) are broadly 
calling new materialisms (Bennett, 2010; Bogost, 2012; Bryant, 2011; Harmon, 2009; Mol, 
2002; Pickering, 2010; Reinberger, 2010; Rickert, 2013). This embracing of new materialisms 
reflects a shifting of the postmodern emphasis on the linguistic and the social construction of 
reality through language and culture. In other words, new materialisms is a direct response to 
what could be seen as the problem of the perspectival.   
In general, the postmodern position that all knowledge is perspectival acknowledges the 
existence of things but argues that humans cannot access them except through language. This 




emphasis on perspective, according to many new materialist critiques, is a continuation of the 
modernist separation of subject and object or nature and culture. While modernists focused on 
questions of objects or substances, postmodernists rejected the notion that material reality could 
be known and, instead, privileged the “other” side, favoring subjects over objects, words over 
things, culture over nature.13 However, as noted most famously by Latour (1993), in the 
postmodern world of the perspectival, subjects are still divided from objects. Therefore, the 
perspectival, linguistic emphasis does little to overcome the binaries the postmodern position 
purports to challenge.  There are still two separate worlds – one material and one perspectival. In 
the words of Michel Serres (1995): “An idea opposed to another idea is always the same idea, 
albeit affected by the negative sign. The more you oppose one another, the more you remain in 
the same framework of thought” (81). Postmodern theories of paradigms are deeply perspectival 
and peppered with visual metaphors that reinforce these binaries. In an attempt to resolve this 
separation, new materialists have broadly rejected inquiry into the perspectival and its underlying 
logic of representation. Rather than seeing and representing, new materialist approaches 
emphasize doing and intervening.  
Transcending the issues evoked by Latour’s brain-in-a-vat, philosopher Annemarie Mol 
offers multiple ontologies, a strain of new materialisms. Embracing a pragmatic, practice-based 
methodology, Mol (2002) characterizes multiple ontologies as “shifting from understanding 
objects as the focus point of various perspectives to following them as they are enacted in a 
variety of practices [and] impl[ying] a shift from asking how sciences represent to asking how 
                                                            
13 An extended discussion about the postmodern extension of the “two-world problem” can be found in the 
following sources: Bogost (2012), Bryant (2011), Graham (2015), Haraway (1991), Harmon (2011), Latour (1991, 
1993, 1999, 2004, 2005), Mol (2002), Pickering (2010), Rickert (2013).  




they intervene” (152). The theory of multiple ontologies emphasizes that reality is not seen or 
represented through multiple perspectives but is, itself, multiple:  
It is possible to refrain from understanding objects as the central points of focus of 
different people’s perspectives. It is possible to understand them instead as things 
manipulated in practices. If we do this—if instead of bracketing the practices in which 
objects are handled we foreground them—this has far-reaching effects. Reality 
multiplies. If practices are foregrounded there is no longer a single passive object in the 
middle, waiting to be seen from the point of view of seemingly endless series of 
perspectives. Instead, objects come into being—and disappear—with the practices in 
which they are manipulated. (Mol, 2002, p. 4-5) 
 
According to the theory of multiple ontologies, it is not just that there are different perspectives 
on a single object but that there are different, multiple objects: “If reality is done, if it is 
historically, culturally and materially located, then it is also multiple” (Mol, 2002, p. 71, 
emphasis original). Scholars pursuing multiple ontologies all argue, in one way or another, to 
reject the notion of a singular ontology for a multiplicity of realities rooted in and developed out 
of practices (Gad & Jensen, 2010; Graham & Herndl, 2013; Gruber, 2014; Mol, 2002; Pickering, 
2010). As both Mol’s The Body Multiple and Pickering’s The Cybernetic Brain establish through 
extended, careful observations, ontologically-speaking, knowledge becomes a phenomenon of 
practice. The locus of analysis, then, becomes practices – what is done or enacted, not what is 
said or known. Highlighting the importance of practice to multiple ontologies, both Mol and 
Pickering employ theatrical metaphors (i.e. enactment and performative, respectively) instead of 
visual ones. In this way, an emphasis on perspective is replaced with one on practice.   
Demonstrating her praxiographical approach, Mol maps enactments of atherosclerosis 
across various sites of practice in a Dutch hospital, including the surgical ward, pathology, 
hematology laboratory, and clinic exam rooms. Because each site enacts atherosclerosis 
differently, Mol argues that there is not one disease looked at from different perspectives but 
different atheroscleroses. For example, in the hematology lab, atherosclerosis is a deviance in the 




blood clotting mechanism, an interaction between blood and vessels, which hematologists enact 
through experiments, flow chambers, and centrifuges. However, the atherosclerosis enacted in 
the clinical setting contrasts with the chemical details observed in the hematology lab. In the 
clinic, atherosclerosis is pain. It is the weak pulsations felt in a patient’s leg. It is enacted through 
patient narratives, doctor-patient interviews, and physical examinations. In the clinic, where 
doctors interact with people, the practices of hematology and its emphasis on blood, not the 
person, are out of place. In other words, what each atherosclerosis is depends on where it is 
situated and how it relates to other practicalities – practices, instruments, people, complaints, 
measurements – that are “involved in enacting reality” (Mol, 2002, p. 54). Each atherosclerosis, 
however, has a place in the practice of the others; this layering of practice is why Mol insists that 
reality, even though multiple, still “hangs together” (55).14 
Recent scholarship has continued to extend Mol’s praxiographic methodology to new 
spaces (e.g., policy, pain medicine, college organization, disciplines), often with the intention of 
developing models for more inclusive science-policy decision making (Graham, 2015; Gruber, 
2014; Herndl & Cutlip, 2013; Teston et al, 2014). For both Graham (2015) and Teston et al 
(2014), the way forward is through doing. Working from the context of health policy 
deliberations, Teston et al (2014) suggest that a true hybrid forum, an inclusive space where 
issues of science and science-related policy can be discussed and evaluated among various 
stakeholders across technical, social, political, ethical and economic dimensions, cannot be 
achieved when membership is based on certified expert knowledge: 
Indeed, such an epistemological orientation will unavoidably marginalize anyone outside 
the evidence-based medicine mainstream as member of the outside ‘laity.’ This source of 
perspectivalism is exactly what the ontological approach seeks to avoid. Rather, 
eligibility for party participation at forums like the Avastin hearing should be decided 
                                                            
14 See Mol (2002) for a discussion of alignment, incorporation, coordination, and calibration, her strategies for how 
objects and realities hang together. 




upon participants’ experiences based in practices. Such an eligibility requirement 
surfaces the legitimacy of experiences had by more than those who run randomized 
clinical trials. This means that we must shift our notion of expertise, or at least the ground 
upon which expertise is legitimated, away from an anecdote/data divide and toward 
ontological multiplicity” (166).  
 
Unwilling to completely dismiss epistemology but still advancing the new materialist focus on 
practice and doing, Graham in Politics of Pain Medicine proposes what he calls a praxiography 
of representational practice:  
My analysis treats the stated epistemologies and metaphysics of the discussants as 
emergent epiphenomena that arise from their ontologies. That is, just as certain practices 
stage certain ontologies, the discursive instantiation of those ontologies (as beholden to 
2500 years of epistemological/metaphysical inquiry) will necessarily be cast as 
perspectival and representationalist. That is, practices stage modes of being which, in 
turn, encourage the participants to talk about truth and knowledge in ways that are 
operationalized by the underlying ontology” (85).  
 
Working across STS and RSTM, Graham’s approach offers a middle ground between the object-
oriented rejection of the perspectival and the postmodern neglect of the material. Graham does 
not deny language and its associated epistemological focus; instead he places it more modestly 
amidst materialist concerns.  
Building on this scholarship, in this chapter I suggest that the theory of multiple 
ontologies can enrich conversations about expertise and inclusion in science-policy decision 
making, particularly in matters of concern. Specifically, I reread Collins and Evans’ normative 
model of expertise through multiple ontologies.15 Collins and Evans most likely will not agree 
with this. However, the blending of Mol with Collins and Evans, I argue, both productively 
resolves gaps in each other’s work while leading to the creation of something new. What Mol 
brings to the table is a way forward that deconstructs the expert/lay binary without, as Latour and 
                                                            
15 Collins and Evans’ vast oeuvre on expertise includes various versions and revisions to their original model of 
expertise. I will provide a brief overview of the main versions in the following section, but my analysis will 
primarily focus on the three core expertises set out in the 2002 article (and further refined in later articles). These 
three have received the lion’s share of the scholarly attention and are most relevant to the emergency CGR meeting.  




others have shown of the postmodern, reconstructing it. Meanwhile, Collins and Evans provide 
the necessary normative model that Mol’s descriptive praxiography lacks.  Indeed, Collins and 
Evans’ call for a third wave of science studies in which “humanities and science studies scholars 
to work ‘upstream’ of technology development” is aligned with Latour and other non-modern 
calls for the development of practical strategies for “helping manage the uncertainty of post-
normal science and policy formation” (Herndl & Cutlip, 2013, p. 4). Rereading Collins and 
Evans’ model through Mol’s theory of multiple ontologies, I will explore what this approach, 
which I am calling an expertise of doing, might mean for the long-standing problem of expertise 
and inclusion in scientific, technical, and health policy disputes. Specifically, I will look at the 
controversy in L’Aquila, an undeniable matter of concern, and ruminate on what an expertise of 
doing might suggest about how to reconfigure such a decision-making dispute.  
 
An Expertise of Doing 
 
What much of the literature and many of the models for incorporating diverse 
perspectives in science-policy debates are concerned with – Collins and Evans included – is what 
Mol (2002) calls "a politics of who" (166). A politics of who focuses on, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
who questions, i.e. who is, or should be, in a position to decide? Concerned about the 
consequences of unlimited inclusion, Collins and Evans propose one way forward for answering 
the question of who should be at the decision-making table – experience and expertise. 
Recognizing that there is more to science and technology expertise than solely what certified 
experts can provide, Collins and Evans suggest that the who at the STEM policy table should 
include experience-based experts. They (2002) begin by developing a four-part classification of 
expertise as a starting point for assessing which fields of experience are legitimate or relevant: 1) 
no expertise, 2) interactional, 3) contributory, and 4) referred. “No expertise” is important to note 




given Collins and Evans’ interest in demarcating experts from non-experts. However, with the 
more exhaustive treatment of expertise in later articles, some of what might have originally be 
placed in the “no expertise” category by default would now be classified differently. 
Interactional expertise entails having enough expertise to “interact interestingly with 
participants” (254). For example, the scientists in Wynne’s well-known study of the Cumbrian 
sheep farmers needed (but did not have) interactional expertise to work productively with and 
take in the farmers’ expertise. If one has enough expertise “to contribute to the science of the 
field being analyzed,” this is considered contributory expertise (254). Lastly, referred experts, or 
those who have “expertise at one remove,” are those who are able to apply their expertise in one 
field to another (257). Referred expertise refers to experience brought from another field and 
indirectly applicable to the technical question at hand. Collins and Evans compare this category 
of expertise to the experience of having “referred pain in a leg as a result of a back injury” (257). 
I will expand in greater detail on these definitions momentarily.   
In Rethinking Expertise (2007), Collins and Evans expand on this model by developing 
the Periodic Table of Expertises (PTE). The PTE is an attempt to classify all the kinds of 
expertises that might be brought to bear on a technical problem (See Figure 2). As part of the 
PTE expansion, Collins and Evans include several major additions. One key idea underpinning  
this expansion is tacit knowledge, which is socially or collectively held and gained by interaction 
with members of the particular community. This also begins to hint at the distinction Collins and 
Evans draw between analyzing expertise at an individual versus a collective level. As part of 
their continuing efforts to prove that expertise is not necessarily limited to rare, esoteric 
individuals, the PTE most prominently includes multiple additions to the original four-part 
taxonomy. Ubiquitous expertises (such as langauge fluency, how close to walk to someone on 




the sidewalk, and moral understandings) are acquired by all members of human societies in the 
course of normal enculturation. Dispositions play a role in converting latent interactional 
expertise into realized interactional expertise. Specialist expertises are at the heart of the PTE, 
ranging from low (i.e., no contact with specialist community) to high levels of expertise (i.e., 
close interaction with specialist community). This indexing of expertise to the contributory 
expert is, I argue, problematic. Finally, the meta-expertises and meta-criteria are used for 
evaluating other experts or claims to expertise.  
While Collins and Evans’ emphasis on making room for diverse kinds of experts is 
valuable, the apparent focus on a politics of who can still be considered problematic. According 
to Mol,  the trouble with a politics of who is: 1) it overemphasizes creating space for other voices 
without considering what those voices might say if they did get the space, which often configures 
the marginalized wills as “set, predetermined, and clear,” 2) it isolates decision-making moments 
Figure 2: The Periodic Table of Expertises (Collins and Evans, 2007, p. 14). 




from the practices that have been producing them, and 3) it pushes the “power of professionals 
back,” claiming more choices for the publics while limiting professionals to an artificial divide 
between fact and value (169-171). Instead, Mol proposes a politics of what, which is concerned 
not with the differences between experts and non-experts, or in Mol’s case, doctors and patients, 
but with the different enactments of the thing in question: “different enactments of disease entail 
different ontologies. They each do disease differently. But they also come with different ways of 
doing the good” (176). From this vantage, “not going primarily with a politics of who but 
stressing the necessity of a politics of what helps to open up the professional domain instead of 
pushing it back” (Mol, 2002, p. 184). Given their manifest desire to articulate a rationale for 
using the advice of scientists and technologists (instead of just pushing them back), Collins and 
Evans’ work might be productively shifted by a focus on a politics of what, and therefore, a 
focus on practices and doing.  
Though they do not frame it as such (and likely do not intend it), Collins and Evans’ 
description of their normative model of expertise is laced with the ontological. Namely, their 
discussion, particularly of their twin key terms, experience and expertise, hints at the practices 
and doings that are the bread and butter of multiple ontologies, practices and doings that give rise 
to the very epistemologies and ways of knowing highlighted by Collins and Evans in their 
taxonomy of expertise. Opening their discussion of categories of expertise, Collins and Evans 
(2002) “start, then, with ourselves and our practices…,” applying their model to sociologists for 
a familiar example (254). Distinguishing between the first and third waves of science studies, the 
authors note that “knowledge and truth are grounded in scientific procedures; expertise is most 
often grounded in experience” (250). Much like the earlier reference to Graham’s case for a 
praxiography of representational practice, knowledge is, here, rooted in practice. For Collins and 




Evans, the rationale for using the advice of scientists and technologists is also rooted in practice, 
“in virtue of the things they do as scientists and technologists” (emphasis mine, 236). It is their 
doings that warrant their inclusion in decision making. Arguing for scientists’ place in the core 
technical decision-making group, Collins and Evans emphasize their value as people “who have 
actually done relevant experiments…the core-scientists’ special position, apart from their 
possession of specialist equipment, arises from their long experience …” (260, emphasis mine). 
Indeed, as Collins and Evans note, the term experience-based expertise, in this situation, refers to 
specialist abilities (238).  
Of course, Collins and Evans are not only concerned with the place of scientists. 
Revisiting Wynne’s discussion of the Cumbrian sheep farmers, Collins and Evans note the 
contributory expertise that the farmers possess. This expertise comes not from credentials but 
from their experiences and practices as farmers: “Those who actually do it (who have 
contributory expertise) might have more relative merit as judges of scientific value than critics” 
(244). Again, in their differentiation between political and technical spheres of decision making, 
Collins and Evans argue that technical decision-making rights are meritocratic (262). In other 
words, inclusion is based on what has been done.  
 Similarly, I propose that the types of expertise put forth by Collins and Evans are better 
understood as distinct ontologies. As Collins and Evans rightly note, expertise is multiple. 
However, these expertises are not simply different perspectives but different ways of doing and 
practicing expertise. And it is from these practices that experts derive credibility, experience, and 
knowledge. In other words, what experts know is based in what they do (or don’t do). A closer 
examination of Collins and Evans’ descriptions of expertise shows invocations of experience and 
practices. Interestingly, very rarely do Collins and Evans comment on what knowledge each 




class of experts should possess; rather, as I will show, they identify experts by what they can do 
or how those particular types of experts would behave or act.  
Contributory Ontology 
The contributory ontology is described as being able to contribute to the field. In other 
words, this way of doing expertise entails specific, skilled participation in the domain of their 
expertise. More than simply theorizing, contribution occurs through practices such as writing 
papers, presenting at conferences, running and reporting on experiments, and building new 
instruments. An expert staging this ontology is distinguished by his or her technical abilities and 
practices, his or her ability to do a particular kind of science. Collins and Evans’ understanding 
of this expertise has remained relatively stable across their publications; they describe it as “the 
standard meaning of technical expertise” (2015, p. 105). Collins and Evans further claim that all 
contributory experts are also interactional experts (because they have mastered both the language 
and the practices of the domain), though potentially only latently depending on their reflective 
and interactive abilities as I will discuss below.   
Interactional Ontology 
The interactional ontology is first described as interacting interestingly with participants 
in the 2002 article, a treatment that Collins and Evans (2015) later call superficial. This 
definition is something they continue to elaborate on many times over in their various 
publications. Collins (2004) describes it in more detail as the ability to converse expertly about a 
practical skill or expertise without being able to practice it. It is “developed through linguistic 
interaction without full scale practical immersion in a culture” (Collins, Evans, Ribero, & Hall, 
2006). In other words, learning a language in order to facilitate interaction. Examples include 
sociologists (such as Collins himself while doing fieldwork with gravitational wave physicists), 




ethnographers, peer reviewers, high-level journalists, non-player sports coaches, and a specific 
case of AIDS treatment activists. These experts have no access to the material culture of a 
domain except as represented in discourse (Collins, Evans, & Gorman, 2007). While this 
particular ontology may initially appear to be the most heavily language-based, as noted by 
Collins and Evans (2002, 2007), a step back will show that this language and discourse is 
grounded in practice. Or rather, it is a practice, as even Collins and Evans recognize on occasion:  
“Indeed, wherever readers see the word ‘language’ they should understand something like 
‘linguistic practice’” (Collins & Evans, 2015; see also Collins, 2011; Collins & Evans, 2017). 
But even more so, in addition to knowing the linguistic practices of a domain of contributory 
expertise, an expert staging an interactive ontology is also engaging in various practices needed 
to occupy such a position and acquire that linguistic knowledge in the first place. Effective 
interactional expertise requires a deep familiarity and level of access, which requires its own 
kind of practices to achieve.   
As mentioned above, Collins and Evans claim that interactional expertise can be latent or 
realized. The difference, they say, depends on one’s interactive and reflective abilities, which 
includes a variety of skills and ways of being or interacting with others (human and non-human), 
including such practices as active listening, turn-taking, collaborating, delegating/directing, 
relationship-building, and conflict management. In other words, someone with contributory 
expertise could learn to become more articulate (a skill that is generalized across domain areas), 
thus enabling him or her to better express the content/domain knowledge s/he already possesses. 
This latent/realized distinction is important for Collins and Evans’ model because of the 
language/practice divide that sets contributory expertise apart as well as their overall indexing of 
all expertises to contributory expertise. But, particularly under a practice-based model, this 




distinction between latent and realized becomes irrelevant. The abilities that Collins and Evans 
describe, even if they are not specific to one contributory expertise domain, are integral to 
actually practicing an interactional ontology. There is no interactional expertise if one cannot 
actually interact interestingly. Thus, for my purposes moving forward, when I speak of 
interactional expertise, I am only referring to what Collins and Evans have called “realized.”  
Referred Ontology 
The referred ontology is described as being able to indirectly apply contributory expertise 
from one domain to another. Later classified as a meta-expertise in the PTE, referred expertise 
involves judging between competing expertises and experts, an ability that is predicated on 
earlier experiences or work on projects of a similar kind but with different technical contents. 
Staged by the practices of transfer or coordination, Collins and Evans compare this way of doing 
expertise to the work of managers or leaders of large scientific projects, who will not possess 
contributory expertise in all of the fields of science they must coordinate.16 Referred expertise 
does not require that an expert have specific knowledge or even the specific technical abilities of 
the various sciences they are overseeing; rather, this ontology values “experience of contributory 
expertise in some related science” (2002, p. 257). This puts them in the position to understand 
what is involved in making a contribution to the fields of the experts they are leading at one 
remove, so to speak. For example, they may know how much to discount technical arguments 
because they will have seen seemingly incontestable arguments turn out to be contestable (2007, 
p. 66). In this ontology, where the technical contents are not shared, it is most clear that what 
transfers (and thus what marks this ontology) is practice.  
                                                            
16 See the appendix in Collins and Sanders (2007) for a non-science example of referred expertise – the case of the 
plumber.  




It is worth noting that while I am excited about the possibilities of bringing multiple 
ontology theory to bear on questions of expertise, I also want to proceed cautiously. To apply 
“doing” as a flat, all-encompassing term could lead us back to the problem of extension (i.e., the 
flattening of expertise and the problem of too much democracy discussed earlier), only through a 
performative doorway. Are all patterns of doing ontological practices? And can any practice 
constitute expertise? After arguing for the existence of experience-based expertise, Collins and 
Evans (2002) recognize that “experience, however, cannot be the defining criterion of expertise. 
It may be necessary to have experience in order to have experience-based expertise, but it is not 
sufficient” (251). I would agree that not all experiences (or doings) can be used to claim 
expertise. This only further highlights the need for practical methods for evaluating claims to 
expertise, a need that Collins and Evans (2003) acknowledge is unmet by their original 
taxonomy, though they later attempt to provide some possibilities for doing so (Collins & Evans, 
2007; Collins & Weinel, 2011). As I will discuss in the following sections as I apply an expertise 
of doing to the L’Aquila case, the performative orientation of multiple ontologies offers some 
possibilities for regulating what counts as practice-based expertise in science-policy deliberation.  
 
Enacting Expertise and Earthquakes 
 
Referring to communication about seismic activity, Thomas Jordan, director of the 
Southern California Earthquake Center at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles 
and chair of the International Commission on Earthquake Forecasting for Civil Protection 
(ICEF), which reviewed the L'Aquila events in a report released in 2011, said, “It has to be done 
right, and it was not in L’Aquila” (Hall, 2011, p. 267, emphasis mine). Jordan’s comment, 
though perhaps not intentionally, highlights the doing or the practices involved in this 
controversy, rather than what was said. But who does (or should do) the doing? And what does 




the doing depend on? According to Mol’s theory of multiple ontologies, “events are made to 
happen by several people and lots of things” (25). In the case of L’Aquila, the 2009 earthquake is 
in fact different earthquakes because each stakeholder (i.e. Giuliani, scientists, government 
officials, the Aquilani) has different, site-specific ways of doing earthquakes. Language is a part 
of that, but it is not the only part. As Graham and Herndl point out, the revised “where” question 
includes the original “what” query, implying that “patterns of talk are informed by patterns of 
practice” (14). In other words, communication is shaped by practice. A more complete picture of 
the controversy in L’Aquila can be obtained by considering the practices that shape the discourse 
and the available expertises.  
 That said, as Collins and Evans so carefully emphasize, the valuable work of description 
and deconstruction are not enough. Scholars also need to work upstream, to use Collins and 
Evans’ term. To this end, I suggest applying an expertise of doing model to L’Aquila, a decision-
making scenario whose global controversy and noise suggests that it may have been done wrong. 
What might such an approach mean for issues of expertise? Does an expertise of doing add 
anything useful to the conversations encircling L’Aquila? What could such a model suggest 
about how to reconfigure long-standing problems of expertise and inclusion in scientific, 
technical, and health policy disputes? Novel problems may require input from different 
assemblages of technical and experiential domains. Without procedures for effectively assessing 
relevant and necessary expertises for a particular situation, debate and decision making will, 
more than likely, default to the traditional pantheon of experts, and novel data and modes of 
thinking may be overlooked at great cost. While it is not my intention to level a value judgment 
about who should have been included in the decision-making process surrounding the 2009 
earthquake, I am confident in recommending the establishment of better—clear and 




transparent—procedures for evaluating issues of expertise and inclusion. However, I differentiate 
this from pre-established inclusion criteria. The CGR and other similar organizations devoted to 
managing risk and informing the public may well benefit from pre-established inclusion 
management procedures, which, in turn, can provide guidance about who should or should not be 
included. Indeed, such revisions to the decision-making process seem to be both a necessary 
response to the human loss suffered at L’Aquila and a necessary step towards saving future lives.  
 While I acknowledge that an emphasis on an expertise of doing works particularly well 
in moments of criticism about past events, such a model can also be productive for future, as-of-
yet-to-occur crises. As I will discuss shortly, an understanding of expertise as practice-based 
includes accounting for social practices, such as deliberation. In this sense, an expertise of doing 
functions less as an analytical heuristic for past crises and more as a guide for developing and/or 
revising inclusion management procedures that can be set in place in advance of potential crises. 
An “Expertise of Doing” Applied 
The L’Aquila earthquake and its ensuing controversy has played out in a wide range of 
discursive settings which have included a scientific commission, an indictment hearing, a trial, 
an appeals process, the popular press, the blogosphere, and the epistolary work of scientific 
organizations like the AAAS. A thorough accounting of the entire L’Aquila earthquake 
controversy would require far more space than is available in a single chapter. As such I will 
confine my analysis of expertise to the primary cluster of decision-making events surrounding 
the earthquake – the 31 March 2009 Emergency Meeting of the CGR and subsequent press 
conference.  
As I described earlier in this chapter, Collins and Evans, even in their first iteration of a 
normative model of expertise, emphasize two spheres of decision making – the technical and 




political. Being able to identify which kind of decision making is happening is important in their 
scheme because it dictates several facets about how the decision making occurs, including what 
expertises are relevant and who should be included. This aspect of their model is a well-meaning 
attempt to curtail the problem of extension; however, it is an ideal division. Many decision 
making situations, not least of all matters of concern, are not (and cannot be) so neatly divided 
into technical and political decision making. The emergency CGR meeting provides one such 
example of how the technical and political are often more muddled, a point I will demonstrate in 
more detail in the following chapter.  
 The primary exigencies for the emergency meeting of the CGR revolve around the 
activity of one local personality—Giampaolo Giuliani. Though Giuliani is not invited to or 
included in the meeting, his claims to contributory expertise are interrogated and responded to by 
those at the meeting. As stated earlier, this exigency is initially masked by technical questions 
about seismic activity. A self-proclaimed expert, Giuliani clearly sees himself as having 
contributory expertise. He is self-published on topics relating to earthquake prediction models 
and has been invited to speak formally to other geologists about his methods. For him, seismic 
activity is enacted through his four homemade radon detectors. In other words, when materiality 
and practices are foregrounded, the visibility of seismic activity is dependent on the radon 
detectors (and, the website that displays the real-time measurements, for that matter). In the 
weeks preceding 6 April 2009, the radon detectors measured increases in radon gas levels, which 
informed Giuliani’s predictions. Here, the earthquake was enacted as increased levels of radon 
gas. While these methods are contested (and even rejected) by many in the geologic community, 
Giuliani is engaging in scientific practices and processes. Taking into consideration the strong 
skepticism of other seismologists about Giuliani’s status as a contributory expert, it may be more 




plausible that he demonstrates referred expertise. His ability to conduct radon measuring 
experiments seems to speak to the transfer of laboratory skills and other experience running 
experiments (though in the context of particle and astrophysics) in keeping with the definition of 
this type of ontology. 
 Approaching expertise more broadly, as practice-based, not only makes room for but 
also requires evaluation of claims to expertise such as Giuliani’s. He clearly engages in a unique 
set of practices, which may or may not warrant his inclusion. Indeed, his very public predictions 
force the question of legitimacy. Removing certified knowledge as the basis for identifying 
necessary expertises (and thus potentially opening wide the doors to include any and all) has 
troubled many scholars, including Collins and Evans. Indeed, questions of who is right and 
wrong may seem to grow quite muddled in light of a practice-based approach to expertise.  
 However, this concern about unlimited inclusion (and the loss of the ability to accuse 
others of being flat wrong about technical matters) can be mediated by drawing on the dual 
facets of practice-based expertise. As Zoltan Majdik and William Keith (2011) argue, enacting 
expertise as practice involves both individual, material practices, (i.e., regular enactment of 
skills, knowledge, and/or behaviors) and social ones (i.e. deliberation, evaluation, validation, 
acceptance) (278). In other words, individual practices alone are not sufficient to endorse a claim 
to expertise or inclusion. Social agreement, and the ability to “articulate reasons for – thus 
operating under a requirement to socially validate and legitimize – an individual’s enactment of 
expertise” are necessary (Majdik & Keith, 2011, p. 279).17 Keith and Majdik (2011) further 
elaborate this point, proposing that expertise can be understood as expert argumentation, in the 
                                                            
17 While Majdik and Keith’s point is well-taken, the question remains, however, to whom should this be 
articulated? 




“ability to make a case for a particular definition of problem or solution” (374). An expertise of 
doing, then, includes a discursive-material element that distinguishes between experts and others. 
 In her discussion of manufactured controversies, Ceccarelli (2011) provides further 
support for the importance of deliberation. She argues that outright dismissal of, say, climate 
change deniers, is doubly harmful to technical experts because it concedes the debate and 
confirms any charges of the close-mindedness of expert groups. A more promising strategy, she 
suggests, is to enact more deliberative practices – engage the opponent’s claims but, after 
refuting the most critical charges, shift the deliberation ‘from questions of fact, definition, and 
cause to the questions of value and policy that are the driving force behind the public debate’ 
(217). Instead of competing for scientific expertise, participants become fellow citizens debating 
policy. 
 Deliberation has long been held to be a strengthening, valued feature of democratic 
practices, but little, if any, such deliberation over necessary expertises occurred in L’Aquila. The 
technocratic deployment of the CGR as a censoring and exclusionary tactic is a drastically 
different way of adjudicating Giuliani’s implicit claims to expertise. Giuliani’s case exemplifies 
the need for and importance of a linguistic layer for evaluation of the legitimacy of practices and 
determining which expertises are necessary.  
While there is much debate surrounding the function Giuliani should be allowed to play, 
the most clear-cut example, perhaps, of contributory ontologies is the seismologists and 
geophysicists of the CGR. Given the technical questions about seismic activity and the feasibility 
of prediction practices at hand, it is unsurprising to find such traditional contributory expertises 
at the emergency meeting. Instead of fluctuating gas emissions, the scientists enact seismic 
activity as releases of energy, measured in magnitudes, and peak ground acceleration, measured 




by local ground movement, as clusters, swarms, and temblors. Their ontologies make 
earthquakes visible through maps, charts, and graphs, which synthesize the data collected by 
various monitoring tools (e.g., creepmeters, tiltmeters, strainmeters, modeling software, satellite 
images, and seismometers). Seismic activity is a matter of measurements, statistics, and 
probability. The INGV, through their map of earthquake hazard, enacts earthquakes through 
color. The darker the color (i.e., blues, purples), the more doing of earthquakes. It was to these 
practices of mapping, charting, and graphing that the scientists at the CGR meeting pointed when 
discussing the potential existence of an earthquake. In fact, the first CGR speaker immediately 
presented a list of recorded magnitudes of recent L’Aquila shocks (Commission 2).  
 In addition to the geologists, the CGR also included three members with engineering 
backgrounds (seismic, civil, and hydraulic). Depending on the technical question at hand, the 
role of these men shift. On the one hand, as practicing or trained engineers, they can offer 
contributory expertise if the question is, for example, one of structural soundness or building 
safety in light of seismic activity. But they do not necessarily have the contributory expertise to 
answer questions about the nature of earthquakes or earthquake forecasting, the likes of which 
were a central focus of the emergency meeting. In such instances, they could, however, function 
as referred experts. While the degree of difference or separation may vary by case and 
subspecialty, the purposes and technical content of engineering are necessarily different from 
geology. Whereas scientists’ work is often about discovering, engineers’ emphasis is generally 
on designing or solving a specific problem. Engineers do not necessarily work to discover the 
mechanisms of a particular process, but they certainly work to discover how to account for or 
counter them. Indeed, because the work of engineering often requires one to integrate knowledge 
from many scientific disciplines, it is highly plausible that engineers could and do learn about 




and interact interestingly with scientists such as geologists. Additionally, whereas geologists 
work within a geologic conception of time, engineers must account for and work within human 
time scales. But, like geologists, they deploy similar kinds of skills and practices in their work on 
projects of a similar kind. And, perhaps most important to being a referred expert, these CGR 
engineers have the experience of contributory expertise in subspecialties that are neighbor to the 
earth sciences.   
These shared practices shaped what and how the scientists (and engineers) communicated 
about L’Aquila’s seismic activity. The earthquake was enacted through practices generally 
purported to be objective ways of knowing – scientifically-tested methods of data collection, 
number-crunching statistics, measurement tools.18 Sticking to their particular strain of 
contributory expertise, the scientists functioned as reporters of these observations and facts, 
making objective statements and passing the information on to the government officials. The 
noted uncertainty in their language may also be a reflection of the statistics and probabilities they 
use to know earthquakes. Shaped by their ontologies, the scientists were not particularly in a 
position to make clear-cut answers or predictions, much less policy decisions.  
Removed from the contributory ontologies of the scientists, the members of the DPC 
involved in the L’Aquila controversy do earthquakes in a different way. Earthquakes, for the 
DPC, mean private meetings, telephone calls, and enacting pre-set risk communication 
                                                            
18 With the rise of experimental science in the 17th century, scientists’ authority and credibility was built on being 
unbiased, rational, and invisible, a practice that Donna Haraway (1997) calls being a modest witness. Science was 
done by mirroring reality, and scientists acted as “authorized ventriloquists for the object world” (Haraway 23). 
Through the 19th century, the dominant model of science’s work was linear; science was to discover how nature 
worked and then hand it off to the civic arena. Following the science-related horrors of WWII (e.g., atomic bomb, 
eugenics), this division of labor, and its implied separation of fact from value, was further reinforced (Walsh 36-38). 
Though much STS and rhetoric of science scholarship has demonstrated that science and scientists are not 
objective, removed witnesses, this is still a practice the discipline strives for and values. Such a disciplinary practice 
would certainly have shaped, and potentially constricted, the ways in which the scientists of the L’Aquila Seven 
responded.  




procedures; it also means holding public press conferences. Bertolaso, head of the DPC, 
described the earthquake to Stati, a regional official, as “a public relations event,” a phrase that 
both capture the doing present (i.e. event) and the relational nature of the doing (Caporale, 2012). 
Here, earthquakes are enacted as announcements, official warnings, press releases, and “policy 
responses” (Commission, 2009, p. 4). They are also, for government officials, done as risk 
assessments. Earthquakes are particular kinds of calculations (economic, ethical, logistical, 
political, etc.), estimations, and probabilities. They are costs. Indeed, earthquakes done as 
emotional, financial, or political costs could explain why the DPC was so invested in reassuring 
or calming the public. What these practices indicate is that, when it comes to matters of policy or 
risk management, the DPC could be considered to have contributory expertise. But in a technical 
conversation about earthquake science, like in the emergency CGR meeting, they do not.  
Whereas the scientists’ particular contributory ontologies tend to relegate them to the 
technical matters, the DPC members are generally admitted to both technical and political 
arenas. The governmental officials, from both regional and national levels, are located in 
multiple spaces. They have access to the scientific practices and technical conversations, but they 
also are located in a public/political arena that enacts earthquakes differently. They move among 
the primary stakeholders, which indicates that they, to a certain degree, experience earthquakes 
in shared ways with the other stakeholders. But their movement is also a particular way of doing. 
The practice of bringing technical content about earthquakes into the context of public policy 
ultimately rests with the DPC. In theory, all of these positions and practices suggest that the DPC 
would be the most likely site for interactional ontologies. I say likely because the reconstruction 
of the events and the ongoing controversy is evidence that interactional expertise was 
demonstrated by no one. This is most surprising for two men, de Bernardinis and Dolce, who 




were both CGR and DPC members and thus most familiar with both groups and best positioned 
to interact interestingly. But, the DPC epically fails to communicate the scientific message of 
uncertainty to the Aquilani. That they did not satisfactorily resolve issues at the procedural level 
(hence the trial) may be due to their positions and practices not just as risk assessors or policy 
makers but also as spokespeople. For example, at press conferences, media correspondents often 
seek yes/no answers, simplified information, and sound bites as a result of how they enact 
earthquakes, thus shaping the communication.  
A Seat at the Table? 
 Across the various spaces and events surrounding the L’Aquila earthquake, the residents 
of L’Aquila are, by in large, absent. Sometimes invoked, they are generally off-stage and limited 
to being receivers of technical and policy decisions. Indeed, the decision-making forums 
deployed in this case do not particularly make room for them at the table. Likewise, Collins and 
Evans caution against unfiltered inclusion. While not opposed to including lay persons with 
expertise, they are quite clear in their stance that just because some lay persons might gain 
expertise does not mean that they can be broadly considered experts. In all of this discussion of 
expertise and doing, the question of the public’s role remains. What, if any, expertise might the 
citizens of L’Aquila have?  
 As I said at the beginning of this chapter, it is not my intention to level a value judgment 
about who should be included. And I am still slightly cautious about doing so for fear of going 
down the well-worn rabbit hole of Mol’s politics of who. But I am hoping that by considering 
more specifically who should or should not have been given a seat at the table, it will allow for a 
broader reflection on the nature of the case itself and the rationale underpinning different 
configurations of inclusion.  




Many have suggested that Giuliani should have been included at the decision-making 
table – or at least listened to – because he was “right.” True, Giuliani’s prediction did come to 
pass, but he was, arguably, more lucky than he was right. Reliable earthquake prediction, 
especially at the level of precision that Giuliani was operating at, is widely acknowledged by the 
scientific community as not presently possible. Moreover, if a criterion for inclusion is rightness, 
it would seem to be more of a return to epistemic grounds and concerns, not ontological, 
practiced-based ones. If we look to see who is right and who is wrong, I worry that the doings 
that lead to that rightness or wrongness would be obscured. By describing the case’s primary 
question as a binary -- “Is there going to be an earthquake or is there not?” – L’Aquila is framed 
as a matter of fact.  And as a matter of fact, Giuliani may be allowed in but the people of 
L’Aquila are, necessarily, excluded and deemed to have no pertinent expertise.  
But as I have argued in Chapter 1, the L’Aquila controversy should not be construed as a 
matter of fact but as a matter of concern. Interpreting L’Aquila as a matter of concern authorizes 
certain responses or ways of handling the situation that are missed when it is treated as a matter 
of fact. As I will show in the next chapter, the deliberation in L’Aquila is not necessarily about 
epistemic issues rather than values. In short, I will show that fact and value may not be neatly 
separated but can be in dynamic, often nested relationships within the flow of debate. I argue that 
the CGR’s attempts to purify and treat the situation as a matter of fact, rather than as a matter of 
concern, resulted in the ensuing and lengthy post-quake conflict. 
When earthquakes are matters of fact, the questions and answers are more clear-cut – is 
there or isn’t there going to be an earthquake? Both the international press and the CGR chose to, 
at least initially, frame the case in such a manner. Additionally, a retrospective analysis such as 
the one I have conducted here allows for an answer to be given to this question, which 




contributes to the case’s potential to appear “facty.” Because the event in question happened, 
right and wrong have been determined. But, this looking backwards hides the messiness and 
uncertainty that was present in the decision-making moment. If an expertise of doing were 
applied in a forward-facing situation (for example, at the time of the deliberations in L’Aquila), 
uncertainty would still be reigning. To be sure, the fault would eventually slip but when and to 
what degree would remain unknown. This kind of uncertainty is likely to remain as, unlike 
meteorology for example, seismology does not study events that repeat on a human scale against 
which to develop predictions of the future. Even more so, the geologic timescale ensures that the 
future is not particularly accessible. This is not to say that there is no benefit in retrospective 
analyses to help assess the decision making that occurred for better or for worse; rather, there 
seems to be a great need and value in identifying strategies and methods that will work in the 
kairotic moment. Particularly if the goal is to save lives, being able to assess issues of inclusion 
and expertise while in the depths of uncertainty, not just after the fact, seems to be key. The 
failure to do so in the case of L’Aquila emphasizes the challenge of determining relevant 
expertise in a timely manner in an ever-changing context.  
L’Aquila is categorically different from other cases that deal in uncertainty, such as 
environmental policy. Just as there are different kinds of doings, value and uncertainty are not 
flat terms either. These may be additional elements to consider if trying to develop normative 
action or principles of rarefaction. When dealing with questions of inclusion, Collins and Evans 
(2002) similarly note the need to distinguishing between types of science as well as types of 
expertise. In their schema, seismology would be classified as a historical science, in which the 
scientific input is uncertain and unlikely to become more so any time soon. As the testimonies 
and statements of various geologic organizations attest, when it comes to questions of earthquake 




forecasting and prediction, there is no foreseeable resolution or consensus on these matters in the 
near future. Seismologists study unique historical trends that are embedded in systems that are 
too complicated to model accurately and “may even be impossible to predict accurately because 
of the working of chaotic processes” (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 268). For Collins and Evans, an 
environmental issue such as climate change is one step removed, classified as a reflexive 
historical science, where the potential for uncertainty is even greater because the long term 
outcomes are affected by humans.  
Despite these differences, in the case of both earthquakes and climate change, the science 
is not certain and not likely to become certain soon. Consequently, Collins and Evans argue that 
in such instances political and social input should be given more importance in deliberation. So, 
if the L’Aquila case is approached as a matter of concern that deals with uncertain scientific 
input, an argument can be made for the inclusion (and more direct representation) of the Aquilani 
at the table. Here, too, Giuliani, as a member of the public sphere may have grounds for 
inclusion. 
But the reasons to include the Aquilani might be more than that. In addition to being 
members of the public, the residents of L’Aquila also have an embodied expertise that is rooted 
in their doings and practices. As theories of embodiment stress, location, space, and materiality 
matter. In the context of expertise, this is clearly demonstrated in works such as Brian Wynne’s 
(1989) now-canonical exploration of the Cumbrian sheep farmers or Beverly Sauer’s (2002) 
analysis of risk, mine safety, and the embodied expertise of miners. Similarly, but with an 
ontological twist, Teston et al’s (2014) study of the FDA’s Avastin hearing suggests that 
inclusion “should be decided upon participants’ experiences based in practices. Such an 
eligibility requirement surfaces the legitimacy of experiences had by more than those who run 




randomized clinical trials” (166). In short, they recognize the lived experiences of patients (and 
other public voices).  
Like the Avastin cancer patients, the residents of L’Aquila have an embodied experience 
of their “disease.” The doing of the earthquake was very different for the people living in 
L’Aquila as compared to the scientists who were located in Rome. For the Aquilani, removed 
from the measurements and data of the scientists and the bureaucracy of the government 
officials, earthquakes are enacted in a physical way.19 Though speaking broadly, Brian Wynne 
(1992) explains that “…public experiences of risk, risk communication or any other scientific 
information is never, and can never be, a purely intellectual process, about the reception of 
knowledge per se” (281). Earthquakes are tangible and felt – in the shaking, the damage, and the 
disruption of daily life. Certainly, of all the stakeholders in this controversy, the Aquilani 
physically experienced these (and past) seismic sequences, from early tremors to the final quake. 
When interviewed about the earthquake, L’Aquila local Pier Paolo Visione literally enacts it: 
“…shaking a table in a restaurant with a slow but vigorous motion that nearly topples a bottle of 
the local red Montepulciano wine,” noting that his ‘“skin began to crawl”’ (Hall, 2011, p. 267). 
Here, in the historic town, the earthquake was made known by “bells ringing and clocks striking, 
and…fresh chasms in the old yellow walls” (Hall, 2011, p. 267). For local resident Vincenzo 
Vittorini, it was “a gigantic noise. And then darkness” (Hall, 2011, p. 267). Moreover, the 
earthquake was staged through what it left behind – reconstruction, continued disruption, injury, 
and death.   
                                                            
19 It is important to note that while the public experiences, to varying degrees, the different practices of the 
scientists and government officials, the scientists and government officials also share in some ways the practices of 
the public, for they are also citizens and residents. In the case of L’Aquila, this commonality is not as strong; the 
CGR scientists are mostly from Rome, the government officials vary. Nevertheless, here I am referring to the 
L’Aquila public and their site-specific practices. 




 These ways of doing earthquakes correlate with the concerns of the Aquilani. 
Considering the very physical aspect of enacting earthquakes for the residents, an enactment 
which directly impacted their lives and well-being, it is unsurprising that they would seek advice 
and answers to questions of action. If buildings are shaking and walls are cracking, whether one 
wants to discuss definitional questions or not, the very material aspect of this situation means 
that qualitative and procedural issues would have to be addressed. Indeed, these are the issues 
which the public cites as being mishandled in the legal case they bring against the CRG 
members, the only real venue in which they are granted active involvement.  
 The experience of seismic activity is personal, but it is also cultural, passed down, and 
refined through the generations. Given L’Aquila’s specific location along Italy’s fault lines, its 
residents, unsurprisingly, have a culture of doing earthquakes. Traditionally, the practice was to 
leave the house and spend the night outside sleeping in cars or staying up in the piazza. Now, 
more and more people stay inside and turn to watching the television and listening to authorities, 
a practice some people said resulted in increased deaths and should never have replaced older 
ways of doing (Hall, 2011). Acknowledging this passed down, lived experience of earthquakes, 
it could be argued that the Aquilani do, in fact, have some kind of expertise. Collins and Evans 
(2002) acknowledge that “local knowledge is a kind of expertise because local people can be 
said to have long experience of the local environment” (267). In other words, the residents of 
L’Aquila could be said to derive expertise from their site-specific practices and experiences.  
As I have said earlier, I agree with Collins and Evans that not all experience can be used 
to claim an experience-based expertise. According to Collins and Evans (2002), for experience to 
be linked to a claim for expertise, it cannot be something that “anyone could 
master…immediately without practice,” and it should not be on the fringe or discontinuous with 




the core-set’s expertise (251). Applying these conditions to the case, the Aquilani’s experiences 
living with earthquakes and seismic risk fit both criteria while Giuliani becomes excluded by the 
fringe status of his methods. Maybe we shouldn’t call what the residents of L’Aquila have and 
do expertise. But it is something to be recognized and, especially in the context of a matter of 
concern, would be valuable to have at the table. Compared to the expertises of the CGR and 
DPC, the L’Aquila residents have an expertise that was not otherwise included in these particular 
science-policy deliberations, an expertise that might have impacted both the deliberations and 
decisions surrounding the L’Aquila earthquake. Whether or not the L’Aquila public are accepted 
as having pertinent expertise, the issues that are raised by this scenario are not necessarily the 
adding of more seats to the table; rather, this scenario highlights the challenge of determining 
relevant expertise in a timely manner in an ever-changing science-policy context as well as how 
science-policy decision making should be done.   
 
Who But Also How 
 
 Banal though it may seem, what this doing-based analysis of expertise makes 
abundantly clear is that people are complicated. They cannot simply be forced into categories. 
Particularly in science-policy decision-making scenarios in which the political, technical, social, 
and material concerns cannot be purified, stakeholders’ ontologies will also blur. As Mol 
emphasizes, people move among sites of practice, thus enacting different ontologies. Take, for 
example, the case of Bernardo de Bernardinis, one of the L’Aquila Seven. If the matter at hand 
concerns the safety of bridges or dams in the context of seismic activity, then de Bernardinis, as 
a hydraulic engineer, may have contributory expertise. However, if the matter pertains to 
earthquake forecasting, he would have referred expertise. But, de Bernardinis, as a member of 
the DPC, could also be considered to have contributory expertise if the topic of discussion is one 




of public policy or risk communication. Not only are people difficult to categorize, as de 
Bernardinis’ case demonstrates, but there will also always be competing allegiances. When de 
Bernardinis speaks, one has to wonder about which role he is functioning in and how he can 
marry the sometimes competing interests and practices of the various groups he is member to. 
However, de Bernardinis is far from being the only example of this complexity across the 
members of the CGR.  As this approach to doing expertise shows, a clear separation between 
experts and non-experts is replaced by a layering of practices and a range of functions.  
 As an idea or a model, the CGR is generally a good one. As one possible format for 
science-policy deliberation, it got a lot of the right kinds of people to the table. And, as the 
previous analysis shows, it also recruited a range of expertises. While good in theory, the CGR 
as a practice, evidenced by the L’Aquila controversy, seems to be malfunctioning. As the wiretap 
and conflicting meeting purposes suggest, the emergency meeting of the CGR was deployed as a 
method of technocratic exclusion. While this targeted exclusion would naturally raise concerns 
for many STS and RSTM scholars, it is particularly troubling when approaching the case as a 
matter of concern. Along with certified and experience-based experts, the inclusion of publics 
and their practices and concerns is especially necessary in these cases of scientific uncertainty for 
satisfying, successful decision making (Collins & Evans, 2002, p. 269). Additionally, such 
inclusion can also be crucial to protecting human lives and minimizing the impact of hazards 
(Sauer, 2002; Wynne, 1989). And yet, as the previous analysis shows, this inclusion was not 
necessarily the case for L’Aquila. The CGR as a practice is broken, but the patch is not simply 
revising who is included. Indeed, specifying exactly who should be included is not possible 
because each case and problem will be unique and thus will require specific deliberative 
practices to evaluate what expertises are necessary to resolve the problem at hand. Though their 




general absence in the L’Aquila controversy is certainly concerning, the addition of lay voices is 
not necessarily the solution. Rather, the way forward seems to rest with how.    
 A more productive line of inquiry might be to examine how science-policy decision 
making is conducted rather than remaining focused only on who should be present. As Mol 
suggests, we need to “stop shifting the boundaries between patient and expert and look for new 
ways of governing the territory together” (171). Analyzing the technocratic deployment of the 
CGR from an expertise of doing places emphasis on what is happening; multiple ontologies 
allows for the mapping of the layered practices while a normative model allows for upstream 
intervention. Such mapping can show which practices or expertises are at play as well as what is 
absent. What is most notably lacking in the case of L’Aquila is interactional expertise. Generally 
associated with practices of mediation, Collins and Evans describe international expertise as 
interacting interestingly with participants. Possible examples of job positions that are likely to 
enact this expertise include managers of large corporations, social science researchers, 
journalists, and technical communicators. In other words, effective interactional expertise hinges 
on being truly familiar with the discourse, content, and practices of participants in order to 
facilitate communication and the task at hand.  
 In complex science-policy scenarios such as L’Aquila, which necessarily require unique 
configurations of multiple and varied expertises and stakeholders, interactive expertise is crucial. 
The fallout from the emergency CGR meeting implies that not only was some form of 
interactional expertise missing but it was desperately needed. What the case of L’Aquila 
suggests, both in the passing of information from CGR to DPC and from DPC to the Aquilani, is 
that science-policy decision making is not just about who is present and talking. There are a 
series of mediations that need to happen in order for reality to hang together across multiple sites 




of practice, which indicates the very important function that interactional expertise plays. Based 
on their positions as straddlers of the technical and public, politicians or civil servants like the 
DPC members could be likely candidates for interactional expertise. But, as de Bernardinis’s 
falsely reassuring message indicates, this is not necessarily the case. Interactional expertise may 
not directly correlate with job title, but it may also be that political objectives were an 
influencing factor. If, in cases of scientific uncertainty, the political and the social are warranted 
more inclusion, an expertise of doing suggests that there may be a need for a mediator whose 
explicit task would be the facilitation of communication across various ways of doing. Such a 
mediator might also be well positioned to facilitate the successful inclusion of previously 
excluded ontologies and stakeholders, like the Aquilani, in the deliberative process. And, in the 
specific case of the L’Aquila controversy, interactive expertise could have helped the CGR and 
DPC conduct a press conference that would have been more useful to the people. Even if the 
CGR could not predict with certainty that an earthquake was imminent, it would still have been 
important for the Aquilani to have a sense of the likelihood of the event. The DPC statements 
represented the risk as zero, which prevented the Aquilani from weighing the scientific picture 
against their own practices and values. In short, the DPC made the decision for them.  
 As any seismologist will readily assert, earthquakes can neither be stopped nor 
predicted. Minimizing their impact requires communication among all stakeholders, a practice 
that begins with a decision-making process that puts greater value on interactional expertise. As 
compared to the contributory experts of the CGR, someone with interactional expertise is, 
arguably, better positioned to and more practiced at facilitating communication. In the case of 
L’Aquila, this could have meant a more clear representation of 1) the technical content – the 
possible risks and assessment of the situation and 2) the qualitative and procedural concerns of 




the public, who face the material consequences of any decision making. Neither decision making 
nor the lived conditions and experiences of the people impacted by those decisions are 
necessarily improved by unlimited inclusion. Without interactional ontologies, the decision-
making table will remain incomplete.  
 
  




Chapter 3: Uncertain Deliberation 
 
 
Just as matters of concern necessitate a reconsideration of who participates in 
deliberation, they also require a reconsideration of deliberative practices and the rhetorical tools 
used to account for them. Having examined some of the practices, specifically those pertaining to 
expertise, that shaped the events in L’Aquila in the previous chapter, I will now turn my attention 
more directly to the practice of discourse. As I mentioned earlier, much of the conversation about 
L’Aquila has been focused on words and miscommunication. And so it is to words, namely key 
communication breakdowns in the deliberation prior to the 2009 earthquake, that I now turn.  
In the weeks and days preceding the tragic events of 6 April 2009, the authorities needed 
to find a way to a) adjudicate the available evidence, b) to assess the appropriateness of including 
Giuliani’s predictions as part of that collection of evidence, c) ensure that the public needs (in 
terms of recommendations for action) were addressed, and d) determine how to effectively 
distribute that information from governmental agencies to the public. The overflow that 
transforms this case from a matter of fact into a matter of concern lies at the intersection between 
public requests for information and the available evidence. Indeed, a truism of research in STP is 
that public requests for information in the face of uncertain situations will exceed the available 
scientific evidence. As Wynne (1992) explains, “public experiences of risk, risk communication 
or any other scientific information is never, and can never be, a purely intellectual process, about 
the reception of knowledge per se” (281). Similarly, Callon, Lascoume, and Barthe (2009) have 
noted that “laypersons…are infinitely more demanding than specialists when they come across a 
problem which resists them, especially when it is an existential problem. Especially when it 
involves illness or death that seems to strike at random” (78). 




The local residents who were interviewed by the media persistently requested guidance 
from governmental authorities: “All we wanted was clearer information on risks in order to make 
our choices” (Hall, 2011, p. 266). Vincenzo Vittorini, one of the local residents who was a party 
to the lawsuit, said his issue was not with “science” but with “a lack of specific advice” (Hall, 
2011, p. 266). Indeed, in the trial following the earthquake, both the CGR and the Department of 
Civil Protection (DPC) were faulted for not discussing “what specific advice should be given to 
residents about what to do in the event of a major quake” and “failing to remind residents of 
earthquake preparedness procedures” (Hall, 2011, pp. 267-268). The Aquilani’s complaints 
reference a perceived failure to provide advice, specifically advice on what action to take. 
Unfortunately, while the deep uncertainty in L’Aquila may have warranted a more open, 
inclusive approach “where groups can come together to discuss technical options involving the 
collective,” what the Aquilani got was the CGR – and a corrupted version of the CGR at that 
(Callon, Lascoume, & Barthe, 2009, p. 18).  
As I have suggested in previous discussion about the case, the DPC deployed the CGR as 
a technocratic method of exclusion, shutting out both Giuliani and the public, at great cost not 
only to the Aquilani but also to the CGR scientists who appear to have been co-opted, perhaps 
unwittingly, into this exclusionary agenda. However, these scientists are not entirely without 
blame. As my analysis will show, they were clearly complicit in attempts to purify matters of 
fact from matters of concern. The scientists and the politicians at the meeting insisted on treating 
seismic activity solely as a technical object, attempting to purify both the matters under 
consideration and the possible interlocutors.    
 In this chapter, I draw upon one of the primary analytic tools deployed in rhetorical 
investigations of science-policy deliberation – stasis theory. Originally deployed in courtrooms 




and legal settings as a way to categorize the issues under debate, stasis doctrine has long been 
used to describe how issues take shape. Traditional stasis theory application comes with the side 
effect that complex and messy stasis moments are disentangled and purified into separate 
questions. This fails to account for the complexity and dynamism of deliberation under and about 
uncertainty, which is a hallmark of matters of concern. As I will show, the events of L’Aquila 
strongly suggest the need for a revised approach to stasis – in both rhetorical theory and 
deliberative practice – because traditional stasis doctrine fails to account for matters of concern 
and may have significantly contributed to the chain of events that ultimately led to the conviction 
of the L’Aquila Seven. Therefore, in this chapter, I employ a “functional” approach that will 
analyze the dynamic flow of issues in situ (Graham, 2015). The following investigation of the 
emergency meeting of scientists, civil servants, and politicians uses this functional stasis analysis 
to identify the primary breakdown in deliberation that ultimately led to a message of calm and 
reassurance immediately prior to the devastating earthquake. The results provide insights into not 
only the events in L’Aquila but also broader issues of risk, uncertainty, fact, and value in 
science-policy deliberation. While I must limit myself to one analytic tool, this approach to stasis 
theory aims to serve as a model to reflect on implications for broader issues of accounting for 
uncertainty in deliberation.  
Perspectives on Uncertainty 
Scholarship in RSTM and STS demonstrates a consistent interest in methods for dealing 
with or managing uncertainty. Indeed, from a classical perspective, rhetoric is inextricably bound 
to the contingent (Crick, 2014). Some approaches advocate settling or reducing technical 
uncertainties first as the best way to provide useful information to decision makers (Pielke, 
Sarewitz & Dilling, 2010). Here, uncertainty is treated as a gap in knowledge that can and should 




be reduced to zero (or as close as possible). Such approaches, however, have been thoroughly 
critiqued in light of contemporary risks that involve irreducible uncertainties that are difficult to 
measure, extend across personal, political, and technical boundaries, and cannot be settled or 
contained before making decisions (Beck, 1999, 2009; Crick, 2014; Keranen, 2013; Pilkey & 
Pilkey-Jarvis, 2009; Prelli, 2013; Scott, Segal, & Keranen, 2013; Wynn & Walsh, 2013). A key 
extension of this work has been the recognition of a range of uncertainties in order to better 
account for them. For example, in their study of how an interdisciplinary pain management 
group dealt with uncertainty, Graham and Herndl (2013) suggest that uncertainty has multiple 
ontologies and epistemologies. Likewise, Walsh and Walker (2016) draw upon the work of 
Goodnight to offer a spheres model for tracing coherent accounts of multiple uncertainties as 
they travel from one context to another. 
In response to calls for alternative approaches for making decisions within the context of 
persistent uncertainty, rhetoricians have argued that our field is uniquely positioned for this 
challenge. A rhetorical perspective and practice – with its concern for judgment and action – can 
support decision making in the contexts of uncertainty and risk, where certainty and prediction 
cannot be assured. By and large, rhetorical scholars have offered deliberative approaches, which 
support an understanding of context, the articulation of common interests, and coordinated action 
with stakeholders and decision makers throughout the process. Deliberation is the process of 
dialogue and decision making about uncertain matters, with the goal of coming to a broadly 
supported decision that will benefit the stakeholders in the future. As part of a deliberative 
approach, rhetoricians have argued for the necessity of developing scientific prudence. This 
ability to deliberate about particular, contingent matters while relying on practical experience 
and virtue, they argue, can help guide deliberation (Danisch, 2010; Grabill, 2007; Herndl & 




Cutlip, 2013; Herndl & Graham, 2015; Keranen, 2008; Sauer, 2003; Scott, 2006; Simmons, 
2007). However, these deliberative approaches also introduce problems of inclusion and power, 
as discussed in previous chapters (Ceccarelli, 2011; Collins & Evans, 2002; DeVasto, 2016; 
Latour 2004, 2009).  
Recognizing the challenge of selecting relevant stakeholders but still favoring a 
deliberative approach, Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe (2009) support distinguishing between 
situations of risk and situations of uncertainty. I will provide a more detailed explanation of this 
distinction momentarily, but, in short, they argue that uncertainty should be handled with a more 
open (though still somewhat constrained) approach. They contrast this with cases of risk, in 
which they advocate for a more technocratic approach. For instance, deliberation and decision-
making about uncertain issues like climate change should be handled with greater deliberation – 
and would warrant greater inclusion – while issues such as vaccinations would warrant 
something more technocratic.  
This distinction between risk and uncertainty is useful up to a point. But risk versus 
uncertainty as an easy line of demarcation fails. This is, in part, because of the increasing 
implementation of Bayesian modeling for addressing serious science-policy questions, the 
forecasting of earthquakes and associated potential hazards being one among many.20 In actual 
                                                            
20 There are two main opposing schools of statistical reasoning – the incumbent frequentist and the up-and-coming 
Bayesian. Until recently, the classical or frequentist approach has been the standard for scientific research. As the 
name suggests, frequentist methods attempt to predict the probability of a future event given the frequency with 
which it has occurred in the past. Reflecting its origins in games of chance, frequentist statistics are often 
associated with examples of determining the probabilities of tossing a certain roll of the dice or drawing certain 
cards. But in Bayesian statistics, probability is extended to cover degrees of certainty about statements. So, while 
frequentists would say that their calculations are based on objective data, Bayesian approaches incorporate 
“subjective” information (i.e. expert judgment) in a way that, arguably, provides more complete information to the 
decision maker. They also allow us to “consider probabilities for events that have never happened before, i.e., 
events for which there is no historical data and for which data can’t be collected” (Wilson, 2001, p. 8). Like the 
frequentist with the deck of cards, the Bayesian approach would use the existing data about the makeup of the 
deck of cards but would also consider if there was additional information (usually the opinion of experts) that 
could be factored into the bet maker’s decision. In this case, a Bayesian might consult someone who typically plays 




practice, the two – risk and uncertainty – are rarely separate. If we, for example, imagine risk in 
something like its pure form, we can conceive of a situation in which there is no judgment 
involved, no qualitative, non-calculative basis for decision-making. And of course this is hardly 
ever the case.  
Matters of concern, like the L’Aquila controversy, make this abundantly clear. For not 
only is there “not a monolithic form of uncertainty operating…but an array of uncertainties” as 
Walsh and Walker (2016) helpfully point out, but there is also a complex and dynamic interplay 
between risk and uncertainty. Certainly, we need to attend more closely to what happens to 
uncertainty as it circulates in these hybrid spaces – especially the blending and transformation of 
uncertainty into risk and the consequences of doing so. As I will show in my analysis, when the 
technical, political, and public overlap, there is a tension between the need to reduce complexity 
and uncertainty (and thus limit the possibilities of deliberation) and the need to embrace them. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I turn to exploring the effects of this slurry of tension, uncertainty, 
and risk on deliberation and communication as well as how rhetorical methods might be adapted 
in order to better trace uncertainty (and its interplay with risk) in the often-hybridized discourses 
of risk communication.  
Stases for Matters of Concern 
In elucidating matters of concern, Latour provides a reinterpretation of Heidegger’s Ding 
[thing]. Both Latour and Heidegger trace the etymology of a thing to Althing—the Old Icelandic 
word for parliament. For Latour (2004) and Heidegger, things, as opposed to objects, do not 
                                                            
cards with this dealer. She may have additional information, like the dealer has a reputation for being a bit shady. 
By working with the expert to quantify what the term “a bit” means in terms of probabilities, the Bayesian comes 
up with additional data to factor into the calculations. By incorporating subjective information into the 
calculations, Bayesian statistics occupies a gray area between subjectivity and objectivity, between risk and 
uncertainty. 
 




stand apart; rather, they are at the center of gatherings that, like hybrid forums, may bridge 
technical and political questions into a seamless whole: 
Martin Heidegger, as every philosopher knows, has meditated many times on the 
ancient etymology of the word thing. We are now all aware that in all the 
European languages, including Russian, there is a strong connection between the 
words for thing and a quasi-judiciary assembly. Icelanders boast of having the 
oldest Parliament, which they call Althing, and you can still visit in many 
Scandinavian countries assembly places that are designated by the word Ding or 
Thing. Now, is this not extraordinary that the banal term we use for designating 
what is out there, unquestionably, a thing, what lies out of any dispute, out of 
language, is also the oldest word we all have used to designate the oldest of the 
sites in which our ancestors did their dealing and tried to settle their disputes? A 
thing is, in one sense, an object out there and, in another sense, an issue very 
much in there, at any rate, a gathering. To use the term I introduced earlier now 
more precisely, the same word thing designates matters of fact and matters of 
concern. (pp. 232-233) 
 
Latour’s use of the term issue is especially interesting given the common focus of rhetoricians on 
stasis as a primary analytic construct for investigating science-policy deliberation (Ceccarelli, 
2011; Fahnestock & Secor, 1988; Graham & Herndl, 2011; Prelli, 2005; Walsh, 2009). And this 
focus, of course, makes a certain amount of sense, for the resolution of stases is central to the 
adjudication of issues. Indeed, I am excited by this potential for productive resonance in 
investigating the deliberative practices in hybrid forums as they tackle matters of concern. But, in 
making this move from matters of concern to stasis theory, I must confront a significant 
methodological issue for rhetorical studies, namely, the tendency of traditional stasis analysis to 
replicate the fact-value divide that is rejected by matters of concern.      
Rhetoric, rhetorically-informed technical communication and STS have long recognized 
the false dichotomy between facts and values. Indeed, the social constructivist and rhetoric-as-
epistemic traditions, which are built on the rejection of this dichotomy, still inform much of 
rhetoric and technical communication today. In spite of these theoretical and epistemological 
commitments, I worry that stasis – both as a theory and methodology – remains indebted to a 




more modernist epistemology. Indeed, rhetorical scholarship on stasis theory, especially in cases 
of science-policy controversy, is traditionally marked by a recurrent focus on purification and 
procedure. That is, the taxonomic methodological approach to stasis theory comes with the side 
effect that complex and messy stasis moments are disentangled and carefully delineated into 
separate questions. And certainly this sort of careful analytic approach to science controversy can 
be helpful in identifying tacit questions within a discourse and determining how those questions 
contribute to the resolution or lack of resolution of overarching questions. However, the 
traditional taxonomic approach often slides into procedural recommendations, which suggests 
that stasis questions can and should be addressed in the order prescribed by classical theorists 
(e.g., fact then definition then value then action). 
For example, Fahnestock and Secor (1988) suggest that stasis debate can and should 
proceed from simpler to more complex, each level building on the answer to the question of the 
previous level: “The full stases, from fact to proposal, constitute the backbone or 
outline…introduc[ing] a topic by defining it and commenting on its extent, go[ing] on to 
consider causes and consequences, then evaluat[ing] the phenomenon, and finally turn[ing] to the 
future by predicting or recommending certain actions” (429). Fahnestock and Secor (1988) 
classified these moves or questions into lower (i.e., fact, definition) and higher stases (i.e., value, 
action), creating a kind of internal hierarchy (440). Similarly, Walsh (2009) explains that 
resolving one level of stasis propels the discussion into debating the next. Due to their linked, 
hierarchical nature, stases exert what she calls “an irresistible upward pull on the discourse” (42).  
Walsh’s (2009) hierarchization and use of directional metaphor “upward” helps codify 
the procedural recommendations of stasis doctrine. Even when the goal is not to prescribe a 
hierarchy or procedure, rhetorical recommendations regarding traditional stasis theory sometimes 




inadvertently reinforce the division between the technical and the public sphere. For example, 
Ceccarelli (2011) offers stasis doctrine as one possible mode in which rhetoricians can intervene 
in manufactured scientific controversies (e.g., if an oil company were to provide concocted 
evidence to create doubts about anthropogenic climate change). Ceccarelli argues, convincingly, 
that scientists’ efforts to discredit such manufactured controversies at the conjectural level of 
stasis have been fraught with failure. Instead, she suggests that 
a more promising strategy would be to engage the debate, but after refuting the 
most damning charges, shift the focus of discussion away from the conjectural 
stasis, recognizing that manufactured scientific controversy is really “a political 
controversy over values masquerading as a scientific dispute.” Addressing the real 
issue of which values should be prioritized in society, or what standards of proof 
should be applied by a public body weighing the stakes of action and inaction, or 
what specific policies would be best in the given circumstances, forces the debate 
to turn on matters that are more appropriately managed in the public forum, rather 
than merely replaying a long and complicated technical debate before a 
nontechnical audience. (212) 
 
While Ceccarelli’s approach may constitute a promising rhetorical strategy to meet the desired 
ends, it still serves to bracket off the public sphere from matters of fact. It still purifies different 
stasis questions while assigning them to separate discursive domains. As such, I worry that this 
traditional rendering of stasis theory may be inadequate to address questions of technical 
democracy that rise to the level of matters of concern. 
Indeed, I am not the first to recognize that the traditional compartmentalization of stasis 
questions is inadequate to address such cases. For example, Blythe, Grabill, and Riley’s (2008) 
study of one community’s debate over the desirability of a dredging project highlights the 
resistance of matters of concern to traditional taxonomic stasis analysis: 
Even if people agree fully on a definition, reaching agreed upon stases is difficult 
because people often switch unexpectedly from one type of stasis to another 
[emphasis added]. An exchange that occurred at a citizens’ meeting on February 
4, 2004, revealed this difficulty. During a meeting of the CEC, Barbara told the 
group about her recent phone conversation with a chemical engineer who had 




been hired by TOSC to review the Corps’s dredging plans. During that 
conversation, the engineer argued that it did not matter whether the federal 
government characterized the dredging as an environmental or a navigational 
project. That is, he claimed that arguments over definition missed the most 
important issue: A navigational dredging project still had to meet environmental 
standards. When Barbara shared the engineer’s opinion at the meeting, Henry, 
another member, said that the environmental versus navigational issue was a red 
herring. The real issue, he said, was whether the project should meet [certain 
legal] standards …. He shifted from a question of definition to one of conflicting 
laws (Hermogenes’s 10th stasis). (290-291) 
 
Why should such a shift in stasis be unexpected? Perhaps only because traditional stasis 
theory in rhetoric and policy discourse tacitly recommends purified, sequential stasis questions. I 
would argue, however, that both this work of purification and the procedural mandates that 
follow fail to account for cases such as the L’Aquila earthquake controversy. Further, I argue 
that if such works of purification are folded into science-policy deliberation, then the discussants 
risk treating matters of concern as matters of fact. Rhetoricians, then, must tackle these questions 
directly and develop novel approaches to stasis theory that can better accommodate the 
complexity and dynamism of debate in matters of concern. To that end, I employ a “functional” 
approach to stasis analysis as identified and described by Graham’s (2015) The Politics of Pain 
Medicine. A functional approach, as I will describe in more detail, is a method for analyzing the 
dynamic flow of stasis questions in situ, focusing more on the interaction between stases and the 
resolution of static questions into usable topoi than on the specific nature of the particular stasis 
issue.  
Functional Stasis Analysis 
 
Originally deployed in courtrooms and legal settings as a way to taxonomize the issues 
under debate, stasis doctrine has been presented in varying ways since the Classical period in 
order to describe how issues take shape. More recent work in RSTM has doubled down on the 
taxonomic approach to offer more complex and nuanced approaches to stasis taxonomies that 




account for evidentiary and methodological debate in technical spheres. Prelli (2005), for 
example, added four additional stases to the traditional taxonomy – evidential, interpretive, 
evaluative, and methodological. These “superior” stases coordinate with the traditional, or 
“subordinate,” stases to create a 16-cell matrix of compound stases (e.g. conjectural–evidential 
or qualitative–methodological). Graham and Herndl (2011) further expanded Prelli’s schema by 
adding a practical stasis, thus creating a 20 compound stasis taxonomy. 
While Prelli’s (2005) stasis taxonomy provides a good starting point for thinking about 
deliberation in hybrid forums, I aim to push beyond the primarily taxonomic approach. Although 
I use many of the excellent insights that Prelli’s schema provides, that analysis will be 
subordinate to what I believe offers a more fruitful approach – Graham’s (2015) “functional 
stasis analysis.” Graham describes how he derived this approach by 
taking a cue from neuroimaging scientists. Neurologists differentiate between 
structural and functional imaging studies. Structural imaging seeks to describe the 
anatomy of the brain. It identifies prominent neuroanatomical features and locates 
them relative to other features. It is concerned with a cartography of the brain—
where does one structure begin and another end? In contrast, functional imaging 
studies work to describe physiology. How do blood and oxygen flow through 
various brain features as they process information and stimuli? Structural imaging 
is three-dimensional; functional imaging is four-dimensional—gathering data 
over time. I would argue that the typical taxonomic approach to stasis theory is 
structural—it isolates individual stases from the flow of argument. In contrast, 
functional stasis analysis seeks to capture the dynamic and often nested 
relationship among stases within the flow of debate. (92) 
 
In keeping with this functional approach, my analysis focuses primarily on three identified static 
moves that describe the evolving in situ relationships between stases and between stases and 
topoi. That is, again following Graham (2015), I explore three “physiological” functions that are 
evident in the L’Aquila discourse: nesting, resolution, and buttressing (93). Nesting describes a 
particular relationship between stases that occurs when positing one stasis question forces a 
second prior stasis question to be raised. The latter stasis is said to be nested in the former. 




Resolution occurs when the argumentative processes of stasis debate come to a close – that is, 
when an answer is provided.  Rhetorically, I understand these static resolutions to be the 
establishment of new topoi – new common places – for future discussion or praxis. Finally, 
buttressing refers to the interaction between nested topic resolutions and stases. That is, when 
stases nest, the resolution of the host stasis is dependent on the resolution of the stasis nested 
within it. The newly established topos of the nested stasis buttresses the soon-to-be established 
topos of the host stasis.  
This functional or physiological approach is essential because it offers an opportunity to 
better capture the complicated relationships between the stases used in arguments. The 
traditional use of stases presumes a direct supporting relationship between different static levels. 
And this makes sense, given the productive orientation of classical rhetorical theory. If the goal 
is to construct a compelling oration, then thinking hierarchically about how supporting 
arguments ultimately lead to the desired outcome is appropriate. However, when stasis theory is 
used analytically and used to study ephemeral rhetorical events with multiple discussants and 
competing lines of inquiry, the stases observed may not be deployed hierarchically and may 
indeed support multiple, conflicting outcomes. Similarly, lines of argument offered at one point 
during an event may not even get folded into the broader discourse, providing stases that 
ultimately support nothing at all.  
In keeping with Graham’s (2015) functional approach and its origin in neuroimaging, my 
analysis of the CGR meeting details the physiological events in the debate. Ultimately, therefore, 
this analysis is a kind of activation study, a mode of neuroimaging investigation that maps 
temporal data onto the brain’s structure. These data show which structures of the brain are 
activated in what order as the brain works its way through events. So, for example, in activation 




studies of reading Shakespeare, researchers might be able to distinguish between the specific 
neurophysiological structures used while reading tragedy, while reading comedy, or while 
simply turning the page. Linguistic- and emotion-processing units will be engaged during the 
cognitive acts of reading and may engage differently in coordinating with those units that control 
movement during the physical act of page turning. In extending Graham’s functional metaphor to 
my analysis, I begin by offering an overarching and structural view of the CGR debate. 
However, in the following sections, I will also identify activations by time. This phase-by-phase 
analysis will center on which stases, resolutions, and buttresses are active at different phases in 









Stasis Generic Form Operationalized for L’Aquila  
Practical–Qualitative What action is most appropriate 
following this discussion?  
How can we reassure the people? 
Evaluative–Conjectural Is claim X scientifically significant? Is it likely there will be another 
earthquake soon? 
Evidential–Conjectural Is there scientific evidence for 
claim X? 
What is the available data? 
Evidential–Definitive What does the available evidence 
mean? 
Does the available data mean 
there will be an earthquake? 
Translative Does X have the proper authority 
to contribute to this issue? 
Do we include Giuliani’s data? 
Ethotic–Translative Does individual X have the 
credibility to serve as an 
authority? 
Can we ignore people who do not 
behave as we wish? 




Is procedure X a viable scientific 
procedure in this case? 
Is radon gas emission detection an 
acceptable method? 
Table 1: Stases present in CGR debate with their generic forms and operationalization for L'Aquila 






What originated as a concerning increase in seismic activity in October 2008 developed 
into an ongoing issue of public concern surrounding the prediction of potentially catastrophic 
earthquakes. This still-unfolding, 9-year and counting controversy has played out in a wide range 
of discursive settings, including a scientific commission, an indictment hearing, a trial, an 
unfolding appeal process, the popular press, the blogosphere, and the epistolary work of 
scientific organizations such as the AAAS. Thus, I confine my analysis to the CGR meeting. In 
keeping with the tenets of functional stasis analysis, I have provided a map of the nesting stases, 
resolutions, and buttressing identified in the CGR meeting (see Figure 3). 
 
The map provided in Figure 3 is ultimately informed by an awareness of the back-channel 
discussions that contributed to the call to meet in the first place. In the wake of Giuliani’s 
predictions and the attention he garnered, the Aquilani demanded answers. As previously 
mentioned, Bertolaso and Stati’s recorded telephone conversation seems to indicate that rather 
than provide these answers, the DPC’s primary goal was to allay the Aquilani’s fears by 
silencing Giuliani. But the CGR meeting was not primarily framed as an effort to discredit 
Giuliani. Although the director of the DPC made one oblique reference to Giuliani at the outset 
Figure 3: Structural mapping of the Commissione Grandi Rischi (CGR) discussion 




of the meeting (see Commission, 2009, p. 2), the CGR was largely presented with a modified 
question: Is an earthquake likely to happen soon? This question, which was ostensibly asked as a 
reasonable response to public demands, would ultimately lead to the rejection of Giuliani that the 
DPC sought all along.  
The articulation of this question represents, temporally speaking, the first nesting in our 
functional stasis map. DPC officials needed to determine what question they could put to the 
CGR that would serve their primary goal of calming the Aquilani in a PR-friendly manner. The 
immediate question – How do we reassure the public (in a PR-friendly way)? – is an example of 
the practical-qualitative stasis, following Graham and Herndl’s (2011) elaboration of Prelli’s 
taxonomy. This question has to do with a course of action (practical), but that course of action 
must be established in dialogue with qualitative concerns (perceptions and community values). 
That is, DPC officials could not simply start the meeting by discrediting Giuliani and asking the 
CGR for confirmation. So instead, the question they asked the CGR was of a different stasis, one 
that was nested inside the first question and resolution. The premeeting question, How do we 
reassure the public (in a PR-friendly manner)?, was answered with the proposed course of action 
– by assessing the likelihood of an impending earthquake – which immediately forces the 
question, What is that likelihood?    
According to Prelli’s taxonomy, the DPC’s question to the CGR is an evaluative–
conjectural question: What is the likelihood of an earthquake? In other words, the DPC officials 
wanted a risk assessment, which would allow them to discredit Giuliani’s predictions and 
reassure the Aquilani. Despite the historical rhetorical distinction between facts and probabilities, 
I understand a risk assessment to be a conjectural question. In his canonical 1921 book, Risk, 
Uncertainty, and Profit, American economist Frank H. Knight demarcates risk from uncertainty:  




Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk, 
from which it has never been properly separated.... The essential fact is that 'risk' means 
in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something 
distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching and crucial differences in the 
bearings of the phenomena depending on which of the two is really present and 
operating.... It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or 'risk' proper, as we shall use 
the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an 
uncertainty at all (19-20). 
 
For Knight, risk applies to situations where the outcome of a given situation is unknown but the 
odds can be accurately measured. Situations in which we cannot know all the information needed 
to set accurate odds from the start are deemed uncertain. In the context of science, risk would 
then correspond to situations in which we have a sufficiency of observed instances such that we 
can plot a probability distribution (e.g., the chance of a person who smokes contracting lung 
cancer) while uncertainty would characterize those situations in which we do not (e.g., the 
prediction of natural hazards). Building on Knightian uncertainty, STS and STP scholarship has 
gone to great effort in recent years to distinguish between questions of risk and questions of 
uncertainty in science-policy deliberations. For example, Callon, Lascoume, and Barthes (2009) 
elaborate on this distinction: 
The term “risk” designates a well-defined danger associated with a perfectly 
describable event or series of events. We do not know if this event or series of 
events will in fact take place, but we know that it may take place. In some cases, 
statistical instruments applied to series of systemic observations performed in the 
past make it possible to calculate the event’s probable occurrence, which will then 
be described as objective probability…. In actual fact, science often proves to be 
incapable of establishing the list of possible worlds and describing each of them 
exactly. This amounts to saying that we cannot anticipate the consequences of the 
decisions that are likely to be made; we do not have a sufficiently precise 
knowledge of the conceivable options, the description of the constitution of 
possible worlds comes up against resistant cores of ignorance, and the behaviors 
and interactions of the entities making them up remain enigmatic. The conditions 
required for it to be relevant to talk of risk are not met. We know that we do not 
know, but that is almost all we know; there is no better definition of uncertainty. 
(19-21) 
 




In short, risk is a quantifiable probability. It is statistically derived numbers grounded in 
established scientific methodologies. Uncertainty is when “more than one outcome is consistent 
with our expectations” (Pielke, 2007, p. 55). This slight detour through the risk–uncertainty 
distinction foreshadows the interpretive conflict between the DPC and the CGR.  
The Emergency Meeting of the CGR 
 
My analysis of the meeting minutes suggests that the conversation between the CGR and 
the DPC proceeded in four phases: data delivery, discussion scaffolding, translative fleshing out, 
and practical fleshing out. 
Phase 1: Data Delivery 
The CGR, like many other science-policy collaborations, sought to assemble the 
available evidence in order to assess it. The meeting began with the activation of the evidential–
conjectural question: What is the available data? As Walsh (2009) notes, stasis questions such as 
evidential–conjectural ones are most often posed to scientists because they focus more heavily 
on “the facts,” as was true of the L’Aquila meeting. Indeed, the bulk of the meeting focused on 
the scientists presenting “che cosa sta accadendo dal punto di vista scientific [what is happening 
from the scientific point of view],” which entailed relaying seismic recordings, historical data, 
and visualizations (Commission, 2009, p. 2). For the first third of the meeting, the discourse 
moved back and forth between activating the evidential-conjectural stasis (What is the available 
data?) and its resolution – recent and historical seismic data.   
These datasets presented seismic activity as an object of scientific inquiry and 
subsequently shaped what and how the scientists communicated about L’Aquila’s seismic 
activity – as a matter of fact. As discussed in Chapter 2, the seismicity was enacted through 
practices generally viewed as objective: scientifically tested methods of data collection, number-




crunching statistics, and measurement tools. In these repeating moments of evidential–
conjectural resolution, the scientists’ sentences often started with phrases such as we observe, we 
are seeing, or in reality, emphasizing an objectivity that was, at times, almost disinterested, and a 
certain factualness (Commission, 2009, pp. 2-4). The scientists, therefore, functioned as reporters 
of observations and facts, using such objective “is” claims to pass them on to policy makers.  
Following this initial presentation of scientific data, the first statement about the meaning 
of the data occurred.  As Figure 4 shows, the evidential–conjectural stasis resolution was 
activated, then, to buttress the evidential-definitional topos. According to the scientists and based 
on current understandings in seismology, the data did not unequivocally mean that there would 
be an earthquake. In fact, the likelihood of an earthquake could neither be confirmed nor denied.  
 
Figure 4: Data delivery 
 
Phase 2: Discussion Scaffolding 
Prompted by the belated entrance of several local officials, seismologist Franco Barberi 
interrupted the presentation of recent and historical seismic data in order to restate what he 
understood to be the meeting’s goals: a) to make an objective evaluation of the seismic activity 
and b) to discuss and provide recommendations regarding Giuliani’s warnings (Commission, 
2009). These statements formally activated the evidential-definitive stasis (Does the available 




data mean there will be an earthquake?) and the translative stasis (Do we include Giuliani’s 
data?) Barberi’s understanding of the goals of the meeting are not quite aligned with those 
presented by the DPC earlier. Not grounded in scientific methodologies or risk–uncertainty 
distinctions, the DPC understood (and needed) the question that they posed to the CGR to be one 
of risk (i.e., Is it likely there will be an earthquake soon?)  if they were to successfully discredit 
Giuliani and reassure the Aquilani. The CGR, unable to answer that question, as seismology is 
unable to predict earthquakes, redeployed the DPC question as an activation of the evidential–
definitional question, What does the evidence mean? or in this case, Does the available evidence 
mean there will be an earthquake? This talking past each other is represented in the functional 
stasis map by their collocation (see Figure 3).  
Members of the CGR then proceeded to resolve this evidential-definitive question. A 
pattern ensues: The scientists alternated between resolution statements – no, the evidence does 
not necessarily indicate an earthquake – and buttressing references to recent and historical 
seismic data. For example, Boschi stated, “Improbabile che ci sia a breve una scossa come 
quella del 1703, pur se non si puo’ escludere in maniera assoluta. [It is improbable that there 
would be a tremor like the one in 1703 in the near future, though the possibility cannot be 
entirely excluded]” (Commission, 2009, p. 2). Later, Barberi responded: “Concordo con Selvaggi 
che sono molto piu’ frequenti le sequenze sismiche che le forti scosse. Ovviamente non possiamo 
dire che ci sara’ o non ci sara’ una forte scossa. [I agree with Selvaggi that there are more 
frequently seismic sequences than large quakes. Obviously we cannot say whether there will be 
or there will not be a large quake.]” (Commission, 2009, p. 4) 
The scientists’ language was repeatedly marked with modals, adverbials, and verb tenses 
typically used to indicate uncertainty: “con un grado, però, di incertezza [with a degree, 




however, of uncertainty],” “non si può escludere in maniera assoluta [it cannot be excluded 
absolutely],” “come sia estremamente difficile fare previsione [it would be extremely difficult to 
make temporal predictions],” and “Gli sciami tendono ad avere la stessa magnitude ed è molto 
improbabile che nello stesso sciame la magnitudo cresca. [The clusters tend to have the same 
magnitude and it is very improbable that within the same cluster the magnitude would increase]” 
(Commission, 2009, pp. 2-4). With only one exception, every scientific speaking turn was 
marked with at least one indicator of uncertainty. Such rhetorical moves to emphasize 
uncertainty reflect the uncertainty inherent in the field of seismology at this time; while the 
scientists can and did present data, they were uncertain about its meaning. Earthquake prediction 
is uniformly rejected in the scientific community. However, there are competing accounts of 
appropriate methodologies for earthquake forecasting, presented variously under the language of 
risk or the language of uncertainty. Whether earthquake forecasts truly constitute risk or 
uncertainty is a fraught question and must remain the subject of another discussion. However, as 
the CGR treats both prediction and forecasting as uncertainty, my analysis of the flow of stases 
and resolutions relies on that account. 
The noted uncertainty in the scientists’ language may also be a reflection of the statistics 
and probabilities they used to understand seismic activity. Their ways of enactment did not 
directly set them up to make clear-cut answers or predictions, much less policy decisions. Thus, 
the scientists’ responses focused exclusively on the stases activated by an earthquake as a matter 
of fact. Such rhetorical moves also demonstrate an attempt to remain in the stases that are 
seemingly objective, to “safeguard their ethos from attack” (Walker & Walsh, 2012, pp. 10-11).  
Buttressed by this cyclical activation of the evidential-definitional and evidential-
conjectural topoi, some of the scientists did venture into other more action-oriented stases but 




only in reference to matters outside of their direct expertise. Supported by their firm conviction 
that the data do not say whether or not an earthquake will occur, the CGR members encouraged 
investment in prevention strategies (i.e., quake-resistant buildings). This was the CGR’s 
resolution to the unvoiced, unactivated practical-qualitative question, How can we reassure the 
people?  
But, as Figure 5 shows, nested inside this question is a concern about roles, a practical–
translative issue. Resisting entering the stases of value and action concerning scientific matters, 
the scientists, in effect, attempted to hand off their information to the government officials who 
would, as one scientist said, “define the action” (Commission, 2009, p. 4). This role distinction 
between scientists and civil servants is one that CGR members were quick to address. And, as if 
to reemphasize their role as scientists who present facts, they promptly returned the conversation 
once again to the inability of scientists to say that the data predict an earthquake, buttressed by 
additional statements about recent and historical seismic data. 
 
Figure 5: Discussion scaffolding 
Phase 3: Translative Fleshing Out 
During their presentation, CGR scientists displayed no inclination to consider Giuliani’s 
evidence. Of course, neglecting to consider this evidence did not constitute refuting it and, as 




such, did not serve the DPC’s tacit goal of silencing Giuliani. As a result, DPC official Daniela 
Stati explicitly introduced the issue, marking a third phase of the meeting: “Quello che 
vorremmo sapere è se dobbiamo dare retta a chi va in giro a creare allarmismo [What we would 
like to know is whether we have to listen to those who go around town creating alarm]?” 
(Commission, 2009, p. 4). As an activation of the ethotic-translative stasis, this question is a 
matter of expertise. Is Giuliani qualified to speak on these matters, and should he be allowed to 
participate? In short, the answer was no; however, unwilling to be pulled into overtly political 
questions, the CGR scientists retreated to the relatively safer territory of matters of fact, invoking 
a methodological-conjectural discussion. 
Here I understand translative as a more general stasis. Even though its instantiation in the 
CGR is indexed specifically to Giuliani, the question raised is more about what types of people 
are eligible to serve as experts in this discussion. And, so the most significant follow-up is found 
in the activation of the nested methodological-conjectural question. That is, for the scientists, at 
least, the appropriateness of including Giuliani is predicated on the appropriateness of his 
scientific process. At the same time, the CGR also opens up as a possible line of inquiry, the 
suggestion that Giuliani's personal credibility might remove him from eligibility as an authority. 
This is activated in the nested ethotic-translative stasis. To be sure, the translative and the 
ethotic-translative are closely related in their activation in the CGR. However, the ethotic-
translative remains unresolved. The line of inquiry is never fully pursued, perhaps due to 
politeness, available time, or simply the activation of the methodological-conjectural stasis 
resolving the translative stasis in a more PR-friendly manner.  
One of the most obvious stopping points in the course of the CGR discussion regarding 
earthquake prediction is Giuliani’s radon gas data and methodology. This issue is not simply 




conjectural; the meeting minutes show that none of the CGR members disputed the presence of 
the radon gas or questioned the measurements that indicated their levels had risen. Those 
measurements, the evidence of increased levels, stood. The question at hand was about the 
validity of radon gas theories and methodology for earthquake prediction and if this data should 
be included as part of the presented data. Prelli’s (2005) schema perfectly accounts for this sort 
of question: The methodological-conjectural stasis is activated and presents itself quite simply 
and directly, “Is procedure X a viable scientific procedure in this case?” (p. 305).  
 With more certainty than they displayed elsewhere, the CGR scientists emphasized the 
consensus of the seismological community that there were simply no available approaches for 
predicting earthquakes: 
Ci sarebbe anche qualcuno che farebbe alcune previsioni con un apparecchio che 
misura le emissioni di gas. Potrebbe essere interessante in futuro, ma oggi sicuramente 
non lo e’. Non c’e’ nessuno strumento che possa avvisarci che ci sara’ un terremoto. 
[There might also be someone who could make some predictions with a device that 
measures gas emissions. This could be interesting in the future, but today there 
definitely is not any such thing. There is not a single instrument that can tell us that 
there will be an earthquake.] (Commission, 2009, p. 4) 
 
And these scientists dismissed radon measurement, neither scientifically proven nor accepted by 
the larger scientific community, as a viable, valid scientific process for predicting earthquakes: 
Non vale la pena che la CGR discuta di questo, ne ha gia’ discusso a lungo in altre 
occasioni. ... Questa sequenza sismica non preannuncia niente ma sicuramente 
focalizza di nuovo l’attenzione su una zona sismogenetica in cui prima o poi un grosso 
terremoto ci sara’. .. l’unica difesa, oggi, e’ quella di incentivare le attivita’ di 
prevenzione (rafforzare gli edifici) e pianificazione. [It is not worthwhile for the CGR to 
discuss this [i.e. whether gas emissions, or anything, can predict earthquakes]. We have 
already discussed it at length at other occasions. ... This sequence of seismic events does 
not predict anything, but it certainly focuses attention once again on an area of seismic 
activity where sooner or later there will be a big earthquake. ... The only defense we 
have today is to incentivize reinforcing buildings.] (Commission, 2009, p. 4)  
 
 In one fell swoop, this rejection of the notion that increased radon levels could predict 
earthquakes buttressed the resolution to both exclude Giuliani from the debate and discard the 




radon-measurement data. Because Giuliani did not adhere to the methodological consensus, he 
was excluded from the body of practicing scientists and from entering the discussion, thereby 
sidestepping any questions about the meaning of his radon evidence. After discrediting 
Giuliani’s methods and excluding his participation as an expert, the CGR could return to the 
question of what the facts were from a “scientific perspective” and what they meant. As if for 
emphasis, this phase of the meeting concluded with a reactivation of the evidential-definitive 
resolution that the available data could not predict an earthquake (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Translative fleshing out 
 
The Giuliani factor at the CGR meeting raises obvious but serious questions within the 
continuing scholarship on expertise and inclusion in science-policy debate (as discussed in the 
previous chapter). The ethics of inclusion in this case arguably differ depending on the wave of 
STS or STP in which one participates. Under the postmodern model of universal inclusion (see 
Collins & Evans, 2002), Giuliani absolutely deserved to be an active participant in the process. 
Discrediting him should never have been a goal. Indeed, his inclusion may also have been 
warranted under the more normative models of technical decision making. Although Giuliani is 
not a published scientist, his lengthy experience as a lab technician might have granted him what 
Collins and Evans (2002) call “referred expertise” and thus validated his inclusion in the ongoing 




decision-making process. While in hindsight, it is easy to note that Giuliani’s recognition of 
increased radon gas levels did indeed correspond with a serious earthquake, the official scientific 
position is that this correlation could be accidental. If so, then the Italian authorities might well 
have been ethically correct in charging him with inciting a public panic and excluding him from 
the conversation. But at the least, it seems problematic that the participants at the CGR went into 
the meeting intending “to immediately shut up any imbecile.” Certainly, the CGR failed to 
constitute itself as anything like the hybrid forum that Callon et al (2009) imagined.  
Phase 4: Practical Fleshing Out  
In the fourth phase, evidence of the CGR meeting really breaking down emerged. I do not 
mean breaking down in the sense that people stormed out of the room or that there was some 
interruption in discourse. While the meeting proceeded without visible interruption or concern, 
the breakdown I refer to was demonstrated by acts of talking past each other, rather than to each 
other. For example, the DPC presented the CGR with a question, but the CGR answered a 
different question. As a result, each group of discussants activated different stases, which 
authorized different resolutions. It is not clear from the meeting transcripts or any follow-up 
material if anyone was ever aware of this static misalignment. 
Buttressed by previous emphases on the impossibility of earthquake prediction, two CGR 
members attempted to provide a resolution (from outside the field of seismology) to the activated 
practical-qualitative stasis. They support preventative measures, such as structural improvements 
and monitoring, as the only defense presently available. Following these comments, the meeting 
concluded with Stati saying, “Grazi per queste vostre affermazioni, che mi permettono di andare 
a rassicurare la popolazione attraverso i media che incontreremo in conferenza stampa [Thank 
you for your affirmations, which allow me to go reassure the public through the media that we 




will have a press conference]” (Commission, 2009, p. 4). Stati’s closing statement demonstrates 
an abrupt switch to an alternative resolution of the practical–qualitative stasis, buttressed by the 
evaluative–conjectural resolution.  
I attribute this transformation of the CGR’s message of uncertainty to the DPC’s message 
of reassurance to an interpretive conflict caused by the false equivalence of the evidential–
definitive and evaluative-conjectural stases that were being adjudicated (see Figure 7). The DPC 
took the scientists’ uncertainty and hesitancy about predicting an earthquake as a signal of 
unlikelihood (conjectural). This interpretation suggests that when dealing with matters of 
concern, which overflow traditional stasis taxonomies, the scientists’ “objective” statements 
cannot necessarily be divided from value, as much as they may try to do so.  According to Walsh 
(2009), even if scientists attempt to restrict their discourse to the “objective” stases, these 
statements of fact carry the power of implication that encourages listeners to “hear scientists 
making implicit value and policy claims” (p. 42). For example, towards the end of the meeting, 
Barberi stated, “This sequence of seismic events doesn’t predict anything” (Commission, 2009, 
p. 4). It does not take much effort to sense the value- and policy-level implications nested in such 
a statement. That is, if the swarms do not announce anything, then they are not a bad sign; an 
earthquake is unlikely, therefore action is not necessary at this time. Certainly, additional factors 
such as political currents or economic impact play a role in assessing these objective statements 
in the decision-making process, but the Giuliani factor cannot be denied. Although the meeting 
was not officially framed as an effort to discredit Giuliani, the desire to silence him seems to 
have colored the DPC’s interpretation of the scientists’ message of technical uncertainty.   





Figure 7: Practical fleshing out 
 
After the CGR Meeting 
 
In accomplishing the identified DPC goals, the CGR emergency meeting was a success. 
It discredited Giuliani, and given the DPC’s interpretation of the CGR’s statement of uncertainty 
as a statement of unlikelihood, it addressed the DPC’s initial question – How can we reassure the 
Aquilani? Subsequently, the DPC held a press conference. Given their desire to calm the public, 
the government officials did not simply convey the facts. They reassured the people, reporting 
that the conditions were normal and “there [was] no real danger” (Woodman, 2013, p. 56). As I 
describe in Chapter 1 with more detail, this is when De Bernardinis’ infamous “glass of wine” 
comment is aired in an attempt to reassure the populace and reclaim the DPC’s authority. As the 
events surrounding the 2009 earthquake show, these assessments and reassurances were 
ultimately based on a misunderstanding of uncertainty as low risk and did not reflect the events 
that took place. This miscommunication is what the Aquilani take issue with during the trial.  




As boundaries become increasingly blurred and hybrids and imbroglios appear more 
frequently, situations like the L’Aquila controversy could become more common. Such 
controversies, though, are useful because they draw attention to these incoherencies that 
otherwise might remain matters of fact, destabilizing existing practices and fostering reflection 
(and maybe changes). Studies of controversy traditionally look for closure. Reporters, scientists, 
bloggers, scholars, and more have been quick to point to the lessons learned from L’Aquila about 
risk communication, ethics, and relationships between scientists, politicians, and publics; many 
fear that scientists will see this controversy as a lesson in clamming up. But the L’Aquila 
controversy, like so many hybrid fora, resists closure and easy conclusions. Although I am not 
able to fully address here the ongoing policy questions involved in this case of the L’Aquila 
Seven, my analysis, however, does suggest potential revisions to rhetorical theory. Specifically, 
traditional approaches to stasis theory might be inadequate to account for technical controversies 
in hybrid forums. 
Ultimately, I argue that the conflict here between the deliberative practices of the CGR 
and the DPC and the expectations of the people of L’Aquila highlights the sort of conflict that 
occurs when matters of concern are construed solely as matters of fact – when uncertainty is 
handled as risk. By handling the situation as a matter of fact and not recognizing the overflow 
into matters of concern, the CGR failed to tell the Aquilani what they wanted to know or include 
them (and Giuliani) in any meaningful ways. As this functional stasis analysis shows, the key 
stakeholders in the L’Aquila controversy were communicating (or had expectations for 
communicating) on different stasis levels. Thus, the “incomplete, imprecise, and contradictory 
information” that the prosecution charged the L’Aquila Seven with referred to information at a 




procedural level rather than a factual one. Such miscommunication points to the hybridity of the 
situation, and such miscommunication, regardless of fault, can clearly be costly. 
If, instead, the DPC and the CGR had chosen to approach the possibility of a L’Aquila 
earthquake as a thing—as a matter of concern, they might then have chosen to constitute a true 
hybrid forum. Hybrid fora take up issues from different domains, overriding the traditional 
purification of fact and value, and reconfigure the division between technical and public spheres. 
Such a move toward hybridity of inclusion and decision-making authority might have given 
discussants the opportunity to open up the issue to a wider array of stases and thus better 
accommodate people’s demands. Such a move might have also made it possible to include, or at 
least consider including, Giuliani and address the appropriateness of his predictions in an open, 
inclusive space rather than allow certain stakeholders’ desires to silence him twist the 
conversation. Of course, the deep uncertainty of living with earthquakes is difficult to deal with. 
But the technical experts’ insistence that earthquakes are matters of fact, thereby bracketing off 
public concerns, likely paved the way for the Aquilani to be more “demanding,” as Callon et al 
(2009) note, in retroactively finding fault. 
Finally, I am concerned with the long-term ramifications of public efforts to find fault. 
While the scientific community’s boundary work and insistence on modeling earthquakes as 
matters of fact certainly contributed to the stasis conflict I identified, the resulting public outcry 
and subsequent indictment of the L’Aquila Seven might only serve to reinforce these boundaries. 
As the epistolary advocacy of the AAAS, AGU, GSA, and IAVCEI referenced in Chapter 1 
indicate, the scientific community has taken both notice of and exception to the current Italian 
legal proceedings. These letters show evidence of the authoring scientists retreating from public 
engagement and reinforcing the modeling of earthquakes solely as matters of fact grounded in 




scientific consensus and accepted methodologies. They declare quite clearly that “to expect more 
of science at this time is unreasonable” (Leshner, 2010). I worry that the efforts to prosecute the 
L’Aquila Seven will further encourage scientists to remove themselves from the political 
dimensions of technical decision making to avoid exposing themselves to risks of incarceration – 
which, of course, is exactly the opposite of what is needed in situations of deep uncertainty. 
Subsequently, the Italian prosecutorial efforts surrounding the L’Aquila Seven will likely have 
international reverberations that further inhibit the formation of hybrid fora – a matter of concern 
for all technical democracy.  
 
  




Chapter 4: Agency Visualized 
 
Whether predicting natural hazard events or measuring social impacts from human-made 
hazards, the handling of risk and uncertainty in modern societies involves an unprecedented level 
of complexity. The challenges of navigating issues such as an abundance of data and sources, 
uncertainty, complicated mathematical models, and technical language have driven the 
development of new risk communication strategies – notably visual techniques. Within the world 
of risk communication, this move to visualize risk is an increasingly popular strategy for 
facilitating interaction between experts and publics. Risk visualization is the strategic use of 
images to either augment the quality of or independently engage in risk communication along the 
entire risk management cycle (e.g., identifying, evaluating, planning for, or monitoring risk). 
Risk visualizations can generally make use of any visual technique and come in a wide variety of 
forms, include drawings, photographs, movies, diagrams, and maps. 
Figure 8: National seismic hazard map of 
Italy 




Evidence of the growing presence and importance of risk visualization can be seen in the 
case of L’Aquila. “The only useful thing that can protect us from earthquakes is the seismic 
 hazard map of a country,” said seismologist Giulio Selvaggi in a spontaneous statement during  
the final hearing of the L’Aquila Seven (Processoaquila, 2014). Enzo Boschi, former President of 
the INGV and another member of the L’Aquila Seven, echoes a similar sentiment in a letter 
published in Science about the L’Aquila controversy. He concludes, “In publishing an official 
map, seismologists have done all they currently can to protect society from earthquakes” 
(Boschi, 2013). The map referenced by these scientists can be seen in Figure 8.  
Agencies and organizations tasked with matters of risk are also increasingly advocating 
for visual risk communication. The Red Cross, for example, promotes the use of visual strategies 
in one of its guidebooks: “Even for highly literate people, pictures speak louder than words. 
People often remember visual messages, such as photos, graphics, animation or video, more 
clearly than text. When people see visual proof of the effectiveness of disaster reduction 
measures…they are much more convinced than when they hear or read about it” (International 
Federation of Red Cross, 2011, p. 59). Similarly, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
(FEMA) guidance about risk communication strategies and public outreach claims that “the use 
of graphical and visual tools, such as color maps, can often be more effective in communicating 
hazard data than tables filled with text and numbers…people understand and remember visual 
data much better than textual data” (25). 
All of the above examples attribute great agency to risk visualizations, both in terms of 
contributing to risk prevention and engaging publics. To be sure, visuals have powerfully 
mediated how the world is perceived, and they have material consequences for catalyzing future 
actions and realities. In prioritizing the role that objects play in rhetorical events, Graham (2009) 




argues for the importance of “trac[ing] how multiple rhetorical events working in concert form 
an agentive chain of events that continues to propagate further discursive and practical effects” 
(399). The fundamental insight behind Graham’s work is that objects (e.g., technologies, 
materials, nature) perform along with the human in rhetorical events and have the ability to 
legitimize certain interpretations. As such, visuals are undeniably important vectors for risk 
communication between experts and non-experts. Visuals, and the ethics of their design and use, 
should be taken seriously. But what agencies do these visuals actually stage? And how do they 
stage them? Do they, as Selvaggi suggests with seismic hazard maps, actually protect us and/or 
enable users to minimize danger? This is an issue that is, as of yet, unexplored in the rhetoric of 
science and made all the more salient because of both the power we culturally invest in visuals 
and the increasing pressure on experts to incorporate visuals into their public outreach.  
As described earlier, matters of concern require the consideration of “a complete set of 
new actors,” actors that are both human and non-human (Latour, 2008, p. 39). Whereas the 
previous chapters emphasized human actors, in this chapter, I will consider the non-human and 
its role in how rhetorical agency is perceived, distributed, and fostered. Recent interest in agency 
scholarship over the role of objects and technologies and the distribution of agency across 
networks is well suited for exploring a variety of associations between the human and non-
human actors present in matters of concern. Continuing this work, I draw upon models of agency 
that entwine individual agency and ideological forces (Herndl &  Licona, 2007; Miller, 2007; 
Winsor, 2007) and network theory (Cooper, 2011; Graham, 2009; Gries, 2015) to explore the 
rhetorical, agentive nature of seismic risk visuals, such as those referenced in the L’Aquila 
controversy. In response to the call to develop novel approaches that can better accommodate the 
complexity and dynamism (and complete sets of new actors) of matters of concern, I offer 




agentive modeling, a mixed methods data visualization approach for networked modeling of 
agency. I apply this method to a collection of technical and public-facing risk visualizations from 
the websites of key seismic risk organizations. In what follows, I engage in a short review of the 
relevant literature before I describe my research methods and interpret the results of the analysis. 
The Pictorial Turn 
 
In the mid-1990s, W.J.T. Mitchell identified the emerging cross-disciplinary trend of 
attending to visuality as the “pictorial turn.” This turn marked a growing understanding both that 
visual culture is highly complicated and that applying traditional textual approaches to study 
visuals was not sufficient for understanding their complexity. Prior to this turn, rhetorical 
research on visuals was limited because of the field’s long-standing emphasis on oral and written 
communication. Because of this disciplinary emphasis, a great effort in rhetorical scholarship has 
been made to demonstrate the argumentative, persuasive potential of visuals (Birdsell & 
Groarke, 1996; Dyehouse, 2011; Finnegan, 2001; Fountain, 2014; Hill & Helmers, 2004; Smith 
et al, 2005; LaWare, 1998; Richards, 2015; Rosner, 2001; Prelli, 2006; Propen, 2007; Walsh, 
2015; Wysocki, 2005). In other words, visuals do not simply display or show information; they 
are rhetorical and “perform persuasive work” (Wysocki, 2004, p. 124). As this body of 
scholarship emphasizes, understanding the rhetorical nature of visuals is central to grasping their 
possibilities and challenges, to taking them seriously.  
In both technical and scholarly spheres, growing attention is being paid to the role of 
visuals in risk communication. Particularly within the contexts of health and medicine, scholars 
are actively evaluating the effect of visuals and specific visualization strategies and technologies 
on public and political perceptions of risk (Bostrom, Anselin, & Farris, 2008; Brander, 
Drozdzewksi, & Dominey, 2014; Landau et al, 2009; Dobos, 2016; Ventura et al, 2015, Roth, 




2012; Severtson & Burt, 2012; Hess et al, 2011; Walsh, 2014) as well as the potential of visuals 
and specific visualization strategies and technologies to foster public engagement with risk 
(Richards, 2015; Stephens, De Lorme, & Hagen, 2015). This research shows, among other 
things, that visuals can be effective tools for public outreach, helping to communicate complex 
information and mediate between different communities. But these are not the only roles visuals 
can play. As Gries (2015) points out, visual things are capable of co-producing all kinds of 
action, including persuading people to take action (69). While work such as DeLuca (1999) and 
Dobrin & Morey (2009) provide well-rounded theories of visual activism, this aspect is not well 
addressed in the study of technical graphics like seismic hazard maps. Existing work on visual 
activism often focuses on media such as photography, which has different affordances than 
technical graphics. Photography, for example, plays with properties like light, texture, depth, 
perspective, and color to capture a moment, subject, or process at a single point in time. 
Technical graphics, on the other hand, are well suited for making trends, distributions, cycles, 
and relationships (particularly across time) more evident. They are also useful for making 
comparisons, representing large quantities of data, and providing overviews or steps of complex 
processes. That technical graphics have distinct conventions and functions has been recognized 
by a robust body of scholarship dedicated to their study (See, for example, Tufte, 1990, 2001; 
Brasseur, 2003; Kostelnick & Hassett, 2003; Kostelnick, 2008).  
One of the goals of risk communication (including the visuals enrolled in it) is to 
generate danger-preventing action from the users. It is not enough to just see and know hazard o 
risk in situations where people’s lives are at stake. The first step in understanding how risk 
visuals may induce action is to explore how they configure the potential for action in the first 
place. What agencies do these risk visuals actually stage, and how do they stage them? Given the 




cultural power we attribute to visuals and their increasing prevalence in risk communication 
efforts, how exactly the potential for action is configured has important ramifications.  
As scholars interested in visual rhetoric, especially, strive to show that visual things 
matter and actively shape our world, questions about available analytical resources and 
methodologies have arisen. Some have looked outside rhetoric, drawing from fields such as 
psychology, aesthetics, philosophy, literary criticism, and media studies. For example, Kress and 
Van Leeuwen’s Reading Images (2006) offers semiotics as a method for studying visual 
argumentation. Likewise, Gross and Harmon (2013) use semiotics and Gestalt theory to develop 
a systematic, analytical framework for understanding how the visual and verbal work together to 
communicate meaning. Others have looked within rhetoric for visual methods, returning to 
classical rhetorical traditions (Dyehouse, 2011; Kimball, 2006; Prelli, 2006; Reeves, 2011; 
Buehl, 2016). Rhetoricians of science and technical communicators have developed a number of 
analytical heuristics to study the effects of science-related visualizations, both in book-length 
treatments (Fahnestock, 1999; Fountain, 2014; Gross, Harmon, & Reidy, 2002; Prelli, 2006), and 
a number of recent scholarly articles (Graham, 2009; Reeves 2011; Teston, 2012; Walsh, 2014).  
In their reflection on the direction of visual rhetorical scholarship in RSTM, Prelli and 
Condit (2013) emphasize the need to be open to analytical tools, especially in this “preliminary 
phase” of study (1). And, there is a vibrant, growing methodological toolbox, as the previously 
referenced work suggests. But this toolbox is primarily focused on studying the effcts of visuals, 
and, as Gries (2015) points out, “we are left…with little empirical evidence to demonstrate how 
that [effecting] actually happens” (58). As Hariman and Lucaites (2007) and Gries (2015) model 
for us, visual rhetoric scholars can do a better job of making visible how visuals act.  
Agentive Modeling 
 




In order to explore the rhetorical, agentive nature of seismic risk visuals, I assembled a 
dataset of technical and public-facing visuals from the websites of key organizations concerned 
with seismic risk. I began with the two organizations involved in the L’Aquila case, the National 
Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV) and the DPC. The INGV is a world-renowned 
scientific organization dedicated to monitoring and maintaining Italy’s network of geophysical 
sensors. They also provide early warnings, forecasts, and educational outreach. The INGV 
supports the DPC in its national, regional, and local efforts to “spread the culture of civil 
protection,” which includes projects and activities for prevention of, monitoring of, and 
intervention or response to natural disasters (“Civil Protection Department”). For additional data 
collection, I went to the American counterparts of these two Italian organizations – the United 
States Geological Society (USGS) and FEMA.  
Many of the visuals from these four websites are more technical in nature and designed 
for expert audiences, but I also wanted to include artifacts that aimed to be more public-facing in 
my analysis. So, I included the DPC’s (2007) The Civil Protection Handbook for Families and 
the USGS’ (2007) handbook for the San Francisco area, Putting Down Roots in Earthquake 
Country, to the dataset. These are the most current editions of this kind of document from both 
organizations.  
For each site, I navigated to the pages related to seismic risk and earthquakes. I collected 
a large initial dataset by downloading or screen capturing the visuals I found. My goal in this 
first stage was to amass as many visuals as possible before beginning to sift and conduct a close 
analysis, a process Gries calls “data hoarding.” As Gries (2015) notes, amassing a large dataset 
can better aid researchers in identifying patterns and trends in the data (111).  




After collecting 91 visuals from the websites and handbooks, I began sorting through the 
data. Duplicate copies of a visual were noted and removed. Similarly, images that were relatively 
synonymous were also pared back, with one representative visual kept in the dataset. For 
example, the USGS creates ShakeMaps for any significant earthquake. While each visual is 
unique to the seismic event, they are all basically the same kind of visual, so only one 
representative ShakeMap was included. Other exclusion criteria included real-time data displays 
and visuals that were interactive and dynamic. As part of this selection process, I developed four 
genres that I used for further sorting and refinement: technical data displays, maps, photographs, 
and infographics. The initial dataset of 91 visuals was narrowed to a purposive sample of 21 for 
schema development and initial analysis.  
Schema Development 
A provisional coding schema was developed based on a random sample of N visuals 
stratified across all four genres. I then applied the provisional coding schema to an initial sample 
of four visuals, one from each category. I repeated this process one time, revising the provisional 
coding schema before completing a series of schema and rater calibration activities with a second 
rater. These activities included both group coding exercises and individual coding with 
subsequent discussion. Following the initial calibration sessions, coding notes and periodic 
conferencing throughout the coding process allowed for continual calibration and discussion, 
clarification, and refinement of the provisional schema. Although some revisions were more 
cosmetic in nature (e.g., numbering systems), others involved altering the actual codes included 
in the schema. In some instances, the initial categories were insufficiently granular. For example, 
the actant code, “land/soil” was broken down into a general “land” category as well as different 
types of soil. Multiple visuals included soil classifications, which had impacts on the varying 




soils’ level of influence. And in other cases, the initial codes were too granular. For example, 
“tectonic plates” and “earthquakes” were condensed into the code, “seismic activity.” 
Periodically, new actants arose in the dataset, and the code was expanded to include them. See 
Table 2 for the final coding schema. 
The coding process adhered to the following guidelines. For each visual, we identified 
who or what was acting and on whom or what, their levels of influence (ranging from minimal 
impact to potentially unstoppable), and the kind of action staged (that is, programmatic, or 
preventing danger, death, or destruction; anti-programmatic, or increasing danger, death, or 
destruction; or neither). While primarily referring to the visual itself to make coding decisions, 
we also drew upon supporting text (e.g., labels, titles, captions, etc.).21 Any instances of repeated 
or multiple interactions were coded. Visuals were coded with an emphasis on what was actually 
represented or what was intended by the designers (particularly in the case of technical visuals) 
as opposed to possible implications or how it might be received. For example, a visual that 
showed post-earthquake destruction might feature multiple, destroyed buildings and rubble but 
be devoid of people. While these ruined buildings would certainly have an effect on people 
moving forward (and it is, perhaps, natural as a human viewer to draw this connection), this 
interaction would not have been captured as part of the coding process because there was no 
direct or indirect staging of people.    
The two raters independently coded the dataset over several days. At the completion of 
coding, interrater reliability was assessed using Krippendorff’s Alpha, an interrater reliability  
 
                                                            
21 As Dobrin and Morey (2009) point out, “While we might try to understand images alone, that is, without 
attaching to them an external language…to do so would be problematic and might also be unethical. Images rarely 
occur without any connection to text, and practical experience tells us that within our culture of communication, 
one must understand both media to make sense of the constant images that clamor for attention” (10).  






Seismic activity Shaking levels, magnitudes, seismograph inscriptions, cracks 
in walls, etc. 
People Direct or indirect representations (e.g., city dots, an 
abundance of community markers) 
Household objects Tables, chairs, books, stairs, etc. 
Infrastructure Buildings, roads, plumbing, power supplies 
Debris Rubble, waste, remains, rough fragments of stone, brick, 
concrete, etc.,; objects that have been transformed 
substantially by seismic activity 
Car  
Information Knowledge about seismic activity, safety actions, etc. 
Seismic hazards Tsunami, landslide, liquefaction 
Seismograph The actual machine or its inscriptions 
Historic faults Faults with evidence of displacement in the last 200 years 
via recorded earthquake, displaced survey lines, or creep 
slippage  




Soft muds  
Emergency responders People specifically engaged in responding to post-disaster 
situations in official capacities 
Heavy machinery Bulldozers, cranes, etc. 
Hardware Safety latches, anchors, etc. 
Land 2D and 3D representations of land (e.g., mountain, land 
mass) 
Animals  
Level of Influence  
 Limited Minimal impact, often limited options for activity 
 Moderate  Some impact, but neither all-powerful nor passive 
 Substantial Significant impact, potentially unstoppable, many options 
for activity 
Kind of Action  
Programmatic Activity that prevents danger, death, or destruction 
Anti-programmatic Activity that increases or imposes danger, death, or 
destruction 
Neutral Activity that contributes to neither program or anti-
program 
 
Table 2: Final coding schema 
 




metric capable of handling many possible designs and data types (Freelon, 2010; Hayes & 
Krippendorff, 2007). Although guidelines for reliability vary, values above .80 on 
Krippendorff’s α are generally understood to represent substantial agreement. 
 
Code   α      n  
Actants .977 798 
Level of Influence .946 15492 
Kind of Action .927 15492 
 
Table 3: Interrater reliability by code using Krippendorff's alpha 
 
 As seen in Table 3, the alpha values for each coding category indicate substantial levels of 
agreement. The relative infrequency of the application of some codes coupled with clear coding 
definitions (for example, the seismograph actant code) accounts for several of the particularly 
high levels of agreement. The total number of coding decisions (n) made is also included.  
Artifact Analysis  
To analyze the selected visual artifacts, I developed a data visualization approach for 
networked modeling of agency. Data visualization, or what many refer to as information 
visualization, is a productive step in making sense of a dataset because it “enables rapid 
interpretation of high quantities of information; enhances perception of trends, patterns, 
analogies, and threads; leads to new revelations about data and the way it is collected; facilitates 
understanding; and leads to hypothesis formation” (Gries, 2015, p. 127). Visualization can be 
more than an end product for delivering final results and findings; it can also be an integral part 
of the research process (Gries, 2015; White, 2010).  




For each visual artifact, the coding schema was applied as described above to identify 
actants and the relationships among them. In the case of Figure 9, I identified seismic activity (as 
represented by the shaking levels), people, land, and infrastructure. For each identified actant, I 
assessed if it was shown as acting on anything else (or if it was being acted upon) and in what 
ways. This information was then entered into Gephi 0.9.1, an open-source network analysis and 
visualization software used in various disciplines.  
To facilitate the analysis and visual interpretation, I selected the Force Atlas layout 
algorithm. According to Mathieu Jacomy, one of the developers of Gephi and author of the Force 
Atlas layout algorithm, this particular algorithm’s strength lies in its ability to allow the user to 
study the detailed properties of scale-free networks with the fewest biases possible. Force Atlas 
belongs to a class of networks known as force-directed algorithms. This algorithm uses the 
properties of the network to produce a layout that is aesthetically pleasing, flexible, and intuitive 
Source Target Level of Influence Kind of Action 
Seismic activity Land Limited Anti 
Seismic activity Land Moderate Anti 
Seismic activity Land Substantial Anti 
Seismic activity People Limited Anti 
Seismic activity People Moderate Anti 
Seismic activity People Substantial Anti 
Seismic activity Infrastructure Limited Anti 
Seismic activity Infrastructure Moderate Anti 
Seismic activity Infrastructure Substantial Anti 
People Seismic activity Limited Programmatic 
0: An urban seismic hazard map of Seattle, WA (left) with accompanying codes (right).  This map, made by the USGS in 2007, 
shows the probability of ground shaking exceeding a certain threshold in a set number of years.  




while offering insights about the relationships between connections. It provides a high degree of 
accuracy for smaller datasets as well as fairly large ones and is particularly suited for networks in 
which every node is connected to relatively few nodes (Khokhar, 2015).  
In Force Atlas, the placement of each node depends on the others. This process is heavily 
dictated by the connections, or edges, between nodes, which, like springs, attract their nodes. 
Nodes that have many shared edges are clustered, assuming that shared edges indicate similarity 
or closer relationship, and unrelated or distantly related nodes are repelled further apart. So, the 
position of a node cannot be interpreted on its own; it has to be compared to the others. Another 
concept that is made use of in force-directed algorithms is that of hubs and authorities. In a 
directed network, hubs are nodes with a high number of outgoing edges, and authorities are 
nodes with a high number of incoming edges. Force Atlas clusters the authorities towards the 
center of the graph, while the hubs get placed towards the periphery.  
Force Atlas has several settings that can be used to impact the final layout, providing the 
user with new perspectives on the data and/or to solve a specific problem. Most of these settings 
affect the network’s shape. For example, the “gravity” setting attracts nodes to the center of the 
network, preventing nodes that are far away from the center from drifting away. The stronger the 
gravity, the more attracted distant nodes are to the center. Another key setting is repulsion 
strength, which is the force repelling two nodes.  
The visualization of any network involves design choices. In order to better answer my 
research questions, my final step was to make adjustments to the visualization settings and 




appearance of the network, which I will go into in more detail shortly. Figure 10 is the final, 
exported network graph of Figure 9.22 
  
How to Read Gephi 
In order to understand these network graphs, there are a few primary features to be aware 
of. Actants are represented by colored circles, or nodes. As seen in Figure 10, I identified four 
actants: infrastructure, land, seismic activity, and people. Each actant has been assigned a unique 
color to assist in cross-visualization analyses. The connections between the nodes are edges. An 
edge is drawn when one actant acts on another. So, these edges are directional.  
                                                            
22 One visualization feature that Gephi does not currently support is multiple edges between the same actants. The 
program retains the data, but the visual output looks like there is only a single connection. To compensate for this, 
I used Adobe Illustrator to draw in the multiple edges as needed.  
Figure 10: Network graph of agency (right) for the USGS (2007) urban seismic hazard map of Seattle, WA.  




Several key pieces of information are encoded within the edges. The direction of the 
relationships between nodes is indicated by the curves of the edges, which can be read by 
following them in a clockwise direction. For example, in Figure 10, seismic activity is acting on 
infrastructure, land, and people, but only people are acting on seismic activity. The thickness, or 
weight, of each edge indicates the level of influence the source node has in relationship to the 
target node. Limited influence is 1, or the thinnest line; moderate, 3; substantial, 5. In Figure 10, 
each one of these weights is present in the edges connecting seismic activity and infrastructure. 
In other words, in the original hazard map of Seattle (Figure 9), seismic activity is shown to have 
substantial, moderate, and limited impact on infrastructure. Accounting for the level of influence 
helps me to account for agency’s relational-ness. The color of the edges indicates whether the 
relationship contributes to the program of action – risk prevention – or an anti-program. Gray 
edges, like the one from people to seismic activity, indicate contribution to the program. The 
hazard map of Seattle suggests that while people are not particularly agential in the face of 
seismic activity, they can minimize their risk by avoiding areas of high hazard and/or relocating 
to areas of lower hazard. Black edges indicate anti-program actions, or actions that increase or 
impose risks, such as the effect of seismic activity on infrastructure. Tan edges indicate an action 
that contributes to neither. Finally, edge labels are used in special circumstances to indicate 
actions that are other than “transforms” or “acts on.” See, for example, Figure 11. People were 
not transforming or acting on information. They were acquiring or enrolling it. 
The design of the nodes also contains information about the original visual. For example, 








determined by its total out-going action. A quick assessment of Figure 10 readily shows that 
seismic activity is the dominant actant in this network while people, land, and infrastructure are 
relatively passive. Knowing the overall agentiveness, as staged by the artifact, is important to 
understanding what agencies are being staged and in what ways. While I recognize that 
connectedness is also a kind of power (see scholarship on actor-network theory, for example), 
that sort of power is visualized by layout position and edges. As mentioned earlier, each actant 
has been assigned a unique color to assist in analysis across the dataset. The only time a node 
does not have its unique color is when one actant enrolls another in order to act together. These 
assemblages are indicated by the shared node color, as shown in Figure 11. In this case, people 




                    
 
 




are enrolling information in order to increase their level of influence and ability to act on seismic 
activity. To further clarify the relationship, the core of the connecting edge shares the color of the 
nodes in the assemblage. The edges of the edge still retain the gray, black, or tan color scheme, 
as specified above.  
Results 
 
The final dataset consists of 21 network visualizations. Using these network 
visualizations, I quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed how agency was staged in my corpus 
of visual artifacts pertaining to seismic risk communication. As mentioned earlier, the visuals 
were well distributed across four genres: maps (6), photographs (6), technical data displays (5), 
and infographics (4). A total of 84 actants were identified across the dataset. The most common 
actants were seismic activity (20 instances), people (12), infrastructure (12), and land (8). 15 
other unique actants were present, each appearing between one to four times across the dataset. 
Almost half of the networks (48%) were simple ones, involving only one to three actants. A third 
had four to five actants, while four were more complex, containing six or more actants. 
Overwhelmingly, the action in most (76%) of the visualizations was anti-programmatic (i.e. 
actions that do not contribute to danger prevention) with 15 networks consisting entirely of anti-
program action and one being primarily anti-program. In only one network visualization was all 
the action contributing to the program; three other networks were mostly pro-program of action. 
One network visualization showed a balance of action between anti-program and program.  
 In keeping with this chapter’s particular interest with agency in situations of uncertainty, 
I analyzed both the location and edge counts of the top three actants, both of which can be 
considered as proxy agency measures. The location of each node was classified as either 
“central” or “fringe.” Incoming and outgoing weighted edges were counted and then divided to 




create a ratio that could indicate the overall flow of the action. Five categories emerged from the 
dataset: passive, moderately passive, balanced, moderately active, and active. Passive nodes had 
zero outgoing edges, resulting in an undefined ratio. For example, people in Figure 12 are 
passive. Alternatively, an actant was considered active if it had zero incoming edges, resulting in 
a ratio of zero, such as the seismic activity node in Figure 12. Among the top three actants, these 
two categories were overwhelmingly common across the dataset (80%). There were also nine 
nodes that had both incoming and outgoing edges. An actant was considered moderately active if 
its ratio of incoming to outgoing edges was between 0.2 and 0.8. For example, the people node in 
Figure 11 had a total of 33 incoming edges; it also had 41 outgoing edges, giving it a ratio of 0.8. 
Alternatively, an actant was considered moderately passive if its ratio of incoming to outgoing 
edges was higher than 2. For example, the people node in Figure 10 had a total in-degree of nine 
Figure 12: Network visualization of a photo collage emphasizing the multiple ways earthquakes cause damage. This 
visual comes from the USGS' Putting Down Roots in Earthquake Country. 
 




and a total out-degree of one, giving it a ratio of nine. A balanced actant, the only example of 
which is infrastructure in Figure 11, had comparable numbers of in and out degrees, resulting in 
a ratio of one.  
Across the dataset, seismic activity is, perhaps unsurprisingly, an active player. 81% of 
the time it appears, seismic activity has a fully active role. More often (14 times) acting from a 
central position in the network, seismic activity is also still very active (6 times) from the 
periphery. In other words, whether seismic activity is in close (or multiple) relationships (and 
thus densely articulated in the network) with other actants or not, it is consistently displayed as 
agential. Seismic activity is never staged in a passive or moderately passive position.  
In comparison, people are shown to be passive 67% of the time. And they are twice as 
likely to be on the fringe of the network as they are to be centrally located. People are active, 
central agents only once and moderately active, central agents thrice. In other words, people can 
be strong, central actants. They can also be targeted victims, powerless and acted upon by many. 
But mostly, they're just peripheral. In a few cases, they can even impact themselves, for better 
and worse.   
Similarly, infrastructure is most commonly shown as wholly passive (83%). It is twice as 
likely to occupy a fringe position in the network but also appears centrally. Unlike either seismic 
activity or people, infrastructure has the most variation in representation. Rather than being 
repeatedly staged in the same ways in these visuals, infrastructure has the greatest flexibility as 
an actant; it occupies the greatest diversity of positions across the passive-active and central-
fringe ranges. It is also the only major actant that has an instance of being balanced.   
Rhetorical Insights 
 




These results suggest several key narratives about agency and how it is constructed by 
these visuals. In the face of seismic uncertainty, the primary message about the agential-ness of 
people is one of passivity.23 One of the most common types of visuals in the dataset – and one of 
the more publicly displayed – is the hazard map. Widely accepted in geology and used by society 
to make major decisions, these maps predict the effects of future earthquakes of different 
magnitudes by assuming how likely certain areas are to have earthquakes. They show the 
distribution of earthquake shaking levels that have a certain probability of occurring in a specific 
area (USGS, 2015). Predicted hazard levels are typically represented by color with warm colors 
indicating the highest areas of hazard (i.e. greatest shaking). While seismologists like Selvaggi 
have touted the hazard map as “the only useful thing” for protecting people from seismic 
activity, these maps do very little to configure people as agentive.  
Take, for example, Figure 8, the national Italian seismic hazard map produced by the 
INGV. The majority of the visual consists of a political map of Italy at a national scale with a 
small key and some brief descriptive text. In this visual, Italy is covered in vivid, eye-catching 
swaths of color, denoting the level of seismic hazard. This complete coverage of the level of 
hazard may be a useful strategy to help people understand that even in a situation of high 
uncertainty, danger is ever-present. However, this same strategy does little to configure people as 
agentive. In other words, if everywhere is dangerous, if everywhere seismic activity can act on 
people, what can people do? The only course of action seemingly suggested by the map is for 
people to move to areas of lower hazard. This action seems both overly simple in the face of a 
complex situation and unlikely given economic, social, and political concerns. In addition, users 
                                                            
23 While their focus is on maps and mapping, Haraway (2007), Barton & Barton (2004), and Kress & Van Leeuwen 
(2006) all argue that the synoptic is totalizing. This is in line with my findings, although my dataset extends beyond 
maps.   




of the map are likely to be further rendered passive by the technical nature of the map. While the 
intensity of the color scale quickly conveys a sense of increasing hazard to even the untrained 
eye, exactly what each color represents, in terms of the physical, lived experience of seismic 
activity, and what someone should do in response to living in that level of hazard, is unclear. So, 
users are alerted to the potential danger but left with no course of action. While this could be, in 
part, attributed to the purpose of the map, it is also a function of its intended audience. Indeed, 
very little on the map besides the color and political boundaries might be meaningful to a non-
expert, further configuring a public viewer as passive and further troubling the suggestion on the 
part of the L’Aquila scientists to promote such maps as protective tools for people.  These 
implications of these findings are all the more concerning given how common seismic hazard 
maps are in seismic risk communication and education efforts.   
The foregrounding of the omnipotent nature of seismic activity is but one way that the 
“passive people narrative” is conveyed. Some visuals, such as Figure 13, also emphasize the 
range of other potential actants that could negatively impact the health and safety of people. In 
the case of an earthquake, people are also surrounded by and at the mercy of everyday actants, 
such as cars, electrical systems, and infrastructure. And in Figure 13, the page is literally 
surrounded by dangerous actants. These actants, which are typically allied with humans, can be 
mobilized by seismic activity to become just as destructive as an earthquake’s shaking. While 
being informed and aware of other potential hazards is undeniably important, the message here is  




so overwhelmingly anti-programmatic that, like the hazard map, people are placed in a passive 
role. Everything is acting on people, including more dispersed, blackboxed systems like 
plumbing and electrical power, all of which could easily induce resignation rather than 
resilience.  
Further contributing to the potential for people to be seen as unable to act is the use of 
high presentational realism. Scholars are conflicted about the effectiveness of using of realism to 
help viewers better understand uncertain, risky situations (Kostelnick, 2013, Richards, 2015). 
While a high level of realism may be advantageous to convey elevated levels of danger or 
engage people’s emotions, it may also, as Kostelnick et al (2013) point out, evoke fear or panic 
for users. The high level of realism displayed in Figure 13 (especially within the context of a 
wholly anti-programmatic message) could have a numbing/paralyzing effect on the viewer, 
Figure 13: Photo collage from the USGS’ Putting 
Down Roots in Earthquake Country 




which is counterproductive for effective risk communication. The dramatic nature, for example, 
of the image of the fires in San Francisco’s Marina District after the 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake (top left image of Figure 13) impresses upon the viewer the seriousness of this 
particular hazard but also its incredible scale and scope. In the face of multiple city buildings 
engulfed in flame, the options for action seem slim and insignificant.   
 Another key strategy in the dataset that seems to configure people in a passive role is 
repetition. Repetition is especially common in visuals that have a simple (1-3 actants) network, 
and it has the effect of reinforcing a particular power dynamic. This effect, while more or less 
apparent in the various visuals, becomes startlingly clear on the network visualizations.  
Overwhelmingly, the dynamic that is repeated is anti-programmatic. For example, Figure 14 is a 
graph generated by the USGS’ citizen science program, Did You Feel It?, which collects 
information from people who felt an earthquake and creates visuals that show what people 
experienced and the extent of damage. In this technical data display, the two actants – seismic 
activity and people – are repeatedly interacting in the same way. Seismic activity, at substantial, 
moderate, and limited levels, acts on people. At least seventeen times (more if counting all 








emphasized. Confirming their limited agential role, people in this scenario are constrained to 
reporting the impact of seismic activity on themselves.  
 The primary message delivered by these visuals about the role of people may be one of 
passivity, but it is not the only message. Sometimes, people are configured as being more active 
and having some kind of power to impact how they come through an earthquake. As mentioned 
in the results, people are central, powerful actants three times in the dataset. And when this is the 
case, they are consistently linked with non-human actants, such as information or anti-seismic 
hardware, suggesting that the enrollment of other actants is key to configuring people as active. 
Figure 15, an infographic created by FEMA to inform viewers about the hazards in their homes 
Figure 14: Sample graph created by the USGS' "Did You Feel It?" program 




during an earthquake, proposes several assemblages as a strategy for helping people to lower 
their seismic risk before an earthquake occurs. For example, the viewer is advised to “know how 
and when to shut off utilities,” suggesting that when people enroll information, they are better 
able to act in a manner that will increase their safety/resistance to seismic activity. Similarly, the 
infographic also advises people to enroll hardware as a means of becoming more powerful and 
active: “Use latches to keep cabinet doors from flying open during an earthquake.” These 
specific suggestions for assemblages appear alongside other directives for home action, some of 
which imply enrolling non-human actants. A total of 12 different actions people can take to 
secure their homes are presented. In every part of the house, something can be done, and, by and 
large, the actions are quite manageable, like relocating large wall hangings over beds or securing 
computers to desks. There is no dramatic quality to the infographic. The illustration of the home 
Figure 15: Infographic from FEMA 
 




is realistic and orderly; the font is neutral; the language is similarly neutral, simple but directive. 
While the visual does assume a certain level of handiness and access to resources, people are 
undoubtedly configured as active and empowered, rather than passive.  
 Of course, human agency has its limits. All the preventative measures people are capable 
of taking cannot stop an earthquake from happening. So, another important part of configuring 
people as agential even in the face of uncertainty and loss of control, is considering how they 
respond to the event as well as how to prepare for it. Figure 16 provides one example of this. 
This photographic header is the beginning of the section on earthquakes in the DPC’s Handbook 
for Families. One of the few visuals in the dataset to include actual people at all, these 
photographs emphasize people’s position as central and active. The photographs capture a sense 
of energy and movement as they portray people engaging in various post-earthquake activities. 
Gender is not always identifiable, but, when it is, it is men who are doing the acting. Compared 
to other natural hazard sections in the handbook, this is the only one that features people in 
response as opposed to photographs documenting the hazard or its effect. Like Figure 13, the 
high presentational realism afforded by photography is at play here. But unlike Figure 13, the 
high level of realism and the dramatic action captured in Figure 16 is inspiring, as if modeling 
what is possible, rather than overwhelming. While they clearly have no control over the 
Figure 16: Photographic header from DPC's The Civil Protection Handbook for Families 
 




earthquake happening, the visual shows that people can control how they respond. And, 
according to the visual, the appropriate response is resilience. To be sure, the response portrayed 
here is idealized. Some elements of post-earthquake response are masked, like how long it can 
take to get from emergency response of photograph one to the reconstruction of photograph two. 
As they act on infrastructure, debris, heavy machinery, and other people, it’s important to note 
that each photograph features a group of people. In other words, people are resilient in the face 
of seismic activity when they work together. Similar to the human/non-human assemblages of 
Figure 15, people can also enroll each other, or at least other men, in order to be agential.  
Investing in Infrastructure 
 
Given the stakes of communicating about seismic activity, it can be easy to focus on the 
human. But, I’d like to turn for a minute to infrastructure, which like people, was more often 
being acted upon. It is only shown as a powerful agent in two visuals – the majority of its action 
being anti-programmatic. That is, if it acted at all, infrastructure was staged as risky far more 
than helpful. This, of course, makes sense given that infrastructure is designed to be more or less 
invisible. As Johnson and Johnson (2016) point out, “When infrastructure is working, the 
resources it provides seem natural. For instance, access to water, electricity, or air travel is taken 
for granted until access to the water supply, the power grid, or airplanes is compromised. 
Functioning infrastructure is only transparent as long as it’s functional.” So, while infrastructure 
may be far more active than it appears, it is like to only appear active in situations, like a natural 
disaster, when it’s no longer facilitating a relatively predictable experience.  
But infrastructure in these visuals is a fairly central, connected actant, often with 
reciprocal relationships. For example, Figure 11 or Figure 12, which is the network graph for 
Figure 13. Interventionally, this seems to suggest possibilities for reducing seismic risk. As 




Johnson and Johnson (2016) suggest, “infrastructure is rhetorical in that it attunes24 audiences 
participating in the activities it supports.” Particularly as a more connected actant in the 
networks, infrastructure is well positioned to contribute strongly to either programmatic or anti-
programmatic activity. In other words, if infrastructure could be altered to be more active (that is, 
more resistant) in the face of seismic activity, it could affect other actants in the network and 
better support danger prevention or mitigation. The L’Aquila Seven noted this before and after 
the 2009 earthquake when discussing what measures could or should be taken in the historic 
town. The fact that is a common theme in post-disaster situations, when the failure of 
infrastructure becomes jarringly apparent, suggests that changing infrastructure is perhaps more 
difficult in practice to accomplish. As Johnson and Johnson (2016) point out, infrastructure is 
often held in place by a powerful network of actants itself, such as economic incentives. 
However, as they also point out, infrastructure are “at their most flexible during moments of 
strain when rules and protocols are more open for interpretation,” which suggests a certain 
element of kairos is necessarily involved in making the kinds of changes I am suggesting. We 
may never be able to predict or impact seismic activity, but we can ally ourselves with our non-
human neighbors.  
Possibilities and Interventions 
 
Taken together, this work supports a mixed methods data visualization approach as a 
useful way to examine what agencies are staged (and how) in risk visuals. It is important to keep 
in mind several things when considering the above analysis. First, this analysis takes the initial 
step of identifying potential agential configurations in visuals used in seismic risk 
communication. This step lays the groundwork for later examining the effects of these sorts of 
                                                            
24 Johnson and Johnson (2016) draw upon Rickert’s notion of attunement here. Rhetoric can “reattune or otherwise 
transform how others inhabit the world to an extent that calls for some action” (Rickert, 2013, p. 162). 




visuals, but no data has been collected about how the public is responding to these documents 
and no analysis of their effectiveness has been conducted. Second, even though I have identified 
various rhetorical strategies in what often seem to be objective, transparent images, this does not 
necessarily imply intentionality. There is a long-standing critique within rhetoric and 
composition for presenting communication as something that an author, illustrator, or composer 
can be fully in control and conscious of. Indeed, the impact and possibilities of visuals is, in part, 
“due to the fact that [they] contain a surplus of value that cannot be fully controlled” (Schneider 
and Nocke, 2007, p. 17). Visuals are not immutable mobiles. They get reappropriated, 
repurposed, and ignored. They may even get “mangled,” to use Andrew Pickering’s image for 
the unpredictable transformations that are worked upon whatever gets fed into the old-fashioned 
device of the same name.  
That being said, certain patterns about human agency in situations of seismic hazard did 
emerge in these visuals and may well have material consequences in terms of danger prevention 
and engaging publics. Some of these trends, like the overwhelming portrayal of people as 
agentiveless, are concerning, particularly because of the power we culturally invest in visuals 
and the increasing move to include visuals when communicating about complex and uncertain 
situations like seismic hazards. “You gonna die” visuals, such as the Italian hazard map (Figure 
8), are not very helpful in the larger sense of learning how to protect oneself in the face of 
seismic activity. Being aware of the powerful, non-human actants that interact with us, as in 
Figure 13, is an important step but, similarly, not very helpful if it is the only one. These kinds of 
visuals, however, are what made up the majority of the dataset, which suggests that these anti-
programmatic, passive relationships may well be the main messages being sent to viewers, which 
can set expectations for how people should act. This was true even of the visuals from more 




public-facing documents, many of which were focused on scaring people or getting them to 
realize the incredible potential danger of seismic activity. The consequences of unsuccessful risk 
communication can result in injuries or even fatalities during or after a crisis. When citizens are 
not appropriately informed about what to do before, during, or after an earthquake, they are more 
vulnerable to accidents that could be avoided with proper information accessible.  
I do not, however, want to be too quick to dismiss visuals that display anti-programmatic 
action as invaluable. While I am skeptical that making people feel small and powerless is the 
most effective way to help them become powerful, I wonder if this might be a strategy for 
catalyzing action. In our digital age, people have access to more information (and issues) than 
ever before. So, maybe a necessary step to engaging people in risk prevention is to first capture 
their attention and persuade them to take the issue seriously. As rhetoricians, we need to find 
ways of mapping kairoi as they arise to seismic risks – mapping the stress of morning commutes 
to the risk of infrastructure breakdown in the event of an earthquake; or mapping budget battles 
over infrastructure to disasters like Mexico City. Geologic time, the invisibility of seismic 
activity, and human misunderstanding of probability compounds the issue. As certain as these 
events are to occur over the long term, for any given place and time, earthquakes are low 
probability events. Those low odds of risk in the shorter term, the time frame humans pay 
attention to the most, are often dismissed. Instead, people pay more attention to, and worry more 
about, what is most salient. But a risk, like seismic activity, can become salient by showing up 
on our radar screen or by developing emotional connections or meaningful experiences with it.  
I also wonder if visuals that are more anti-programmatic could contribute to decreasing 
(at least our sense of) uncertainty. They may make people feel more secure and in control 
because they can be used to establish, at least, an aesthetic of intelligence. In other words, we 




may not know much, but let’s focus on what we do know. As opposed to sticking our collective 
heads in the sand, these visuals can be read as evidence of the (often scientific) work being done 
to better understand seismic activity. Did You Feel It? graphs, like Figure 14, create, at the least, 
an illusion of doing something, of knowledge-building, even if they don’t really position people 
as particularly powerful. Perhaps something useful (deliberative or not) is happening here, even 
if the visual itself is totalizing. Again, while I am skeptical that making people feel powerless is 
the most effective way to save lives, reducing the uncertainty of the situation to a more 
manageable level might also be important for catalyzing action.25 
But ultimately, interventionally, we need visuals that configure people as agentive, that 
help them to enroll in the program of action. An important part of doing that is first 
understanding how power is being shaped in and by these visuals and through what means. As 
this analysis has demonstrated, visuals in seismic risk communication most often configure 
people as passive in the face of seismic activity, though there are exceptions. These visuals make 
use of strategies like color, repetition, tone, realism, genre, and content to configure the 
relationships among actants and their potential for action. Understanding these visuals as 
rhetorical can help to dismantle the tendency to treat visuals as certain, as truth.  
However, this rhetorical nature is often masked by the perceived certainty of visuals. 
Indeed, one of the reasons why visuals are powerful and persuasive is because people think they 
are factual representations. Scholars such as Dragga and Voss (2001), Finnegan (2001), Kessler 
(2017), Walsh (2014), and Wysocki (2004, 2005) have challenged assumptions about the 
epistemic status of visuals, showing that they are crafted and designed. Joseph Dumit (2004) 
                                                            
25 That being said, it is worth noting that organizations such as FEMA have said that effective earthquake education 
“fosters uncertainty, causing people to wonder about their environment and to question their safety in it.” (FEMA, 
2013.) 
 




shows in his study of PET scan brain images that objects that make knowledge visible, as images 
do, are often treated as visual truth. Recognizing the tendency towards visual truth is important 
for considering how a particular visual might be received and interpreted.  
Arguably, this tendency becomes even more significant when considering scientific 
visuals that will travel outside technical spheres, given the strong objective qualities associated 
with scientific practices. Visuals crafted by experts are often offered as a scientific salve for 
collective anxieties in situations of risk or uncertainty, “implying that the knowledge embodied 
in these visualizations might mitigate the risks of natural disaster, although they had no such 
ability” (Weisenfeld, 2012, p. 9). Critiquing the fetishism of the map, Donna Haraway (2007) 
states that they “would seem to be a reliable foundation, free of troping, guaranteed by the purity 
of number and quantification, outside of yearning and stuttering” (135). Visuals, such as the 
hazard maps the L’Aquila scientists offer above, may seem to make things seem clear and under 
control, but “that kind of clarity and that kind of referentiality are god-tricks” (Haraway, 2007, p. 
135). 
Challenging this perception may ultimately bolster expert-public communication and 
relationships by helping to curb what historian of science Naomi Oreskes noted as a more 
general societal expectation of “god-like omniscience and certainty in matters of earthquakes,” 
an expectation that I surmise may be reinforced by the growing presence of visuals in risk 
communication (36). Additionally, if users and designers can recognize the rhetorical nature of 
these visuals, they can think critically about the choices being made and their potential 
ramifications.26 
                                                            
26  Fostering public agency in situations of risk and uncertainty may also require looking at how publics resist and 
reinvent more technical risk visuals in order to create different forms of knowledge and different agentive 
trajectories. These “cartographies of struggle,” as Donna Haraway (1997) has called them, are a response to the 
tendency of technical visuals to interpolate publics as subjects of expert knowledge and power.  




In recognizing this rhetorical-ness, a door is opened for considering what other choices 
might be made instead, how they might be designed differently, which is its own kind of 
agentiveness in the face of seismic hazard: “What kinds of new arguments are possible (for 
example) if writers of academic pages take more responsibility in choosing the visual 
presentations of their arguments? What sorts of relationships can a writer establish with readers 
through different visual presentations?” (Wysocki, 2004, p. 125). Though Wysocki is addressing 
academic writers in particular, her question (and challenge) can apply just as well to technical 
experts seeking to communicate with non-experts. The visuals in this study that most often 
configured people as having some power to act a) were infographics that b) had more complex 
networks of agential relationships that included both pro- and anti-programmatic action. It may 
be that infographics have certain affordances, such as being a more familiar genre or better able 
to handle complexity, that make them well-suited for seismic risk communication. This is not to 
say that all seismic, visual risk communication should be done via infographic. Rather, that this 
genre may point to communication strategies that are worth identifying and incorporating in a 
more intentional way.    
Configuring people as agentive, in this dataset, also entailed representing a complex 
network of agential relationships that included both pro- and anti-programmatic action. Despite 
tendencies to “simplify” technical situations, to “cut to the chase,” or even the desire to tidy up a 
messy and uncertain matter of concern, this finding suggests a need for retaining a certain level 
of complexity. Visuals themselves are often perceived as a strategy for simplification. But that 
does not mean they need to be simple. For example, Figure 11 reveals a visual (see Figure 17 for 
a selection from the original visual) that contains more intricate relationships between a range of 
actants and a balance of both pro- and anti- programmatic action. While not the greatest act of 




visual rhetoric, the infographic in Figure 17 retains a certain level of complexity. There is a give 
and take, a mutual shaping and intra-acting among a variety of components (Barad, 2007, p. 
235). There are multiple pathways and strategies for action. By representing a more complex 
program of action, seismic risk visuals can avoid the extremes of “falsely optimistic” and 
“doomed,” which creates greater opportunities for engagement and for multiple pathways and 
strategies for action. To return briefly to L’Aquila, if visuals such as seismic hazard maps are 
indeed “the only useful thing” for protecting people from seismic activity as Italian seismologist 
Giulio Selvaggi suggests (and fellow L’Aquila Seven member Enzo Boschi supports), it is 
Figure 17: Sample from infographic from the DPC’s The Civil Protection Handbook for 
Families 




critical that these visuals provide a framework for the right kinds of action. The results of this 
chapter’s analysis suggest one way forward.   
  




Conclusion: Picking up the Pieces 
 
The North Anatolian Fault extends for nearly a thousand miles across the northern edge 
of Turkey; in geologic circles, it’s regarded as a sister fault to the San Andreas in Southern 
California. They are the same length and located at plate boundaries that slide past each other 
horizontally; they also slip at an equivalent long-term rate and have “creeping” middle sections. 
Both have major cities along their lengths. For all their sisterliness, the two faults have key 
differences. Most importantly, the North Anatolian is isolated from other faults, and it ruptures 
progressively in segments, like falling dominos. The San Andreas, which lies close to other 
major faults, is less defined. On a map, it appears to be one long, sweeping curve. In truth, it is 
less a single line than a broad, complex zone of parallel cracks, ranging in width from a few 
hundred feet to almost a mile, which exert influence on one another and keep the entire area in a 
state of constant tension.  
Many dissertations might be more like the North Anatolian, advancing in a relatively 
linear progression, their chapters falling in succession like dominos. But this dissertation is more 
akin to the web of schisms that make up the San Andreas. There is a latticework of exigencies 
and variables that influence one another, often in ways that are difficult to untangle. So, if this 
work feels messy, that’s because it is. There is no “single, golden thread that winds its way 
through the whole” (Galison, 1997, p. 844). Instead, it advances piecewise. But in so doing, there 
is a lamination of material. As my case suggests, matters of concern in general and earthquakes 
specifically are difficult to write and talk about, especially in a linear fashion. This dissertation 
has not escaped that fact. This is also why we need new approaches.  
This project makes a case for developing scholarly approaches that better account for the 
complex and fraught nature of matters of concern in order to more clearly understand and 




address these particularly sticky material-discursive situations and the difficulties inherent in 
communicating about them. Such developments can contribute to bolstering expert-public 
communication and relationships and to saving future lives. “Better accounting” for matters of 
concern is necessarily multifaceted. One such facet includes integrating three key concepts in 
rhetorical studies on public-expert interaction – expertise, uncertainty, and agency. As I have 
shown, treating these concepts in isolation only gets rhetorical theory so far in its attempts to 
address matters of concern. I have attempted to begin the work of integrating these concepts in 
the rhetorical approaches I offer here.  
Each of the chapters of this dissertation offers possible ways forward. In Chapter 2, I 
offered an expertise of doing, which I apply to the L’Aquila controversy in order to show how 
practices shape what is known by various stakeholders and what is done. I argue that a practice-
based orientation can enrich conversations about expertise and inclusion in matters of concern, 
reconfiguring how we might act in such situations as well as who could or should act. In Chapter 
3, I applied a functional stasis analysis to the pivotal emergency meeting preceding the L’Aquila 
earthquake in order to better account for deliberative practices in uncertain science-policy 
controversies. I show how limiting deliberation to only credentialed experts in situations of deep 
uncertainty (i.e., handling the situation as a matter of fact) can lead to costly miscommunication 
and conflict between the deliberative practices and the expectations of the public. In Chapter 4, I 
explored the rhetorical, agentive nature of seismic risk visuals through agentive modeling in 
order to help make visible how these visuals act. Especially given the cultural power we attribute 
to images in general, these seismic risk visuals condition possibilities for response and action, 
with the most common narrative being one of passivity in the face of uncertain seismic activity.  




In advancing these new approaches, these chapters also work more implicitly to entangle 
expertise, uncertainty, and agency. I do not mean to suggest that all three concepts are taken up 
in equal measure in all chapters or that that was the goal. Rather, my aim was to open new 
avenues of inquiry by beginning the process of entanglement. On that point, I find Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle helpful to remember. This principle describes the relationship between the 
position and movement of subatomic particles, and the impossibility of simultaneously 
determining both. First proposed in 1927 by physicist Werner Heisenberg, it theorizes that the 
more precisely the position is determined, the less precisely the momentum is known in this 
instant, and vice versa. While this principle is not immediately relevant to earthquakes or 
rhetoric, it could easily apply to almost any area of inquiry. It speaks to the challenge of focusing 
on everything at once, which is an inherent challenge in matters of concern. This tension – 
between isolating and analyzing pieces of matters of concern and dealing with them together – is 
one that must continue to be negotiated. While such a feat may someday be possible, at this time, 
I must necessarily limit myself to more modest entanglements. Shuttling between different 
positions (isolation and various degrees of entanglement). 
While it may not be possible to focus on everything at once, the situation is such that 
expertise, uncertainty, and agency are entwined and do influence each other. As Barad and 
others have pointed out, entities (e.g., things, words, objects, subjects) are constituted through 
their mutual entanglement with other entities. For example, uncertainty matters and is given 
meaning because of its relationship with agency. As we see in the days before the L’Aquila 
earthquake, uncertainty has agency; it can propel action and engagement. Its presence in a 
decision-making situation raises questions about who has expertise and how to determine what 
expertise is needed let alone how to act and who or what is authorized to do so. While agency is 




often linked to having recognized expertise, it can also be extended to the previously 
marginalized by rethinking how expertise is defined. Indeed, it makes little sense to think about 
such an issue if one is not considering the relationship between expertise and agency. However, 
claiming expertise does not necessary confer agency, as Giuliani’s example demonstrates. 
Alternatively, as scholars advance new understandings of agency, like Pickering’s mangle or 
Barad’s intra-action, these have impact on how we conceptualize expertise and how we 
understand uncertainty. Like decision-making, visuals are yet another ideal artifact for unifying 
agency, expertise, and uncertainty because they can be used to visualize uncertainty, construct 
expertise, and condition possibilities for response or action as well as act themselves – all of 
which could be happening concurrently. As Mol (2002) states, in practice such concepts are not 
treated in isolation, and “it makes no sense to delegate them to separate layers of reality. They 
are all relevant and have to be somehow reckoned with together” (155). While Mol is referencing 
the different practices and specialties involved in medical care, her argument transfers quite 
nicely here if we think of concepts like expertise, agency, and uncertainty as different areas of 
inquiry involved in attending to matters of concern. Like pathology or radiology, these concepts 
encompass different knowledge and practices, offering distinct points of leverage and methods of 
intervention.  
Ultimately, the issues and questions raised here are left open. But surely, the first step is 
to consistently recognize that there are many entanglements in every action and situation. As 
Mol (2002) notes, open endings need not imply immobilization. Rather they indicate that there is 
work to be done. In the following discussion, I will suggest how this work can be extended and 
applied in other sites and, more generally, what this work might contribute to a more robust 




theory of rhetoric and interventional practices. In so doing, I hope to foster additional work on 
risk communication, science-policy decision making, and visual rhetorics.   
Ways Forward 
 
One of the primary future directions for work that extends this dissertation is continued 
thinking about what “better accounting” for matters of concern entails. Part of this work, I argue, 
will be to continue to address the pervasive dualistic thinking that has long been recognized as 
one of the most challenging theoretical problems in Western philosophy. Scholars such as 
Graham (2015), Gronnvoll (2013), Pickering (2010), and Barad (2007) have drawn attention to 
the ways in which the postmodern project, despite providing alternatives and solutions to 
Cartesian binaries, has not transcended but reinscribed dualisms by privileging subjects over 
objects, humans over nonhumans, language over matter, culture over nature, and so on. As these 
scholars contend and as L’Aquila has shown, the upholding of binaries can be both unproductive 
and damaging. But truly dismantling them – in theory, method, and reality – is no simple matter. 
My work here aims to reinforce a shift to excavating vestiges of dualistic thinking from 
rhetorical theory and tools so that scholars can deeply engage with matters of concern, making 
rhetoric more robust in the process. In some cases, this will take the form of adapting existing 
rhetorical tools (i.e., functional stasis analysis) and in others it may require more novel 
innovation.  
 In particular, better accounting for matters of concern also entails continuing to explore 
the material alongside the discursive. Rhetoricians have successfully demonstrated that risk is 
socially constructed and that risk communication is a “difficult rhetorical enterprise that requires 
many different actors” (Danisch 174). But to render risk as a matter of discourse ignores the 




physical, material reality of it.27 One way this dissertation could be extended would be to more 
directly address the brute reality of seismicity. At times, I have mentioned and briefly discussed 
the material force of earthquakes, but these discussions have merely skimmed the surface of 
what a more thorough engagement with new materialism might produce. For example, how 
might earthquakes help us better understand matter’s dynamic and sometimes resistant capacities 
(and thus enrich our thinking about agency)? What might be the rhetorical agency of an 
earthquake? More direct attention to vibrant materiality in matters of concern may require some 
methodological revisions. For example, one tool often used to help account for nonhuman actors 
is the network metaphor of ANT. While useful in many ways, it is limited in its ability to grasp 
situations that cannot be conceptualized as linear connection of nodes.  
 Materially, this dissertation’s work could also be extended to attend more deeply to lived 
experience. As Fountain (2014) affirms, “We perceive, think, move, and feel through our whole 
bodily interactions and corporeal entanglements with the world around us…we are an 
assemblage made of bodies, objects, documents, discourses, and displays” (49). If this is the 
case, then there is an increasing need to understand peoples’ embodied experiences if we are to 
better account for matters of concern. In the context of seismic activity, this is particularly 
relevant given the bodily experience of seismicity and seismology’s extended efforts to erase 
bodies. But these embodied experiences are recurring for those living in seismically active areas. 
Following Sauer’s (2003) work on mine safety, rhetoricians might work to capture the lived 
experience of those residing in seismically active areas in order to improve safety through more 
                                                            
27 This is not to say that language and culture do not influence or engage with matter or that materiality should be 
privileged over language. As Coole and Frost (2010) argue, “society is simultaneously materially real and socially 
constructed…the challenge here is to give materiality its due while recognizing its plural dimensions and its 
complex, contingent modes of appearing” (27). Rhetoricians must continue to navigate the tension between 
language and materiality, to find ways to be with both. See Graham (2015), Mol (2002), Barad (2007), Bennett 
(2010). 




effective documentation and engagement mechanisms. Alternatively, if we know that individuals 
are motivated by local concerns, personal experiences, and values, then what kinds of risk 
communication can tap into such motivations?  
In the L’Aquila controversy, the voices of those who lived through the 2009 earthquake 
have been some of the least heard and, Pietrucci (2016) argues, most misrepresented. 
Foregrounding the lived experiences of the Aquilani, especially those involved in the trial, would 
provide an opportunity to improve our understanding of the controversial case but also produce a 
richer representation of the local experience of public communication of risk in L’Aquila prior to 
the earthquake. It would provide a chance to explore different rhetorical possibilities or 
opportunities that arise in specific contexts as well as the interrelatedness of public discourse, 
embodied experiences, nonhuman persuasion, and the ways spaces and places affect civic 
engagement.  
Finally, in continuing to develop theory and interventions to better account for these 
messy material-discursive situations, rhetoricians must persist in asking “how to responsibly 
explore entanglements” (Barad, 2007, p. 74). How should we go about conducting this work? 
What do these cases require? For whom or what? How does that change by context? As the trials 
in the L’Aquila case suggest, part of better accounting for matters of concern takes on an ethical 
bent. Where does responsibility rest? Accountability becomes muddied as humans meddle more 
vigorously in natural processes (and in the case of earthquakes, contribute to human-induced 
seismicity) but also as nonhumans are increasingly recognized as actants. Who or what should be 
taken as the subjects and objects of ethical, legal, or political action? How will long-standing 
rhetorical concepts like epideictic rhetoric, with its emphasis on praise and blame, be impacted 
by evolving understandings of expertise, agency, and uncertainty?  




 Another path not taken here is examining the insights L’Aquila could provide on the role 
of science in decision making and policy. The L’Aquila case brings into sharp relief many of the 
issues under discussion in this area of research – what is the proper role of the expert in these 
contexts? If certainty is unattainable, how can scientists better act? How do we integrate expert 
knowledge with democratic processes that value public decision making? How can and do 
publics assert their own decision-making roles? The addition of the trial and manslaughter 
charges heightens the stakes. (See Walsh (2013) for extended discussion and her review of 
various models, including reinforcing the is/ought divide, the progressive model, the education 
model, and the “more seats for non-experts” model). 
  
Beyond L’Aquila 
 This case study of L’Aquila is, in many ways, a forensic analysis of failure. As such, the 
lines of inquiry established here could be productively extended by juxtaposing it with less 
circumscribed cases. One artifact of the case I’ve chosen is that the science of risk and the 
emphasis on (and hunger for) seismic prediction emphasizes specific technical and quantifiably 
criteria and patterns of reasoning that dominate public imagination. But what about wicked 
problems that defy such patterns and have no clear decision even in retrospect? How might 
issues of expertise, uncertainty, and agency look different in cases of environmental policy and 
risk, sustainability, or community development, for which an answer, such as it might be, might 
be 20 years in coming? Even more so than L’Aquila, such cases highlight clashes in values as 
well as epistemic issues. 
 The communication failures exemplified in the case of L’Aquila might also be 
productively juxtaposed with examples of success. As Walker (2014) points out, there is an 
overwhelming tendency in rhetorical studies to focus on how communications fail or might have 




been done better. This dissertation is no exception. But, Walker (2014) asserts, “rhetorical 
engagements in public science communication can benefit from providing examples of success” 
(4). The primary benefit he suggests is inspiring scientific audiences that they too can have 
successful communications, which might in turn aid rhetoricians’ attempts at engagement. 
Particularly in light of the potentially chilling message the L’Aquila trial sends to scientific 
experts, circulating examples of success is critical, not just for providing inspiration but also for 
developing best practices.28  
Visual Extensions 
 The work I have begun here with seismic risk visuals could be productively continued in 
several ways. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, my analysis of the dataset is not calibrated 
with viewer/user reactions. Conducting reception studies would provide insight about how 
exactly these visuals are contributing to, as Wysocki describes it, the “thick work [of] shaping 
how we see space and time and ourselves” (Fleckenstein, Hum, & Calendrillo, 2007, p. 83). 
Given the results of Chapter 4, a focus on infographics and social media might be particularly 
fruitful in order to better understand how to motivate risk-reducing actions and sustainable 
behaviors. Additionally, looking to successful risk visuals like hurricane probability maps may 
also provide insight. Simply visualizing complex scientific information to a public audience 
(e.g., mapping hazard levels) is insufficient because it lacks engaging, human components 
(Dragga & Voss, 2001). This information could then be used by rhetoricians to develop or refine 
communication and engagement efforts.  
                                                            
28 Such work is also in line with recent publications in science policy literature, which suggests that science policy 
scholars who see to improve decision making in the context of deep scientific uncertainty should “look [for] 
empirical examples that work in certain situations and provide them not as recommendations but as options in a 
range of alternatives” that can be utilized in developing science policy, adapt as needed, or attempted and possibly 
disregarded (Logar, 2011, p. 264).  




 To be clear, my goal is not necessarily to help non-experts read risk visuals more like 
scientists. That is a technocratic outcome, and it requires a whole set of cultural affordances that 
can neither be administered to viewers like a vaccine nor fixed with the bandage of a color scale 
change on the USGS side. But if we can move past this kind of deficit model thinking, we can 
begin to advocate for and design hazard assessments and visuals that are more meaningful and 
real to non-experts, that better account for the whole story of “hazard.”29   
  Additionally, future scholarship that directly engages methodologies for non-iconic 
visuals seems particularly important as the field moves toward interventional goals. Much of the 
visual rhetorical scholarship I have drawn upon (e.g., Gries, 2015), while incredibly insightful 
and helpful in my thinking, focuses on iconic images.30 But none of the images in my dataset are 
iconic. How might some of the insights from new materialist-visual work such as Gries’ be 
modified for studying non-iconic images or visuals that have developed in response to repeat 
situations? As Bazerman and Miller describe in their discussion of genres, “If a community or 
communities encounters the same class of crisis over and over again – such as natural disaster or 
foreign invasion – they predictably develop standard responses to it” (Walsh, 2013, p. 35-36). 
Though Bazerman and Miller do not specify, these responses could arguably include visual ones. 
Surely, visuals that develop in response to recurring situations (visuals that are perhaps more 
mundane and widespread) can mediate and live rhetorical lives just as iconic ones do, rhetorical 
                                                            
29 As L’Aquila (among other cases) shows, some of the impacts of natural hazards, which are brutal for some 
inhabitants (particularly marginalized ones) are not shared by technocratic organizations like the USGS or the DPC 
(e.g., power staying cut-off to low income housing for much longer than high-income in the heat of summer, or 
groceries making it to Beverly Hills but not Compton for weeks). Primary concerns of these organizations, like lost 
real estate and damage to national security and public infrastructures are important but not the whole story.   
30 Iconic a la Hariman and Lucaites (2007): “images appearing in print, electronic, or digital media that are widely 
recognized and remembered, are understood to be representations of historically significant events, activate 
strong emotional identification or response, and are reproduced across a range of media, genres, or topics” (27).  




lives that are equally if not more important to understand because of their accessibility and 
presence. 
Not By Theory Alone   
 
Communication about matters of concern remains a particularly difficult challenge. But I 
see this challenge as a window of opportunity for research and action – a kairotic moment. As 
Crowley and Hawhee (2004) describe in their work on kairos, for ancient rhetoricians like 
Isocrates, “the urgency and currency of a situation demands action” (40). Critical engagement, in 
other words, is not just the current trend; it is part of the rhetorical tradition. This early call to 
involvement and intervention is echoed in contemporary rhetorical work. Ceccarelli (2013), for 
example, calls rhetoricians to more overtly address how they engage in public scholarship in 
order to more effectively transform scholarly findings into action in non-academic fora. She is 
joined in this call to turn rhetorical theory, concepts, and findings into practical strategies and 
tools by a number of contemporary scholars (Druschke, 2014; Goodwin, 2014; Herndl & Cutlip, 
2013; Parks, 2014; Walker, 2014). I am invigorated by this ancient and contemporary resolve 
that our task as rhetoricians is multifaceted. We must both criticize and construct; we must be 
willing to identify the problem and work to recommend solutions. In light of the L’Aquila 
controversy, with its palpable material consequences, it seems clear that these kinds of situations 
cannot be left to theoretical work alone.  
Therefore, an additional purpose of this chapter is to begin to transform the insights from 
this dissertation into a few practical suggestions for those engaged in communication and 
deliberation about seismic risk (with the intention of scaffolding civic agency and designing 
spaces of interaction). These suggestions are five-fold: 1) disrupt the promise of closure; 2) meet 




people where they are; 3) recognize that visuals do real, rhetorical work; 4) make use of “peace 
time”; and 5) reconcile expertise and citizenship.  
1. Disrupt the promise of closure. In matters of earthquakes, much of society seems to 
expect god-like omniscience and certainty. Accordingly, much of the discourse focuses 
on prediction – will or won’t there be an earthquake? But that question as well as the 
question of what to do is unlikely to be resolved with facts. Experts need to resist 
answering “yes or no” questions because seismology cannot provide those kinds of 
answers. As seen in L’Aquila, making reassuring or trivial statements, both of which tend 
to provide closure and certainty, can be incredibly problematic. Instead, experts should 
acknowledge scientific uncertainties while still speaking to what is known. Information 
should be publically available, with uncertainties clearly expressed, during periods of 
normal seismicity as well as during seismic crises. People expect experts to be certain, 
but when they are not, it can cause people to pay more attention and think more deeply 
about what is going on. Additionally, by not making unfulfillable promises of closure, 
experts can work to build trust with public audiences. 
2. Meet people where they are – communicatively. Experts (e.g., politicians, civil 
servants, and scientists) need to do a better job of meeting non-expert stakeholders where 
they are. Too often, experts speak strictly on technical terms and, in the case of L’Aquila, 
adopt a paternalistic approach to communication. Instead, experts should consider what 
sorts of motivations, decisions, and needs non-expert stakeholders have; they should 
listen to and inquire about the concerns, questions, and positions held by non-experts. 
Organizations like the DPC or the USGS might be primarily concerned with the cost of 
lost real estate and infrastructure, but a sole emphasis on those concerns may only be 




partially effective. Particularly in the case of seismic risk, disaster is universal but it is 
also particular and embodied (Coen, 2013; Weisenfeld, 2012). So, more than the issue of 
making scientific findings more accessible (i.e., content delivery), experts need to 
understand local hazard conditions, locally available resources, and local experience 
when thinking about how to best communicate about seismic risk with non-experts. 
3. Recognize that visuals do real, rhetorical work. Understanding the rhetorical nature of 
visuals is central to grasping their possibilities and challenges, to taking them seriously. 
Visuals crafted by experts are often offered as a scientific salve for collective anxieties in 
situations of risk or uncertainty, “implying that the knowledge embodied in these 
visualizations might mitigate the risks of natural disaster, although they had no such 
ability” (Weisenfeld, 2012, p. 9). As the previous chapter shows (along with other 
scholars), visuals do real work; they are not secondary or add-ons. There are choices to 
be made when creating a visual, and those choices (as represented in and by the visual) 
will have impact. Contrasting this perspective against more traditional approaches to 
visuals prompts the question: “What kinds of new arguments are possible (for example) if 
writers of academic pages take more responsibility in choosing the visual presentations of 
their arguments? What sorts of relationships can a writer establish with readers through 
different visual presentations?” (Wysocki, 2004, p. 3). Though Wysocki is addressing 
academic writers in particular, her question (and challenge) can apply just as well to 
technical experts seeking to communicate with non-experts. By understanding the 
rhetorical nature of visuals and taking an active role in their design, experts can begin to 
lay the groundwork for designing and deploying usefully persuasive graphics. 




4. Make use of “peace time.” In many communities, seismicity is a recurring event. And 
while any seismic situation is necessarily unique and must be treated as such, experts can 
draw upon the typical responses, needs, and motivations that affect stressed stakeholders 
to develop possible responses. Crafted without the pressures of a seismic crisis on hand, 
these typified responses can be adapted to a particular context as needed and circulated 
rapidly. One example is responses to earthquake prediction claims. Imagine if in 
L’Aquila, rather than a knee-jerk reaction to silence Giuliani, the DPC had deployed 
some version of a proactively designed response, one in which scientific, governmental, 
and communication experts had collaborated. The ‘prediction effect’ brought on by 
Giuliani might have been diffused. With less pressure for immediate responses and 
action, communities can work to provide publics with open sources of information at 
regular intervals, not just during seismic crises. 
The interludes between increases in seismic activity are also opportunities to 
engage in more holistic approaches to planning and reducing risks across environmental, 
social, economic, and political landscapes. “Peace time” provides an opportunity to build 
a shared understanding of risks, consequences, and options. Adaptions, like constructing 
new infrastructure, reorganizing vulnerable systems, or retrofitting existing infrastructure, 
take time to plan, design, agree upon, fund, and implement. But a shared understanding 
among key stakeholders can help to streamline a community’s efforts to become more 
earthquake-resilient. One way to do this is by holding events or workshops that bring 
together stakeholders with different perspectives to facilitate conversation and co-
produce strategies and/or policy. To help catalyze robust dialogue around difficult topics, 
event facilitators can identify key boundary objects (e.g., maps, simulations, decision-




making software, concepts) to guide and focus discussion. (See, for example, Wilson & 
Herndl, 2007). 
5. Reconcile expertise and citizenship. A commonly voiced challenge for science-policy 
decision making is to recognize that publics can have expertise. This dissertation 
certainly echoes that point. But it is also important for science-policy decision making 
that experts be recognized as citizens. In their attempts to remain objective and protect 
their ethos, scientific experts often compartmentalize their identities (Walsh, 2009). But, 
at the end of the day, scientists are people who are connected to local communities. As 
such, they, as fellow citizens, have a certain level of accountability to that community 
both in their scientific work and in their clear communication about their work. As 
members of the L’Aquila Seven have pointed out during the trials, they did not directly 
contribute to the false information or reassuring messages distributed to the Aquilani. But 
neither did speak up to correct it. So, in this case there is a reversal – instead of protecting 
their credibility by being detached, scientists could have protected it by being involved. I 
do not mean to suggest that scientific experts should always have their citizen hat on. The 
roles we all play necessarily shift depending on the rhetorical situation. But we do need to 
make room for expertise and citizenship to co-exist – because in reality, they do, but also 
because we need them to if we are to ethically address matters of concern. And while I 
am primarily thinking about scientists here, this point applies to political and 
governmental experts, too. Political officials also have a responsibility to communicate 
risks to their fellow citizens, though in their case, without sacrificing the science to 
politically palatable messages. Political and technical discourses can be understood as 




more than just managing public issues; they can also be fundamental acts of what Asen 




The questions and the issues raised over the course of this project have lead me into 
complicated theoretical terrain. The case and examples I have examined in this project offer 
insights in a number of areas of study, as I have previously suggested. In this concluding chapter, 
I have attempted to provide readers with academic fodder and move our discipline a little further 
toward drawing practical conclusions from our complex theories. I am confident that the 
approaches advocated for in this dissertation lay the groundwork for more directly interventional 
work. Such a movement to engagement is not only possible but an important part of the 
rhetorical tradition. And as L’Aquila (and subsequent central Italian earthquakes in 2016) shows, 
even nations on the forefront of seismic research, with comparatively sophisticated disaster 
preparedness, need to realize that much more work remains to be done. These are pressing 
opportunities for rhetoricians interested in science-policy deliberation. In the end, I hope this 
project motivates rhetoricians of science to continue theoretical and applied work on MOCs.  
Reporters, scientists, bloggers, scholars and more have been quick to point to the lessons 
learned from L’Aquila. They cite lessons about risk communication, about ethics, about 
relationships between science and politics, between science and the public; many fear that 
scientists will take a lesson in “clamming up.” But L’Aquila, like any matter of concern, resists 
closure and easy conclusions. Perhaps its greatest lesson is one we have yet to learn - how to live 
with uncertainty.  Uncertainty, which we’ve always lived with, is magnified immediately before 
and after major earthquakes. But it recedes after a time, like the memory in this country of the 
San Francisco earthquake of 1906. While the L’Aquila controversy is still fresh in our minds, my 




hope is that this dissertation can catalyze changes in our understanding and actions towards 
disaster. L’Aquila is but one of many reminders that we exist in a geologic time and in a world 
where catastrophic events beyond our predicting may occur, that we exist precariously on the 
surface of this volatile planet. Seismology may not be able to provide us with the answers we 
desire. But that doesn’t mean we should not “seek…worthwhile ways of living with the real” 
(Mol, 2002, p. 158).  
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